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Communications in Theoretical Physics

Robust Multiparty Quantum Secret Sharing against Participant Forcible Manipulation

Sun Ying, Wen Qiao-yan, Fu-Chen Zhu

Published Jul 1, 2010• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol proposed by Gao [G. Gao, Common. Theor. Phys. 52 (2009) 421] is analyzed. It is shown that this protocol is vulnerable since the agents' imperfect encryption scheme can be attacked by a powerful participant. We introduce a attack strategy called participant forcible manipulation and analyze the information leakage in this protocol under this attack. At last, we give an improved version of the original protocol. The improved protocol is robust and has the same efficiency as the original one.

DOI
10.1088/0253-6102/54/1/17

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The security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol proposed by Gao [G. Gao, Common. Theor. Phys. 52 (2009) 421] is analyzed. It is shown that this protocol is vulnerable since the agents' imperfect encryption scheme can be attacked by a powerful participant. We introduce a attack strategy called participant forcible manipulation and analyze the information leakage in this protocol under this attack. At last, we give an improved version of the original protocol. The improved protocol is robust and has the same efficiency as the original one.
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This paper analyzes the security of a quantum secret sharing protocol between multiparty and multiparty, which was proposed by Yan and Gao. We show that this protocol is not secure because an external attacker can obtain the secret message shared by the two groups, making use of entanglement swapping. There are two reasons leading to this result. Firstly, the messages, which are transmitted on the quantum and classical channels, are not protected by message authentication. Secondly, the last participant in group 1 knows more information about the shared secret by the two groups. This result shows that there are some hidden security loopholes in this kind of quantum secret sharing protocols.
Recently, Liu et al (2011 Phys. Scr. 84 045015) pointed out that the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol based on the GHZ state (Hwang et al 2011 Phys. Scr. 83 045004) is insecure. They found that an inside participant can deduce half of the sender's secret information directly just by his piece of the secret. In order to resist this attack, an improvement was put forward. However, in this paper, we find that Liu et al 's improved protocol is still insecure. We give details of three attack strategies to steal the secret information. It is shown that the eavesdropper can steal half or all of the secret information. Furthermore, a simple and ingenious MQSS protocol is proposed. We perform explicit cryptanalysis to prove that our improved protocol can resist the attacks from both the outside attackers and the inside participants, even the collusion attack.
In this paper, the perfect secret sharing in quantum cryptography is investigated. On one hand, the security of a recent protocol [Adhikari et al. Quantum Inform. \& Comput. 12 (2012) 0253-0261] is re-examined. We find that it violates the requirement of information theoretic security in the secret sharing and suffers from the information leakage. The cryptanalysis including several specific attack strategies are given, which shows that a dishonest participant can steal half or all of the secrets without being detected. On the other hand, we design a new quantum secret sharing protocol. The security of protocol is rigorously proved. It meets the fundamental requirement of information theoretic security. Furthermore, the security analysis including both the outside attacks and participant attacks is given in details. It is shown that our proposed protocol can achieve perfect secret sharing.