In its core, the non-locality–locality debate is a discussion about the concept of the physical reality. The difference between the measurement bases of classical and quantum mechanics is often interpreted as a loss of reality arising in quantum mechanics. In this paper it is shown that this apparent loss occurs only if one believes that everyday experience determines the Euclidean space, instead of considering this space, both in classical and quantum mechanics, as a theoretical construction needed for measurement and representing one part of a dualistic space conception. From this point of view, Einstein's program of a unified field theory can be interpreted as the attempt to find a physical theory that is less dualistic. However, if one regards this dualism as resulting from the requirements of measurements, one can hope for a weakening of the dualism but not expect to remove it completely. Further, it follows from the requirements of measurements that the Heisenberg cut cannot be arbitrarily far moved towards the observer. Epistemological discussions on quantum mechanics yield two insights: (i) To acquire physical knowledge, means of cognition are always necessary, and measurement provides this means. (ii) The space of measurement and the space of the representation of physical dynamics must be distinguished conceptually; both coincide factually in classical physics, but not so in quantum mechanics.
In its core, the non-locality–locality debate is a discussion about the concept of the physical reality. The difference between the measurement bases of classical and quantum mechanics is often interpreted as a loss of reality arising in quantum mechanics. In this paper it is shown that this apparent loss occurs only if one believes that everyday experience determines the Euclidean space, instead of considering this space, both in classical and quantum mechanics, as a theoretical construction needed for measurement and representing one part of a dualistic space conception. From this point of view, Einstein's program of a unified field theory can be interpreted as the attempt to find a physical theory that is less dualistic. However, if one regards this dualism as resulting from the requirements of measurements, one can hope for a weakening of the dualism but not expect to remove it completely. Further, it follows from the requirements of measurements that the Heisenberg cut cannot be arbitrarily far moved towards the observer. Epistemological discussions on quantum mechanics yield two insights: (i) To acquire physical knowledge, means of cognition are always necessary, and measurement provides this means. (ii) The space of measurement and the space of the representation of physical dynamics must be distinguished conceptually; both coincide factually in classical physics, but not so in quantum mechanics.
For Bohr quantum mechanics is complete. It expresses all that can be said about the atomic world, which he regards as a newly discovered and separate ontological component of reality, operating at the Planck scale, and describable only with a separate physics, namely, quantum mechanics. The classical world, in contrast, represents its binary and symbiotic counterpart, which is also ontologically substantive, but operates according to 'classical concepts'. The different physics of each component indicates a different ontology, the classical one is accessible to us, as we are classical objects, where the Planck scale does not apply, while the other is not. The measurement problem cannot therefore be solved through the discovery of hidden variables as these are classical in nature and therefore ineffective in explaining the quantum world. The measurement problem is therefore not due to epistemological limitations but emerges directly from a 'two worlds' dualism. Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation has therefore been erroneously misunderstood as a positivist retreat rather than as a view of reality proposing an ontological structure which is dualistic. l then propose similarities between Bohr and a ‘two worlds’ view of Kant, where noumena is an ontology which is inherently unknowable as it is devoid of a priori agents, much as the quantum world is unknowable as it is devoid of Bohr's classical concepts. However, just as classical concepts in Bohr are crucial in constituting classical reality, a priori intuitions and concepts in Kant are crucial in constituting phenomena, which are real ontological objects and not just appearances. The noumenal and quantum realms are therefore both substantive, but impossible to investigate. The phenomenal and classical worlds are also substantive. They are where objects and therefore meaning condenses. They are therefore open to our investigations.
According to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bohr being its leading voice), the attributes of a physical object (position, momentum, spin, etc.) can be assigned only when they have been measured. Einstein advocated the local realist viewpoint that an object had definite attributes whether they had been measured or not. The Copenhagen school view that measurement actually produces an object’s property would imply that the measurement of one part of an entangled quantum state can instantaneously fix the value of another part, no matter how far the two parts have been separated. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen devised a thought experiment to shine a light on this “spooky action-at-a-distance” feature; its discussion and debate have illuminated the meaning of quantum mechanics (QM). It led later to Bell’s theorem showing that these seemingly philosophical questions can lead to observable results. The experimental vindication of the orthodox theory has sharpened our appreciation of the nonlocal features of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the counter-intuitive QM picture of objective reality still troubles many, leaving one to wonder whether quantum mechanics is ultimately a complete theory.
Abstract In considering models of reality we must consider the fundamental nature of quantum mechanics, which has had great success in describing the spectrum of light from distant stars and galaxies, formulating the properties of the strong, electro-weak or electromagnetic and weak decay forces, and explaining atomic order formulated as the atomic periodic table and atomic spectra. A vast array of technologies has resulted from quantum theory, from semiconductors to NMR machines, nuclear reactors and possibly encryption secured, fast quantum computers. Quantum theory, however, has yet to fully engage with the gravitational force. With the advent of quantum theory, several major issues stand out, leaving us with major philosophical questions on the nature of physics and reality, and our ability to comprehend them. The issues involve the interpretation of quantum measurement, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle on the completeness of quantum theory and nonlocality. The frontiers of science continue to open new concepts based on a multidimensional reality which we use to address these issues, including solving the Schrödinger and Dirac equations in complex Minkowski eight space. We also formulate Bell’s theorem and the Young’s double slit experiment in Rauscher’s complex eight-space. We formulate an interpretation of the quantum that yields locality in a hyper-dimensional complex space and that maintains the completeness of quantum theory and nonlocality in usual four space, with local connectivity and the Lorentz invariant conditions, where subluminal and luminal signaling are maintained. Are we really forced to choose between two alternate views of reality? One view that external reality exists independent of the observer, and the other that the observer somehow is a participator or an integral part of all of nature. Must we choose between these or is there another way out? We find our way out and we satisfy both Bohr (Copenhagen) and Einstein (determinism) in bringing about a practical outcome of the debate. By developing and applying complex eight space, we can accommodate locality or local realism in terms of contiguous event connections in complex eight space. In four space, nonlocality dominates and also can be considered locality in eight space. The determination of the state of a system naturally collapses to its final state where quantum mechanics is functioning completely in four and in eight dimensional spaces.
The EPR controversy between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr about the completeness of the quantum mechanics is one of the most essential contemporary debates in physics with respect to the issue of realism. Initially considered as a though-experiment, the EPR paradox was meant to evidence the inadequacy of quantum mechanics with respect to the traditional leading principle of physics such as locality, independence of the system elements of reality with respect to the observer or semantic reference of theories to elements of the reality in itself. Bell’s mathematical inquiry opened the possibility to empirically discriminate between the view of Bohr and Einstein through the so-called Bell’s inequalities. Based on these inequalities, the experimental test provided in particular by the work of Alain Aspect settled the debate in favor of Bohr and the completeness of quantum mechanics. The previously evident assumption that physical theories are describing the reality in it-self can thus be questioned. Several approaches have been proposed to face that challenge, such as the orthodox quantum physics formulation coupled with the interpretation of Bernard d’Espagnat , the non-local theory of De Broglie-Bohm or the quantum mechanics approach with extended probability of James B. Hartle . In this paper, we consider the idea according to which the field of experiments and measurements on quantum systems is a research context where several epistemic values traditionally leading the scientific activity are in conflict. Instead of conceiving the transition from classical to quantum physics along Thomas Kuhns’ theory of revolutionary paradigm change , characterized by a strong incommensurability between the old and the new approaches, we argue that this epistemological shift could be rationally understood as an incremental evolution of the epistemic values leading scientific activity. As the analysis in this paper aims to show, such a rational reconstruction shows a process of gradual change, where core epistemic values are maintained, while others are broadened to account for the new scientific approaches. The settling of the EPR controversy could be understood as the indication that the previously assumed epistemic values cannot be consistently held together in the quantum context. The values of logical consistency and empirical adequacy remained universally shared, but the controversy leads to question the other traditionally admitted principles, such as the locality, the requirement of semantic references to the reality in itself and the independence of experimental results with respect to the observer, all tightly connected with the realistic conceptions of the world. This first part of the paper characterizes the selected contemporary approaches in quantum context with respect to the modification of the epistemic principles they adopt to restore their consistency. While the de Broglie-Bohm theory explicitly follows the requirement of referring to the reality in itself at the expense of the locality principle, the approaches of d’Espagnat and of Hartle give priority to the values of theoretical framework simplicity and predictive power. In the case of d’Espagnat, the descriptive purpose of the scientific activity remains, but only in a weak objectivity perspective, restricted to the “empirical reality” in which the observer is involved. In the case of Hartle, the extended probability formulation of quantum mechanics is conceived as “an extension of familiar probability theory that incorporates negative probabilities”6, which relies on the Bayesian conception of “probabilities as instruction for betting” (negative probability is thus associated to the instruction “don’t bet”). In a second part, the paper uses this reconstruction of the various theories in order to address the epistemic status of the principles of descriptive power and of independence of the observed system with respect to the observer. In particular, our analysis aims to assess if a reference to the observer is part of the reality description or if such reference is avoidable. This is of prior interest in exploring the main characteristics of a realistic approach that would be applicable in the context of experiments and measurements on quantum systems. In that perspective, we argue that the direct holistic realism, developed by Hilary Putnam in The Threefold Cord , could be a promising intermediate option between a classical realism, which assumes that theoretical structures are describing the reality in it-self, and a more instrumentalist view, focusing mainly on the modeling of the empirical reality as a result of experimental operations while rejecting access to the reality in itself.
The Bohr-Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism (held by Einstein) and phenomenalism (held by Bohr). An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme-logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality.
A case study of quantum mechanics is investigated in the framework of the philosophical opposition “mathematical model – reality”. All classical science obeys the postulate about the fundamental difference of model and reality, and thus distinguishing epistemology from ontology fundamentally. The theorems about the absence of hidden variables in quantum mechanics imply for it to be “complete” (versus Einstein’s opinion). That consistent completeness (unlike arithmetic to set theory in the foundations of mathematics in Gödel’s opinion) can be interpreted furthermore as the coincidence of model and reality. The paper discusses the option and fact of that coincidence it its base: the fundamental postulate formulated by Niels Bohr about what quantum mechanics studies (unlike all classical science). Quantum mechanics involves and develops further both identification and disjunctive distinction of the global space of the apparatus and the local space of the investigated quantum entity as complementary to each other. This results into the analogical complementarity of model and reality in quantum mechanics. The apparatus turns out to be both absolutely “transparent” and identically coinciding simultaneously with the reflected quantum reality. Thus, the coincidence of model and reality is postulated as necessary condition for cognition in quantum mechanics by Bohr’s postulate and further, embodied in its formalism of the separable complex Hilbert space, in turn, implying the theorems of the absence of hidden variables (or the equivalent to them “conservation of energy conservation” in quantum mechanics). What the apparatus and measured entity exchange cannot be energy (for the different exponents of energy), but quantum information (as a certain, unambiguously determined wave function) therefore a generalized law of conservation, from which the conservation of energy conservation is a corollary. Particularly, the local and global space (rigorously justified in the Standard model) share the complementarity isomorphic to that of model and reality in the foundation of quantum mechanics. On that background, one can think of the troubles of “quantum gravity” as fundamental, direct corollaries from the postulates of quantum mechanics. Gravity can be defined only as a relation or by a pair of non-orthogonal separable complex Hilbert space attachable whether to two “parts” or to a whole and its parts. On the contrary, all the three fundamental interactions in the Standard model are “flat” and only “properties”: they need only a single separable complex Hilbert space to be defined.