Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

How Physics Confronts Reality: Einstein Was Correct, But Bohr Won the Game

Andrew Whitaker

Published Jul 28, 2009• 6 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This article reviews How Physics Confronts Reality: Einstein was Correct but Bohr Won the Game by Roger G. Newton . 147 pp. , Singapore, 2009. Price: $54(cloth) ISBN 978-981-4277-02-0; $29.95(paper) ISBN 978-981-4277-03-7.

Related papers

Einstein and Bohr and the Nature of Reality

Norman Graves

Arguably the most important scientific debate of the 20th Century was that which took place between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr over the nature of reality. Bohr argued that reality was subjective in nature and therefore depended on the presence of an observer or observing process, while Einstein argued that reality had to be objective. The debate was never resolved, ending prematurely with Einstein's death in 1955. Having outlived Einstein, Bohr's ideas have come to dominate modern physics and Einstein has been somewhat sidelined. Perhaps now it is time to revisit the debate to see if Einstein was correct all along.

•May 1, 2015•0 citations

Bohr or Einstein?

Andrew Whitaker

In this last chapter I shall attempt a very brief assessment of the Bohr–Einstein debate. Who won it in the view of the audience? Who actually had the better case? I will also ask two rather more specific questions. The first is ‘Have the contributions of John Bell favoured the position of either of the protagonists?’ The second is ‘Has the dramatic arrival and progress of quantum information theory anything to tell us about the Bohr–Einstein debate?’

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 29, 2006•1 citation

Comparative Analysis on the Physical Realities Of Einstein And Bohr

Huang Ji

Einstein and Bohr are all realists, holding the view of physical reali ty. Einstein thinks that physical reality is localizable, separable, and causall y deterministic; however, Bohr holds that physical reality is illocalizable, ins eparable and statistically deterministic.

•Jan 1, 2004•0 citations

A bolt from the blue

Jim Baggott

Abstract The confrontation between Einstein and Bohr over the interpretation of quantum theory has been painted in the past as a direct conflict between realism and positivism. However, more recent attempts to uncover the philosophical positions of both Einstein and Bohr have revealed that these were not so black and white. Einstein’s realism was conditioned by the strong empiricist influence in his own early experiences as a theorist and the growing wariness that led him eventually to reject Machian positivism. His was a realism born of a sense of necessity: a belief that a realist stance is the only one that leads to productive theorizing about the physical world. Bohr’s philosophy went through some quite marked changes, principally in response to Einstein’s challenges. The father of modem atomic theory could hardly subscribe to an uncompromising positivist position that rejected the reality of atoms. But the reality of the inner workings of those atoms was, Bohr contended, beyond the reach of a knowledge founded on complementary classical concepts of waves and particles. As Einstein’s challenges became deeper and more subtle, so Bohr’s position shifted to that of a distinctive anti-realism. Add to this a rhetoric in Bohr’s speeches and published writings that insisted on the logical inevitability of the Copenhagen interpretation, that insisted on its status as the only feasible interpretation, and that countenanced no other alternative, and you have dogma in the making. Heisenberg called it ‘Kopen hagener Geist der Quantentheorie’, the Copenhagen spirit of quantum theory which, he declared in 1930, ‘has directed the entire development of modem atomic physics’. Einstein frequently referred to the Copenhagen doctrine as ‘Talmudic’.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Nov 6, 2003•0 citations

The Bohr—Einstein confrontation: phenomena and physical reality

Sandro Petruccioli

As Quine wrote in 1961, what strikes us in a paradox is its initial air of absurdity, which develops into a sort of psychological discomfort when we compare the conclusions of the reasoning with the apparently irrefutable arguments on which it is based. However, as he went on to observe, ‘More than once in history the discovery of paradox has been the occasion for major reconstruction at the foundations of thought’. Catastrophe may therefore lurk even in the most innocent-seeming of paradoxes and force us to recognize the arbitrary nature ‘of a buried premise or of some preconception previously reckoned as central to physical theory, to mathematics or to the thinking process’. More recently, ideas of this kind have been used to assert in general that the role of paradox in the growth of knowledge is to generate category switches and to construct new universes of discourse. It could also be argued that paradoxes constitute elements of the logic of discovery capable of amplifying and thus making intelligible the still obscure phases accompanying paradigm shifts. Paradoxes would thus represent points of accumulation for the tension created between a given system of conceptual representation and a theory or empirical discovery that violates it. Historians of science have tried different interpretative approaches in their attempts to unravel the thought process that was to lead Einstein in 1905 to the formulation of special relativity and the simultaneous demolition of the classical conception of space and time.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 18, 1993•0 citations

EPR

David Wick

The third round of the Bohr-Einstein debate was conducted by way of the journals rather than in person. Five years after Bohr’s victory at the Sixth Solvay Conference, Einstein, working with two younger colleagues, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, finally achieved a sharp formulation of the argument that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of reality. They published in the American journal The Physical Review , in 1935. As one expects in a paper bearing Einstein’s name, the argument is simple but very clever. An improvement by Schrödinger speeds up the exposition. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Birkhäuser Boston eBooks•Jan 1, 1995•0 citations
This article reviews How Physics Confronts Reality: Einstein was Correct but Bohr Won the Game by Roger G. Newton . 147 pp. , Singapore, 2009. Price: 54(cloth)ISBN978−981−4277−02−0;54(cloth) ISBN 978-981-4277-02-0; 54(cloth)ISBN978−981−4277−02−0;29.95(paper) ISBN 978-981-4277-03-7.
Arguably the most important scientific debate of the 20th Century was that which took place between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr over the nature of reality. Bohr argued that reality was subjective in nature and therefore depended on the presence of an observer or observing process, while Einstein argued that reality had to be objective. The debate was never resolved, ending prematurely with Einstein's death in 1955. Having outlived Einstein, Bohr's ideas have come to dominate modern physics and Einstein has been somewhat sidelined. Perhaps now it is time to revisit the debate to see if Einstein was correct all along.
Abstract The confrontation between Einstein and Bohr over the interpretation of quantum theory has been painted in the past as a direct conflict between realism and positivism. However, more recent attempts to uncover the philosophical positions of both Einstein and Bohr have revealed that these were not so black and white. Einstein’s realism was conditioned by the strong empiricist influence in his own early experiences as a theorist and the growing wariness that led him eventually to reject Machian positivism. His was a realism born of a sense of necessity: a belief that a realist stance is the only one that leads to productive theorizing about the physical world. Bohr’s philosophy went through some quite marked changes, principally in response to Einstein’s challenges. The father of modem atomic theory could hardly subscribe to an uncompromising positivist position that rejected the reality of atoms. But the reality of the inner workings of those atoms was, Bohr contended, beyond the reach of a knowledge founded on complementary classical concepts of waves and particles. As Einstein’s challenges became deeper and more subtle, so Bohr’s position shifted to that of a distinctive anti-realism. Add to this a rhetoric in Bohr’s speeches and published writings that insisted on the logical inevitability of the Copenhagen interpretation, that insisted on its status as the only feasible interpretation, and that countenanced no other alternative, and you have dogma in the making. Heisenberg called it ‘Kopen hagener Geist der Quantentheorie’, the Copenhagen spirit of quantum theory which, he declared in 1930, ‘has directed the entire development of modem atomic physics’. Einstein frequently referred to the Copenhagen doctrine as ‘Talmudic’.
As Quine wrote in 1961, what strikes us in a paradox is its initial air of absurdity, which develops into a sort of psychological discomfort when we compare the conclusions of the reasoning with the apparently irrefutable arguments on which it is based. However, as he went on to observe, ‘More than once in history the discovery of paradox has been the occasion for major reconstruction at the foundations of thought’. Catastrophe may therefore lurk even in the most innocent-seeming of paradoxes and force us to recognize the arbitrary nature ‘of a buried premise or of some preconception previously reckoned as central to physical theory, to mathematics or to the thinking process’. More recently, ideas of this kind have been used to assert in general that the role of paradox in the growth of knowledge is to generate category switches and to construct new universes of discourse. It could also be argued that paradoxes constitute elements of the logic of discovery capable of amplifying and thus making intelligible the still obscure phases accompanying paradigm shifts. Paradoxes would thus represent points of accumulation for the tension created between a given system of conceptual representation and a theory or empirical discovery that violates it. Historians of science have tried different interpretative approaches in their attempts to unravel the thought process that was to lead Einstein in 1905 to the formulation of special relativity and the simultaneous demolition of the classical conception of space and time.
The third round of the Bohr-Einstein debate was conducted by way of the journals rather than in person. Five years after Bohr’s victory at the Sixth Solvay Conference, Einstein, working with two younger colleagues, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, finally achieved a sharp formulation of the argument that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of reality. They published in the American journal The Physical Review , in 1935. As one expects in a paper bearing Einstein’s name, the argument is simple but very clever. An improvement by Schrödinger speeds up the exposition. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.