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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)

Hilary Putnam

Published Sep 10, 2005• 99 citations
Publisher

Abstract

‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’ (Putnam [1965]) explained why the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a philosophical problem in detail, but with only the necessary minimum of technicalities, in the hope of making the difficulties intelligible to as wide an audience as possible. When I wrote it, I had not seen Bell ([1964]), nor (of course) had I seen Ghirardi et al. ([1986]). And I did not discuss the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation. For all these reasons, I have decided to make a similar attempt forty years later, taking account of additional interpretations and of our knowledge concerning non-locality. (The Quantum Logical interpretation proposed in Putnam [1968] is not considered in the present paper, however, because Putnam [1994b] concluded that it was unworkable.) Rather than advocate a particular interpretation, this paper classifies the possible kinds of interpretation, subject only to the constraints of a very broadly construed scientific realism. Section 7 does, however, argue that two sorts of interpretation—ones according to which a ‘collapse’ is brought about by the measurement (e.g. the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation), and the Many Worlds interpretation or interpretations—should be ruled out. The concluding section suggests some possible morals of a cosmological character. 1. Background 2. Scientific realism is the premise of my discussion 3. What ‘quantum mechanics’ says—and some problems 4. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics 5. The problem of Einstein's bed 6. Classification of the possible kinds of interpretation 7. Which interpretations I think we can rule out 8. The ‘moral’ of this discussion

DOI
10.1093/bjps/axi135

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The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.

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Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. 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Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations

Another Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics, or What Quantum Theory Is Not

Nancy Delaney Cartwright

In 1965 Hilary Putnam published the standard work on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a piece that all philosophers of quantum mechanics of the time had to come to terms with. He laid out one-by-one in a clear non-technical way each of the available approaches to the problem and explained, again non-technically but very

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 24, 2005•1 citation
‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’ (Putnam [1965]) explained why the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a philosophical problem in detail, but with only the necessary minimum of technicalities, in the hope of making the difficulties intelligible to as wide an audience as possible. When I wrote it, I had not seen Bell ([1964]), nor (of course) had I seen Ghirardi et al. ([1986]). And I did not discuss the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation. For all these reasons, I have decided to make a similar attempt forty years later, taking account of additional interpretations and of our knowledge concerning non-locality. (The Quantum Logical interpretation proposed in Putnam [1968] is not considered in the present paper, however, because Putnam [1994b] concluded that it was unworkable.) Rather than advocate a particular interpretation, this paper classifies the possible kinds of interpretation, subject only to the constraints of a very broadly construed scientific realism. Section 7 does, however, argue that two sorts of interpretation—ones according to which a ‘collapse’ is brought about by the measurement (e.g. the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation), and the Many Worlds interpretation or interpretations—should be ruled out. The concluding section suggests some possible morals of a cosmological character. 1. Background 2. Scientific realism is the premise of my discussion 3. What ‘quantum mechanics’ says—and some problems 4. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics 5. The problem of Einstein's bed 6. Classification of the possible kinds of interpretation 7. Which interpretations I think we can rule out 8. The ‘moral’ of this discussion
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
For over a century, scientists have been fascinated by the strange behaviour of matter at the quantum level, where particles can exist in many states at once and affect each other instantly across distances. This paper explores this realm of quantum mechanics by focusing on wave–particle duality, superposition, entanglement and the measurement problem. It shows how these concepts defy the foundations of clas-sical physics to challenge assumptions about determinism, locality, interconnection and objectivity. The paper maintains that although quantum theory works remarkably well, we lack a clear account of what kind of reality it describes, as major interpretations such as Copenhagen, Many-Worlds and objective collapse still struggle to match quantum theory’s success with a clear picture of reality. yet as its major interpretations offer com-peting and unresolved pictures of the world. Schrödinger’s cat illustrates this tension to showcase how macroscopic systems can expose the limits of observation and the line be-tween classical and quantum worlds. The paper concludes that these quantum principles are underpinned by both technical and philosophical challenges and they force us to re-think causality and the role of the observer in explaining reality.
The Einstein Podolsky and Rosen argument labeling quantum mechanics as an ‘incomplete theory’ is revisited, and it is shown that one of its premises is incompatible with the physics of measurement uncertainties. Bell’s criticism toward quantum mechanics is discussed in detail and contrasted with the opinion of well-known practitioners of quantum mechanics such as Born, Dirac, Feynman, Lamb, and Ward. A discussion on hidden variable theories is given, and it is indicated that these theories have features that make them non-quantum mechanical. The argument is made that the so-called ‘quantum measurement problem’ is not a practical problem but a conceptual problem of those who believe in the ‘collapse of the wave function.’ In turn, it is explained that the ‘collapse of the wave function’ is completely unnecessary from a quantum interference and quantum entanglement perspective. The chapter continues to explain the physical bases of quantum entanglements and concludes advocating for a pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics devoid of philosophical prejudices. Instead, a philosophical approach based on the very indeterminism of quantum mechanics is proposed.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.