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Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical

A periodic point-based method for the analysis of Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 symmetric quantum games

David M. Schneider

Published Feb 9, 2011• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We present a novel method of looking at Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 quantum games. Our method is based on a mathematical connection between the problem of identifying Nash equilibria in game theory, and the topological problem of the periodic points in nonlinear maps. To adapt our method to the original protocol designed by Eisert et al (1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 3077–80) to study quantum games, we are forced to extend the space of strategies from the initial proposal. We apply our method to the extended strategy space version of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and find that a new set of Nash equilibria emerge in a natural way. Nash equilibria in this set are optimal as Eisert's solution of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and include this solution as a limit case.

DOI
10.1088/1751-8113/44/9/095301

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We present a novel method of looking at Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 quantum games. Our method is based on a mathematical connection between the problem of identifying Nash equilibria in game theory, and the topological problem of the periodic points in nonlinear maps. To adapt our method to the original protocol designed by Eisert et al (1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 3077–80) to study quantum games, we are forced to extend the space of strategies from the initial proposal. We apply our method to the extended strategy space version of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and find that a new set of Nash equilibria emerge in a natural way. Nash equilibria in this set are optimal as Eisert's solution of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and include this solution as a limit case.
We extend the periodic point-based method for Eisert's quantum games (Schneider 2011 J. Phys. A: Math. Theor. 44 095301) to games not previously analyzed. From the comparison of different cases, we observe that games sharing the same classical features (as for instance the symmetrized Battle of the Sexes and the Chicken game) can have different characteristics after the quantization, and conversely, games with different classical behaviors (the Chicken game and the Prisoner's dilemma), are completely equivalent within Eisert's protocol. This fact is reflected in the structure of the map that the periodic point-procedure associates to the quantum game (from which the Nash equilibria are deduced). In order to understand how these unexpected outcomes are generated, we give a geometrical description of our observations in terms of bifurcation theory for maps.
The concept of Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum extensions of the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated. The process of quantization involves incorporating two additional unitary strategies, which effectively expand the classical game. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. The resulting Nash equilibria are found to be more closely aligned with Pareto-optimal solutions than those of the conventional Nash equilibrium outcome of the classical game. Our results demonstrate the complexity and diversity of strategic behavior in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In particular, we provide a detailed characterization of strategy profiles and their corresponding Nash equilibria, thereby extending the understanding of quantum strategies' impact on traditional game-theoretical problems.
We present a novel formulation of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition, which has the merit that the entanglement of quantum strategies is manifestly quantified. We apply this formulation to 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games and obtain a complete set of quantum Nash equilibria. Apart from those available with the maximal entanglement, these quantum Nash equilibria are extensions of the Nash equilibria in classical game theory. The phase structure of the equilibria is determined for all values of entanglement, and thereby the possibility of resolving the dilemmas by entanglement in the game of Chicken, the Battle of the Sexes, the Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Stag Hunt, is examined. We find that entanglement transforms these dilemmas with each other but cannot resolve them, except in the Stag Hunt game where the dilemma can be alleviated to a certain degree.
For any two-by-two game G \mathbf {G} , we define a new two-player game G Q \mathbf {G}^Q . The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game G \mathbf {G} communicating via quantum technology according to the protocol introduced by J. Eisert and M. Wilkins. In the game G Q \mathbf {G}^Q , each player’s (mixed) strategy set consists of the set of all probability distributions on the 3-sphere S 3 \mathbf {S}^3 . Nash equilibria in the game can be difficult to compute. Our main theorems classify all possible mixed-strategy equilibria. First, we show that up to a suitable definition of equivalence, any strategy that arises in equilibrium is supported on at most four points; then we show that those four points must lie in one of a small number of allowable geometric configurations.
A quantum approach to twice-repeated 2×22\times 22×2 game
Abstract This work proposes an extension of the well-known Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein scheme for playing a twice repeated 2×22\times 22×2 2 × 2 game using a single quantum system with ten maximally entangled qubits. The proposed scheme is then applied to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Rational strategy profiles are examined in the presence of limited awareness of the players. In particular, the paper considers two cases of a classical player against a quantum player game: the first case when the classical player does not know that his opponent is a quantum one and the second case, when the classical player is aware of it. To this end, the notion of unawareness was used, and the extended Nash equilibria were determined.
A quantum game in the Eisert scheme is defined by the payoff matrix, plus some quantum entanglement parameters. In the symmetric nonzero-sum 2x2 games, the relevant features of the game are given by two parameters in the payoff matrix, and only one extra entanglement parameter is introduced by quantizing it in the Eisert scheme. The criteria adopted in this work to classify quantum games are the amount and characteristics of Nash equilibria and Pareto-optimal positions. A new classification based on them is developed for symmetric nonzero-sum classical 2x2 games, as well as classifications for quantum games with different restricted subsets of the total strategy set. Finally, a classification is presented taking the whole set of strategies into account, both unitary strategies and nonunitary strategies studied as convex mixures of unitary strategies. The classification reproduces features which have been previously found in other works, like appearance of multiple equilibria, changes in the character of equilibria, and entanglement regime transitions.