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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

Identity versus determinism: Émile Meyerson׳s neo-Kantian interpretation of the quantum theory

M. Anthony Mills

Published May 4, 2014• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsb.2014.03.005

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Grete Hermann’s philosophical work on the foundations of quantum mechanics has recently received increased attention and appreciation. This includes her critique of John von Neumann’s “no hidden variables” proof and her neo-Kantian considerations on causality. I argue that Hermann, who was a German mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, took a critical view of Leonard Nelson’s interpretation of Kant. Her aim was to challenge Nelson’s dogmatism through her interpretation of quantum physics. Support for this thesis can be found in her interpretation of Bohr’s complementarity principle and her criticism of Heisenberg’s cut and von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Over the years, Hermann progressively distanced herself from Nelson, adopting a more liberal and democratic interpretation of Kant, and became a committed advocate of research ethics and responsibility in science and politics.
This chapter repeats for quantum mechanics the comparison carried out for relativity in Chapter 5. Its thesis is that the same three interpretative families, neo-Kantian, empiricist and scientific realist, reappear in the philosophical reception of quantum mechanics, but in a more radical form, because the dispute now reaches the meaning of the quantum state, of probability and of measurement. The chapter first identifies what the formalism established in Chapter 4 leaves open and treats the Copenhagen framework as a point of departure rather than a unified doctrine. It then reconstructs the neo-Kantian interpretation (the Kantian affinities of Bohr’s complementarity, Cassirer, Grete Hermann and contemporary transcendental perspectives), the empiricist interpretation (Heisenberg’s observability principle, instrumentalism, Schlick, Frank, Reichenbach and van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) and, on equal terms, the realist interpretation: Einstein and the EPR argument, Popper’s propensities, the de Broglie–Bohm theory, Bell’s beables and local causality, realist modal interpretations, and the Everett and collapse programmes. The realist family is the most developed of the three in quantum mechanics, but it is also internally plural: it affirms that the theory refers to a mind-independent reality while disagreeing about whether that reality consists of particles, fields, propensities, branching worlds or definite and possible properties. On this basis the chapter compares the three interpretations of causality and of stationary action. Causality appears as a relativized condition of objective description, as a statistical relation without surplus content, or as an objective but non-local structure; stationary action appears as a coordination axiom of quantum dynamics, as an empirically equivalent formulation, or as a real dynamical structure that in Bohm’s theory directly guides motion. The result confirms the pattern of Chapter 5 and identifies the precise point, the relation between quantum possibility and actuality, from which the BBMT bridge of Chapter 7 will start.