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Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society

On Lorentz invariance in the quantum theory. II

Arthur Stanley Eddington

Published Apr 1, 1942• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

1. I appreciate the careful reply which Dirac, Peierls and Pryce (hereafter referred to as DPP) have made to my criticism of the usual theory of the eigen-functions of a hydrogen atom. Their paper will be generally welcomed because there has not, I think, previously been available an authoritative and clear statement of what is assumed and the grounds for assuming it. Their defence, which is partly on lines I had not expected, has required very serious consideration. But the result of making the arguments more explicit is two-fold. The theory is perhaps more self-consistent than it had appeared to be; but on the other hand, the pressing need for amendment becomes too plain to be overlooked. I have endeavoured to show in the last twelve years that this amendment opens out very fertile extensions.

DOI
10.1017/s0305004100021861

Related papers

Addendum: “On the Dirac equation for the hydrogen atom’’ [Am. J. Phys. 47, 1098 (1979)]

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American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 1980•11 citations

Introduction

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Mar 23, 2006•0 citations

The complex interplay between the ontological status of the wave-function and the motion of the particles in the De Broglie-Bohm Theory

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This contribution aims to show the complex interplay between the ontological status of the wave-function and the kinematics and dynamics of the particles within the guidance view of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In particular, it deals with two formulations of the theory. The former, which goes under the name of Bohmian mechanics, puts the particles in a Galilean space-time and considers the wave-function as a nomological entity; the latter, which is normally known as the pilot-wave theory, puts the particles in an Aristotelian space-time and regards the wave-function as a physical field. On one hand, I will show that the difference of the ontological status of the wave-function is due to a difference in how the theory is formulated. On the other hand, I will show that in both cases the dynamics and kinematics of the particles are determined by a prior ontological commitment concerning the wave-function. My talk will open with a brief summary of Bohmian Mechanics and its nomological view in connection with the dispositional view. After that, I will claim that, given the Galilean space-time and the law of motion for the particles, the natural choice is to attribute a nomological status to the wave-function. I will argue, however, that this is true only if we adopt a certain argument according to which we derive the dynamics from the kinematics. I will also point out that the nomological status of the wave-function was already presupposed before building the guiding law of motion. My last consideration will be that, given the nomological status of the wave-function, the kinematics of the theory becomes ambiguous. In particular, we need a clarification of the meaning of ‘natural state’, otherwise we have two possible natural motions for Bohmian Mechanics, which are either uniform velocity or the velocity given by the wave-function through the law of motion. This last inertial motion, however, would on one hand endorse a dispositional interpretation of the wave-function, on the other hand, it would imply the abandonment of perhaps Galilean space-time and certainly Newtonian mechanics. In the second part of my talk, I will investigate the ontological status of the wave-function in the Pilot-wave theory. I will show that on one hand the realist interpretation of the wave-function is a necessary commitment once we hold true the dynamics and the kinematics of the particles, and in particular once we hold true that we derive the kinematics from the dynamics. I will however point out that this derivation is straightforward if and only if we first assume that the wave-function represents a physical field. I will draw a two-fold conclusion, which is useful for any theory. On one hand it is methodologically wrong to decide on the ontological status of the wave-function regardless of the structure of the theory. On the other hand, it is sometimes naïve to say that we should not read off the ontology from the formalism, since the formalism may be determined by a certain ontological choice.

•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations

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See also update Addendum: “On the Dirac equation for the hydrogen atom’’ [Am. J. Phys. 47, 1098 (1979)]

American Journal of Physics•Dec 1, 1979•14 citations

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The best case for thinking that quantum mechanics is nonlocal rests on Bell's Theorem, and later results of the same kind. However, the correlations characteristic of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR)–Bell (EPRB) experiments also arise in familiar cases elsewhere in quantum mechanics (QM), where the two measurements involved are timelike rather than spacelike separated; and in which the correlations are usually assumed to have a local causal explanation, requiring no action-at-a-distance (AAD). It is interesting to ask how this is possible, in the light of Bell's Theorem. We investigate this question, and present two options. Either (i) the new cases are nonlocal too, in which case AAD is more widespread in QM than has previously been appreciated (and does not depend on entanglement, as usually construed); or (ii) the means of avoiding AAD in the new cases extends in a natural way to EPRB, removing AAD in these cases too. There is a third option, viz., that the new cases are strongly disanalogous to EPRB. But this option requires an argument, so far missing, that the physical world breaks the symmetries which otherwise support the analogy. In the absence of such an argument, the orthodox combination of views—action-at-a-distance in EPRB, but local causality in its timelike analogue—is less well established than it is usually assumed to be. 1 Introduction 1.1 Background 1.2 Outline of the argument2 The Experiments 2.1 Standard EPRB 2.2 Sideways EPRB 2.3 Comparing the experiments 2.4 The need for beables3 The Symmetry Considerations 3.1 The action symmetry 3.2 Time-symmetry in SEPRB4 The Basic Trilemma 4.1 An intuitive defence of Option III?5 Avoiding the Trilemma?6 The Classical Objection7 Defending Option III 7.1 The free will argument 7.2 Independence and consistency8 Entanglement and Epistemic Perspective

arXiv:1001.5057•The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Jun 14, 2012•45 citations
  1. I appreciate the careful reply which Dirac, Peierls and Pryce (hereafter referred to as DPP) have made to my criticism of the usual theory of the eigen-functions of a hydrogen atom. Their paper will be generally welcomed because there has not, I think, previously been available an authoritative and clear statement of what is assumed and the grounds for assuming it. Their defence, which is partly on lines I had not expected, has required very serious consideration. But the result of making the arguments more explicit is two-fold. The theory is perhaps more self-consistent than it had appeared to be; but on the other hand, the pressing need for amendment becomes too plain to be overlooked. I have endeavoured to show in the last twelve years that this amendment opens out very fertile extensions.
The first objective of this chapter is to briefly review some of the basic ideas about the structure of matter, in particular the concepts of microscopic physics, in order to recall the knowledge gained in previous physics (and chemistry) courses and make it more precise. Our review will be very concise, and most statements will be made without any proof or detailed discussion. A second objective is to give a brief description of some of the crucial stages in the early development of quantum physics. We shall not follow the strict historical order of this development or present the arguments used at the beginning of the last century by the founding fathers of quantum mechanics; rather, we shall stress the concepts which we shall find useful later on. Our last objective is to give an elementary introduction to some of the basic ideas, like those of a quantum particle or energy level, that will reappear throughout this text. We shall base our review on the Bohr theory, which provides a simple, though far from convincing, explanation of how energy levels are quantized and how the spectrum of the hydrogen atom arises. This chapter should be reread later on, once the basic ideas of quantum mechanics have been made explicit and illustrated by examples. From the practical point of view, it is possible to skip the general considerations of Sections 1.1 and 1.2 at the first reading and begin with Section 1.3, returning to those two sections later on as needed.
This contribution aims to show the complex interplay between the ontological status of the wave-function and the kinematics and dynamics of the particles within the guidance view of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In particular, it deals with two formulations of the theory. The former, which goes under the name of Bohmian mechanics, puts the particles in a Galilean space-time and considers the wave-function as a nomological entity; the latter, which is normally known as the pilot-wave theory, puts the particles in an Aristotelian space-time and regards the wave-function as a physical field. On one hand, I will show that the difference of the ontological status of the wave-function is due to a difference in how the theory is formulated. On the other hand, I will show that in both cases the dynamics and kinematics of the particles are determined by a prior ontological commitment concerning the wave-function. My talk will open with a brief summary of Bohmian Mechanics and its nomological view in connection with the dispositional view. After that, I will claim that, given the Galilean space-time and the law of motion for the particles, the natural choice is to attribute a nomological status to the wave-function. I will argue, however, that this is true only if we adopt a certain argument according to which we derive the dynamics from the kinematics. I will also point out that the nomological status of the wave-function was already presupposed before building the guiding law of motion. My last consideration will be that, given the nomological status of the wave-function, the kinematics of the theory becomes ambiguous. In particular, we need a clarification of the meaning of ‘natural state’, otherwise we have two possible natural motions for Bohmian Mechanics, which are either uniform velocity or the velocity given by the wave-function through the law of motion. This last inertial motion, however, would on one hand endorse a dispositional interpretation of the wave-function, on the other hand, it would imply the abandonment of perhaps Galilean space-time and certainly Newtonian mechanics. In the second part of my talk, I will investigate the ontological status of the wave-function in the Pilot-wave theory. I will show that on one hand the realist interpretation of the wave-function is a necessary commitment once we hold true the dynamics and the kinematics of the particles, and in particular once we hold true that we derive the kinematics from the dynamics. I will however point out that this derivation is straightforward if and only if we first assume that the wave-function represents a physical field. I will draw a two-fold conclusion, which is useful for any theory. On one hand it is methodologically wrong to decide on the ontological status of the wave-function regardless of the structure of the theory. On the other hand, it is sometimes naïve to say that we should not read off the ontology from the formalism, since the formalism may be determined by a certain ontological choice.
The best case for thinking that quantum mechanics is nonlocal rests on Bell's Theorem, and later results of the same kind. However, the correlations characteristic of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR)–Bell (EPRB) experiments also arise in familiar cases elsewhere in quantum mechanics (QM), where the two measurements involved are timelike rather than spacelike separated; and in which the correlations are usually assumed to have a local causal explanation, requiring no action-at-a-distance (AAD). It is interesting to ask how this is possible, in the light of Bell's Theorem. We investigate this question, and present two options. Either (i) the new cases are nonlocal too, in which case AAD is more widespread in QM than has previously been appreciated (and does not depend on entanglement, as usually construed); or (ii) the means of avoiding AAD in the new cases extends in a natural way to EPRB, removing AAD in these cases too. There is a third option, viz., that the new cases are strongly disanalogous to EPRB. But this option requires an argument, so far missing, that the physical world breaks the symmetries which otherwise support the analogy. In the absence of such an argument, the orthodox combination of views—action-at-a-distance in EPRB, but local causality in its timelike analogue—is less well established than it is usually assumed to be. 1 Introduction 1.1 Background 1.2 Outline of the argument2 The Experiments 2.1 Standard EPRB 2.2 Sideways EPRB 2.3 Comparing the experiments 2.4 The need for beables3 The Symmetry Considerations 3.1 The action symmetry 3.2 Time-symmetry in SEPRB4 The Basic Trilemma 4.1 An intuitive defence of Option III?5 Avoiding the Trilemma?6 The Classical Objection7 Defending Option III 7.1 The free will argument 7.2 Independence and consistency8 Entanglement and Epistemic Perspective