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Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE

Toward quantum-ensured privacy and voting

Mark S. Hillery

Published Aug 31, 2006• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A number of schemes that use quantum mechanics to preserve privacy are presented. In particular, anonymous broadcast channels, voting, and secure function evaluation are discussed. It is found that entangled quantum states can be useful in maintaining privacy.
DOI
10.1117/12.675272

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We present a number of schemes that use quantum mechanics to preserve privacy, in particular, we show that entangled quantum states can be useful in maintaining privacy. We further develop our original proposal [see M. Hillery, M. Ziman, V. Bu\ifmmode \check{z}\else \v{z}\fi{}ek, and M. Bielikov\'a, Phys. Lett. A 349, 75 (2006)] for protecting privacy in voting, and examine its security under certain types of attacks, in particular dishonest voters and external eavesdroppers. A variation of these quantum-based schemes can be used for multiparty function evaluation. We consider functions corresponding to group multiplication of NNN group elements, with each element chosen by a different party. We show how quantum mechanics can be useful in maintaining the privacy of the choices group elements.
We describe quantum protocols for voting and surveying. A key feature of our schemes is the use of entangled states to ensure that the votes are anonymous and to allow the votes to be tallied. The entanglement is distributed over separated sites; the physical inaccessibility of any one site is sufficient to guarantee the anonymity of the votes. The security of these protocols with respect to various kinds of attack is discussed. We also discuss classical schemes and show that our quantum voting protocol represents a NNN-fold reduction in computational complexity, where NNN is the number of voters.
Recent advances at Google, IBM, as well as a number of research groups indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by the ever more realistic threat quantum computers pose to existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist "quantum attacks". In particular, for electronic voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. In this paper, we systematize and evaluate the security of suggested e-voting protocols based on quantum technology. We examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identified specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and in a more general lack of reference to the existing cryptographic literature.
Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist “quantum attacks.” In particular, for electronic voting (e-voting), several schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims that are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. To address this, we propose the first formal security definitions for quantum e-voting protocols. With these at hand, we systematize and evaluate the security of previously proposed quantum e-voting protocols; we examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness, and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identify specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and references to the existing cryptographic literature.
Classical approaches to encoding information generally rely on using encryption protocols that are difficult for computers to crack, because the required mathematical operations are prohibitively slow on classical computers. However, the same encryption protocols will not work when quantum computers are developed, because these mathematical operations are much easier for them. Therefore, new protocols must be developed if information transfer is to be secure in a world where quantum computers are in use. [Bennett and Shor][1] discuss recent advances in this field, through which theory has caught up with experiment in quantum cryptography. [1]: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/short/284/5415/747