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The Scientific World JOURNAL

Two-Cloud-Servers-Assisted Secure Outsourcing Multiparty Computation

Yi Sun, Qiaoyan Wen, Yudong Zhang, Hua Zhang, Zhengping Jin, Wenmin Li

Published Jan 1, 2014• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We focus on how to securely outsource computation task to the cloud and propose a secure outsourcing multiparty computation protocol on lattice-based encrypted data in two-cloud-servers scenario. Our main idea is to transform the outsourced data respectively encrypted by different users' public keys to the ones that are encrypted by the same two private keys of the two assisted servers so that it is feasible to operate on the transformed ciphertexts to compute an encrypted result following the function to be computed. In order to keep the privacy of the result, the two servers cooperatively produce a custom-made result for each user that is authorized to get the result so that all authorized users can recover the desired result while other unauthorized ones including the two servers cannot. Compared with previous research, our protocol is completely noninteractive between any users, and both of the computation and the communication complexities of each user in our solution are independent of the computing function.

DOI
10.1155/2014/413265

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We focus on how to securely outsource computation task to the cloud and propose a secure outsourcing multiparty computation protocol on lattice-based encrypted data in two-cloud-servers scenario. Our main idea is to transform the outsourced data respectively encrypted by different users' public keys to the ones that are encrypted by the same two private keys of the two assisted servers so that it is feasible to operate on the transformed ciphertexts to compute an encrypted result following the function to be computed. In order to keep the privacy of the result, the two servers cooperatively produce a custom-made result for each user that is authorized to get the result so that all authorized users can recover the desired result while other unauthorized ones including the two servers cannot. Compared with previous research, our protocol is completely noninteractive between any users, and both of the computation and the communication complexities of each user in our solution are independent of the computing function.
The emergence of cloud computing provides a new computing paradigm for users -- massive and complex computing tasks can be outsourced to cloud servers. However, the privacy issues also follow. Fully homomorphic encryption shows great potential in privacy-preserving computation, yet it is not ready for practice. At present, secure multiparty computation (MPC) remains mainly approach to deal with sensitive data. In this paper, following the secret sharing based MPC paradigm, we propose a secure 2-party computation scheme, in which cloud servers can securely evaluate functions with high efficiency. We first propose the multiplicative secret sharing (MSS) based on typical additive secret sharing (ASS). Then, we design protocols to switch shared secret between MSS and ASS, based on which a series of protocols for comparison and nearly all of the elementary functions are proposed. We prove that all the proposed protocols are Universally Composable secure in the honest-but-curious model. Finally, we will show the remarkable progress of our protocols on both communication efficiency and functionality completeness.
Outsourcing computation to cloud server has recently become popular in cloud computing. Cloud computing technologies enable clients with limited computational resources to outsource their massive computations to powerful cloud servers. Outsourcing computation has some new concerns, such as outsourced data and result privacy, verifiability and efficiency. Matrix multiplication is one of the most basic computational problems. In this paper, we are motivated to design a secure and efficient protocol for outsourcing the massive matrix multiplication computations to the cloud server. The existing works are mostly under amortized model that have an expensive phase as offline mode. Our proposed scheme does not have any expensive phase. So the client can outsource its matrices in online mode in which the efficiency of outsourcing will be increased. In our scheme, the client encrypts two matrices and sends them to a semi-honest cloud server. The cloud server computes matrix multiplication and a proof. After that, it sends the encrypted result to the client and finally the client checks the validity of the computation and decrypts the result. Our proposed scheme achieves privacy protection of outsourced data and multiplication result, unforgeability of proof, verification and high efficiency.
Web-servers are a dominant medium of modern communication and thus process vast amounts of highly sensitive, private data. Social networks, online auctions, and all kinds of cloud services constitute popular examples of online services complying with this paradigm. Due to many alarming scandals regarding the misuse of private data, IT security solutions protecting this sensitive data (for example by hiding it through encryption) are indispensable. Ideally, web-servers should be able to compute on private data without seeing it - we refer to this as the "Secure Outsourcing of Computation". Most notably, the cryptographic primitive of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) enables the web-servers to process data in the encrypted domain, which thereby hides/protects all private data as it is never available in the clear. More precisely, HE is a type of encryption that allows for the computation of certain functionalities on encrypted data without knowledge of the decryption key. Depending on the HE scheme, various functionalities can be evaluated in the encrypted domain, ranging from additions or multiplications only (Group Homomorphic Encryption, GHE), to virtually any computable functionality (Fully Homomorphic Encryption, FHE). We provide a clean foundational framework for HE that permits security characterizations for a large class of HE schemes and shows strong similarities between GHE and FHE. We study these characterizations in order to assess the limits of HE, and show that GHE is obsolete in the quantum world, meaning that any GHE scheme can be broken by a quantum computer. Together with our newly constructed universal blueprint that encompasses virtually any GHE scheme, we know exactly how these schemes must be designed and what the underlying hardness assumptions must look like. To some extent, this rounds off the topic of GHE both in the standard and quantum model of computation. In the standard model (which is presently assumed to be the most realistic model of computation), GHE is still highly attractive as it provides very efficient solutions to a variety of practical problems. On the basis of our foundational framework, we construct new GHE schemes with unique features and show their employability in practical applications. Most importantly, we use the special features of one of these schemes and develop a novel technique to achieve a practically efficient solution to the problem of securely outsourcing computations. Our construction allows multiple users to send encryptions of their private data under their own keys to a distrusted web-server that can then, on behalf of the users, evaluate any dynamically chosen computable function on these inputs in the encrypted domain (even across encryptions under different public keys) without learning anything at all, and without interacting with the users.
Outsourced secure multiparty computation (SMC) protocols allow resource-constrained devices to execute input-private computation with great efficiency. Unfortunately, existing outsourced SMC protocols require that all parties know the function being evaluated, precluding applications where the function itself must remain private. We develop the first linear-complexity protocols for outsourcing private function evaluation (PFE), SMC protocols that provide input and function privacy. Assuming a semi-honest function holder, we build on existing two-party PFE constructions to develop outsourced protocols that are secure against a semi-honest, covert, or malicious outsourcing server and malicious mobile participants. To do this, we develop a garbling technique for combining public and private sub-circuits in a single computation. This allows us to apply auxiliary checks for malicious behaviour using only free-XOR gates. These protocols demonstrate the feasibility of outsourced PFE and provide a first step towards privacy-preserving applications for use in cloud computing.
We give improved protocols for the secure and private outsourcing of linear algebra computations, that enable a client to securely outsource expensive algebraic computations (like the multiplication of large matrices) to a remote server, such that the server learns nothing about the customer's private input or the result of the computation, and any attempted corruption of the answer by the server is detected with high probability. The computational work performed at the client is linear in the size of its input and does not require the client to locally carry out any expensive encryptions of such input. The computational burden on the server is proportional to the time complexity of the current practically used algorithms for solving the algebraic problem (e.g., proportional to n3 for multiplying two n x n matrices). The improvements we give are: (i) whereas the previous work required more than one remote server and assumed they do not collude, our solution works with a single server (but readily accommodates many, for improved performance); (ii) whereas the previous work required a server to carry out expensive cryptographic computations (e.g., homomorphic encryptions), our solution does not make use of any such expensive cryptographic primitives; and (iii) whereas in previous work collusion by the servers against the client revealed to them the client's inputs, our scheme is resistant to such collusion. As in previous work, we maintain the property that the scheme enables the client to detect any attempt by the server(s) at corruption of the answer, even when the attempt is collusive and coordinated among the servers.