Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Philosophy of Science

Some Consequences of the Positivistic Interpretation of Physics

A. V. Bushkovitch

Published Jan 1, 1940• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The prevailing philosophical mood among those physicists today whose interests are mainly in the field of modern atomic theory, is some form of positivism. This is true not only of the leaders in the field of quantum mechanics, as for instance Heisenberg, Jordan, and Dirac, in whose writings on the philosophical aspects of the recent revolutionary advances in physics the positivistic tendency is clearly visible, but also of the rank and file of competent students of the modern quantum theory.

DOI
10.1086/286609

Related papers

Quantum Mechanics

Richard Healey

The early twentieth century saw the development of two revolutionary physical theories: relativity (see space, time and relativity) and quantum mechanics. Relativity theory had an immediate impact on the rise of logical positivism, as philosophers like Carnap, Reichenbach, and Schlick struggled to come to terms with its content and implications (see logical positivism). By contrast, discussion of philosophical issues raised by quantum mechanics began among physicists who created the theory before being taken up by technically inclined philosophers of science.

Wiley eBooks•Sep 1, 2017•0 citations

Critical Points in Modern Physical Theory

Henry Margenau

Recent discussions in the physical literature, designed to clarify the logical position of modern physical theory, have brought to light an amazing divergence of fundamental attitudes which may well bewilder the careful student of physics as well as philosophy. Quantum mechanics, representing an abstract formalism, should be capable of having its logical structure analyzed with great precision like any other mathematical discipline. Its consequences in all problems to which its method can be applied are so unambiguous, consistent, and successful in predicting physical experience as to disperse immediately all thoughts of possible discrepancies in its fundamental texture. Yet it must be said that even the founders of quantum theory are not in harmony in their various expositions of the bases of that theory. However, while this situation seems disquieting on the face of it, there is no cause for serious brow raising, for it is a fact that there exists agreement with regard to the central axioms of the theory, and that the ambiguities affect only their philosophical interpretation, a field in which differences of opinion may at present be honestly entertained.

Philosophy of Science•Jul 1, 1937•58 citations

Heisenberg and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: The Physicist as Philosopher

Kristian Camilleri

This book provides a new perspective on Heisenberg's interpretation of quantum mechanics for researchers and graduate students in the history and philosophy of physics.

•Feb 23, 2009•76 citations

PHILOSOPHY AND QUANTUM PHYSICS

Rom Harr

THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative

•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations

Reflections on the philosophy of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger

Abner Shimony

Many of the pioneers of quantum mechanics – notably Planck, Einstein, Bohr, de Broglie, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Born, Jordan, Landé, Wigner, and London – were seriously concerned with philosophical problems. In each case one can ask a question of psychological and historical interest: was it a philosophical penchant which drew the investigator towards a kind of physics research which is linked to philosophy, or was it rather that the conceptual difficulties of fundamental physics pulled him willynilly into the labyrinth of philosophy? I shall not undertake to discuss this question, but shall cite an opinion of Peter Bergmann, which I find congenial: he learned from Einstein that “the theoretical physicist is … a philosopher in workingman's clothes” ([1], q. v.).

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Feb 26, 1993•3 citations

Did Logical Positivism Influence the Early Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics?

Jan Faye, Rasmus Jaksland

This chapter explores the relation between logical positivism and the early development and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Despite frequent claims to the contrary, we find that logical positivism did not influence physicists’ view of quantum mechanics until well into the 1930s, if at all. Special emphasis is given to Niels Bohr due to his central role in the understanding of the new physics. While Bohr was in contact with several central figures of logical positivism and on several occasions expressed his agreement with them, we find that Bohr developed his main ideas concerning quantum mechanics well before this contact was made. Instead, this chapter speculates that it was Bohr who tried to influence logical positivism: Bohr believed that understanding quantum mechanics provided us with a general philosophical lesson to which the logical positivist would be responsive. Because of similarities in viewpoints, Bohr apparently had hoped that this might compel the logical positivists to join him in the attempt to extend his ideas of complementarity and contextualism beyond quantum mechanics.

Routledge eBooks•Mar 2, 2021•3 citations
The prevailing philosophical mood among those physicists today whose interests are mainly in the field of modern atomic theory, is some form of positivism. This is true not only of the leaders in the field of quantum mechanics, as for instance Heisenberg, Jordan, and Dirac, in whose writings on the philosophical aspects of the recent revolutionary advances in physics the positivistic tendency is clearly visible, but also of the rank and file of competent students of the modern quantum theory.
The early twentieth century saw the development of two revolutionary physical theories: relativity (see space, time and relativity) and quantum mechanics. Relativity theory had an immediate impact on the rise of logical positivism, as philosophers like Carnap, Reichenbach, and Schlick struggled to come to terms with its content and implications (see logical positivism). By contrast, discussion of philosophical issues raised by quantum mechanics began among physicists who created the theory before being taken up by technically inclined philosophers of science.
Recent discussions in the physical literature, designed to clarify the logical position of modern physical theory, have brought to light an amazing divergence of fundamental attitudes which may well bewilder the careful student of physics as well as philosophy. Quantum mechanics, representing an abstract formalism, should be capable of having its logical structure analyzed with great precision like any other mathematical discipline. Its consequences in all problems to which its method can be applied are so unambiguous, consistent, and successful in predicting physical experience as to disperse immediately all thoughts of possible discrepancies in its fundamental texture. Yet it must be said that even the founders of quantum theory are not in harmony in their various expositions of the bases of that theory. However, while this situation seems disquieting on the face of it, there is no cause for serious brow raising, for it is a fact that there exists agreement with regard to the central axioms of the theory, and that the ambiguities affect only their philosophical interpretation, a field in which differences of opinion may at present be honestly entertained.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
Many of the pioneers of quantum mechanics – notably Planck, Einstein, Bohr, de Broglie, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Born, Jordan, Landé, Wigner, and London – were seriously concerned with philosophical problems. In each case one can ask a question of psychological and historical interest: was it a philosophical penchant which drew the investigator towards a kind of physics research which is linked to philosophy, or was it rather that the conceptual difficulties of fundamental physics pulled him willynilly into the labyrinth of philosophy? I shall not undertake to discuss this question, but shall cite an opinion of Peter Bergmann, which I find congenial: he learned from Einstein that “the theoretical physicist is … a philosopher in workingman's clothes” ([1], q. v.).
This chapter explores the relation between logical positivism and the early development and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Despite frequent claims to the contrary, we find that logical positivism did not influence physicists’ view of quantum mechanics until well into the 1930s, if at all. Special emphasis is given to Niels Bohr due to his central role in the understanding of the new physics. While Bohr was in contact with several central figures of logical positivism and on several occasions expressed his agreement with them, we find that Bohr developed his main ideas concerning quantum mechanics well before this contact was made. Instead, this chapter speculates that it was Bohr who tried to influence logical positivism: Bohr believed that understanding quantum mechanics provided us with a general philosophical lesson to which the logical positivist would be responsive. Because of similarities in viewpoints, Bohr apparently had hoped that this might compel the logical positivists to join him in the attempt to extend his ideas of complementarity and contextualism beyond quantum mechanics.