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Philosophy of Science

Continuity, A Key to Quantum Mechanics

Alfred Landé

Published Apr 1, 1953• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The present article is written by a theoretical physicist who, for some time, has endeavored to trace the origin of the concepts and principles of quantum theory to an empirical background broader than that afforded by delicate optical and mechanical experiments on a microphysical scale involving the microconstant h. In particular he tried to reduce the dominant role of probability in modern physics to irrefutable evidence of a quite general nature. As long as quantum probability is deduced from experience with seemingly uncontrollable micro-mechanisms—think of radioactive disintegration as the most typical example—there will always be the objection that one day we still may find a hidden causality behind those small scale gambling devices called atoms, although one example of an exactly predictable atomic event would make present-day quantum theory untenable. In order to dislodge the remaining classicists from their fortress of doubt one may try to show that quantum probability is not an alibi for a temporary impotence of predicting microphysical events, but is a positive conclusion drawn from experience of a most general type, namely, from the principle of continuity, the basic tenet of the philosophy of Leibniz.

DOI
10.1086/287249

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•Jan 1, 1972•4 citations
The present article is written by a theoretical physicist who, for some time, has endeavored to trace the origin of the concepts and principles of quantum theory to an empirical background broader than that afforded by delicate optical and mechanical experiments on a microphysical scale involving the microconstant h. In particular he tried to reduce the dominant role of probability in modern physics to irrefutable evidence of a quite general nature. As long as quantum probability is deduced from experience with seemingly uncontrollable micro-mechanisms—think of radioactive disintegration as the most typical example—there will always be the objection that one day we still may find a hidden causality behind those small scale gambling devices called atoms, although one example of an exactly predictable atomic event would make present-day quantum theory untenable. In order to dislodge the remaining classicists from their fortress of doubt one may try to show that quantum probability is not an alibi for a temporary impotence of predicting microphysical events, but is a positive conclusion drawn from experience of a most general type, namely, from the principle of continuity, the basic tenet of the philosophy of Leibniz.
History is the most fundamental science, for there is no human knowledge which cannot lose its scientific character when men forget the conditions under which it originated, the questions it answered, and the functions it was created to serve .Astudent of quantum mechanics can ignore these words of Benjamin Farrington, often quoted by Schrödinger [1], only at his own peril. For, without their historical perspective, the counter-intuitive nature of the physical laws of the quantum theory may appear to be mystic. Indeed, the laws of quantum mechanics exhibit their distinctive character on a scale which is out of reach of our everyday experience. This is in contrast with the intuitive appeal of the Newton's laws and their conformity with our common experience. However, the inability of the then known theories, referred to now as the classical theories, to explain certain physical phenomena led to the search for a new theory. It culminated with the advent of the quantum theory. The true scientific character of the quantum theory cannot be appreciated without understanding the conditions under which it originated, the questions it answered, and the functions it was created to serve. Such an understanding can even motivate one to ponder whether there can be any other description of the laws of nature which is free from the conceptual and philosophical inconsistencies which are often pointed out in the present-day quantum theory. This chapter outlines brie_y how the ideas leading to the birth of quantum mechanics took shape.
In a recent number of Blackfriars (July, 1949) Dr A. W. Gledhill has discussed very competently some aspects of the statistical method as used in modern physics. He has tried to show there ‘that modern physical theory does not contradict the principle of causality’. Having made a study of this subject over quite a number of years, the writer, while agreeing with some of Dr Gledhill’s conclusions, feels nevertheless that there are a few points which have not been covered as adequately as the importance of the subject for modern philosophy seems to warrant. In order to understand the controversy about the validity or non-validity of the principle of causality, which has been initiated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, it is necessary to realise, first of all, that when a physicist speaks about causality, he usually does not mean the same thing as a scholastic philosopher. In scholastic philosophy one distinguishes different kinds of causes, such as the material, the efficient, the final, as well as the formal and exemplary causes. The classical physicist, on the other hand, since the time of Galileo, admits only efficient causes. Let us therefore give a brief sketch of the development of this concept of scientific causality and show the reasons for this limitation. The purpose of a scientific theory is the prediction of events among the natural objects which form the field of enquiry of the particular science concerned. Evidently, the more certain the prediction, the better the theory on which it is based.
How does it come about then, that great scientists such as Einstein, Schrödinger and De Broglie are nevertheless dissatisfied with the situation? Of course, all these objections are levelled not against the correctness of the formulae, but against their interpretation. […] The lesson to be learned from what I have told of the origin of quantum mechanics is that probable refinements of mathematical methods will not suffice to produce a satisfactory theory, but that somewhere in our doctrine is hidden a concept, unjustified by experience, which we must eliminate to open up the road. (Born [1954], pp. 8, 11) It is truly surprising how little difference all this makes. Most physicists use quantum mechanics every day in their working lives without needing to worry about the fundamental problem of its interpretation. (Weinberg [1992], p. 66) I endorse the view that it may be of no relevance to the acceptability of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics as a physical theory whether or not an informed observer can be uncertain about the outcome of a quantum measurement prior to its having occurred. However, I suggest that the very possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty has an essential role to play in both confirmation theory and decision theory in a branching universe. This is supported by arguments which do not appeal to van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. 1. Dendritic Unitary Evolution 2. The Born–Vaidman Rule 3. Greaves on Uncertainty 4. Retroactive Counterfactual Uncertainty 5. Odds and Ends
In trying to develop a theory of chance, I have so far drawn largely on a metaphysical picture inspired by classical physics, and have used statistical mechanics as my central example of chance arising in physical theories. It has proven difficult to develop an adequate theory of chance. But perhaps things will look different if we turn to quantum mechanics. The theory of quantum mechanics is extremely well confirmed. It is doubtful whether it is strictly true in its current form, due to the well-known conflict between quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity, but it is an outstandingly good example of a successful physical theory, and it represents a stark break from earlier models of the physical world. Perhaps by tapping into these resources, we can develop an adequate metaphysics of chance.
Over the past three decades or so, experiments of the type called Gedanken have become real. Recall the Schrödinger quote from Chapter 8: “… we never experiment with just one electron or atom or (small) molecule.” This is no longer true. We can do experiments involving single atoms or molecules and even on single photons, and thus it becomes possible to demonstrate that the “ridiculous consequences” alluded to by Schrödinger are, in fact, quite real. We have already discussed some examples of single-photon experiments in Chapter 6, and in Chapter 10 we shall discuss experiments performed with single atoms and single trapped ions. In the present chapter, we shall elaborate further on experimental tests of fundamentals of quantum mechanics involving a small number of photons. By fundamental tests we mean tests of quantum mechanics against the predictions of local realistic theories (i.e. hidden variable theories). Specifically, we discuss optical experiments demonstrating violations of Bell's inequalities, violations originally discussed by Bell in the context of two spin-one-half particles. Such violations, if observed experimentally, falsify local realistic hidden-variable theories. Locality refers to the notion, familiar in classical physics, that there cannot be a causal relationship between events with space-like separations. That is, the events cannot be connected by any signal moving at, or less than, the speed of light; i.e. the events are outside the light-cone. But in quantum mechanics, it appears that nonlocal effects, effects seemly violating the classical notion of locality in a certain restricted sense, are possible.
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics