Relativistic quantum theories are equipped with a background Minkowski spacetime and non‐relativistic quantum theories with a Galilean space‐time. Traditional investigations have distinguished their distinct space‐time structures and have examined ways in which relativistic theories become sufficiently like Galilean theories in a low velocity approximation or limit. A different way to look at their relationship is to see that both kinds of theories are special cases of a certain five‐dimensional generalization involving no limiting procedures or approximations. When one compares them, striking features emerge that bear on philosophical questions, including the ontological status of the wave function and time reversal invariance.
Relativistic quantum theories are equipped with a background Minkowski spacetime and non‐relativistic quantum theories with a Galilean space‐time. Traditional investigations have distinguished their distinct space‐time structures and have examined ways in which relativistic theories become sufficiently like Galilean theories in a low velocity approximation or limit. A different way to look at their relationship is to see that both kinds of theories are special cases of a certain five‐dimensional generalization involving no limiting procedures or approximations. When one compares them, striking features emerge that bear on philosophical questions, including the ontological status of the wave function and time reversal invariance.
Galilean time in nonrelativistic quantum theory and historical time in parametrized relativistic quantum theories such as the four-space formulation are examined. Clear physical distinctions are drawn between Galilean time, Minkowski time, and historical time. Minkowski time is the temporal coordinate of a space-time four-vector. Galilean time and historical time are evolution (ordering) parameters in their respective theoretical frameworks. Using N-body formulations, a physically unambiguous procedure for measuring evolution parameters in terms of familiar observables is presented. The procedure is illustrated by the design of a simple evolution-parameter clock.
What is relativistic quantum theory? How does it differ from non-relativistic quantum mechanics? Is there something more involved than the transition from the Galilean group to the Lorentz group? These questions are evidently of great importance to the understanding of relativistic quantum theory (RQT), in particular to the distinction between the basic principles of quantum theory, and the characterization of a particular class of dynamical evolutions. Within non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) a reasonably precise response is possible (differences concern the number of degrees of freedom, the existence of internal symmetries, and the form of the Hamiltonian as a function of the canonical variables); what appears characteristic of RQT is the appearance of a dynamics of a qualitatively different character (involving the creation and annihilation of particles), involving new kinds of constraints (renormalization theory: anomalies). Nevertheless, it seems we must know how to pass from the inhomogeneous Galilean group (IHGG) to the Lorentz group (IHLG), if only because we have successfully constructed a RQT, surely, then, we know what it is that we hold invariant in this transition.
The implications of the relativistic space-time structure for a physical description by quantum mechanical wave-functions are investigated. On the basis of a detailed analysis of Bell's concept of local causality, which is violated in quantum theory, we argue that this is a subtle, as well as an important effort. A central requirement appearing in relativistic quantum mechanics, namely local commutativity, is analyzed in detail and possible justifications are given and discussed. The complexity of the implications of wave function reduction in connection with Minkowski space-time are illustrated by a quantum mechanical measurement procedure which was proposed by Aharonov and Albert. This procedure and its relativistic implications are explicitly analyzed and discussed in terms of state evolution. This analysis shows that the usual notion of state evolution fails in relativistic quantum theory. Two possible solutions of this problem are given. In particular, it is shown that also a theory with a distinguished foliation of space-time into space-like leafs - accounting for nonlocality - makes the right predictions for the Aharonov-Albert experiment. We will repeatedly encounter that an analysis of the wave-function alone does not suffice to answer the question of relativistic compatibility of the theory, but that the actual events in space time, which are predicted and described by the theory, are crucial. Relativistic versions of quantum mechanical theories which precisely describe actual processes in space-time are briefly described and discussed in the appendix.
A body of theory is completely different between relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Most targeting physical phenomena are different between them as well. Despite that both theories describe our time-space world, no one has succeeded in arriving at one of these theories by using the other one, deductively. Fusion of these two theories produced quantum field theory. However this theory impresses us as a theory that was made by merging the two theories by force. So this theory cannot indicate the reason why both relativity theory and quantum mechanics exist in this world at the same time. Here I show you that quantum mechanics can be led by the equation of Minkowski's metrics, which stands up in the relativistic world of space and time. This is the first report proving mathematically that quantum mechanics can be born reductively in our relativistic world.
This contribution aims to show the complex interplay between the ontological status of the wave-function and the kinematics and dynamics of the particles within the guidance view of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In particular, it deals with two formulations of the theory. The former, which goes under the name of Bohmian mechanics, puts the particles in a Galilean space-time and considers the wave-function as a nomological entity; the latter, which is normally known as the pilot-wave theory, puts the particles in an Aristotelian space-time and regards the wave-function as a physical field. On one hand, I will show that the difference of the ontological status of the wave-function is due to a difference in how the theory is formulated. On the other hand, I will show that in both cases the dynamics and kinematics of the particles are determined by a prior ontological commitment concerning the wave-function. My talk will open with a brief summary of Bohmian Mechanics and its nomological view in connection with the dispositional view. After that, I will claim that, given the Galilean space-time and the law of motion for the particles, the natural choice is to attribute a nomological status to the wave-function. I will argue, however, that this is true only if we adopt a certain argument according to which we derive the dynamics from the kinematics. I will also point out that the nomological status of the wave-function was already presupposed before building the guiding law of motion. My last consideration will be that, given the nomological status of the wave-function, the kinematics of the theory becomes ambiguous. In particular, we need a clarification of the meaning of ‘natural state’, otherwise we have two possible natural motions for Bohmian Mechanics, which are either uniform velocity or the velocity given by the wave-function through the law of motion. This last inertial motion, however, would on one hand endorse a dispositional interpretation of the wave-function, on the other hand, it would imply the abandonment of perhaps Galilean space-time and certainly Newtonian mechanics. In the second part of my talk, I will investigate the ontological status of the wave-function in the Pilot-wave theory. I will show that on one hand the realist interpretation of the wave-function is a necessary commitment once we hold true the dynamics and the kinematics of the particles, and in particular once we hold true that we derive the kinematics from the dynamics. I will however point out that this derivation is straightforward if and only if we first assume that the wave-function represents a physical field. I will draw a two-fold conclusion, which is useful for any theory. On one hand it is methodologically wrong to decide on the ontological status of the wave-function regardless of the structure of the theory. On the other hand, it is sometimes naïve to say that we should not read off the ontology from the formalism, since the formalism may be determined by a certain ontological choice.
Based on a linear realization formulation of a quantum relativity, — proposed relativity for 'quantum space-time', we introduce the new Poincare-Snyder relativity and Snyder relativity as relativities in between the latter and the well known Galilean and Einstein cases. While there is supposed to be not separate notion of classical and quantum mechanics at the level of the very unconventional quantum relativity, the Poincare-Snyder relativity is more like a mathematically extended form of Einstein relativity on which we can write down a formal canonical classical and quantum mechanics. We discuss how the Poincare-Snyder relativity may provide a stronger framework for the description of the usual (Einstein) relativistic quantum mechanics and present a first look of the interesting picture from the new perspective.