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Foundations of Physics

Toward a factually induced space-time quantum logic

Mioara Mugur-Schächter

Published Jul 1, 1992• 7 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf01889688

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Based on a clear ontology of material individuals, we analyze in detail the factual semantics of quantum theory, and argue that the basic mathematical formalism of quantum theory is just okay with (a certain form of ) realism and that it is perfectly applicable to quantum gravity. This is basically a process about 'cleansing' the formalism from semantic assumptions and physical referents that it doesn't really need (we use the term 'semantics' in the sense of the factual semantics of a physical theory, and not in the sense of model theory of abstract mathematics or logic). We base our study on the usual non-Boolean lattice of projectors in a Hilbert space and probability measures on it, to which we give a careful physical interpretation using the mentioned tools in order to avoid the usual problems posed by this task. At the end, we study a possible connection with the theory of quantum duration and time proposed in [arXiv:2012.03994, arXiv:2107.06693], for which this paper serves as a philosophical basis, and argue for our view that quantum gravity may show that what we perceive as change in the classical world was just (an ontologically fundamental) quantum collapse all along.
Quantum non-locality has become a popular term. Yet, its precise meaning, and even its mere existence, is the subject of controversies. The main cause of the controversies is the never ending discussion on the appropriate definitions of Locality and Realism in the derivation of Bell's inequalities. On the other hand, Louis Sica derived Bell's inequalities from the hypothesis that time series of outcomes observed in one station do not change if the setting in the other (distant) station is changed. The derivation is based on arithmetical properties of time series only; it does not involve the definitions of Locality, Realism and probabilities, and is valid for series of any length. An important consequence is that violation of Bell's inequalities implies the series recorded (at the same time) in one station to be different if the setting in the other station is changed. This result gives precise meaning to the idea of quantum non-locality, and also makes evident why using it for faster than light signaling is impossible (because the difference is between factual and counter-factual series). Finally, it is demonstrated that series of outcomes, even if they violate Bell's inequalities, can be always embedded in a set of factual and counter-factual data that does hold to Bell's inequalities. Loosely speaking, the factual world may be quantum or not, but the union of factual and counter-factual worlds is always classical.
In an empirical logic, an experimentally verifiable proposition P relating to a quantum system is assigned the value of either true of false if the system is in the pure state that belongs or, respectively, does not belong to the Hilbert subspace that represents P. Determined in such a way, truth or falsity of P can be termed “a factual truth-value” of P. In this present paper, it is proposed to consider “a counter-factual truth-value” of P, i.e., either of the values, true or false, that might have been taken by P if the system had been in a pure state belonging to a Hilbert subspace that does not represent P. The assumption that it is always possible to speak meaningfully of counter-factual truth-values of experimental propositions can be called “the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness.” As shown in this paper, this hypothesis lies at the basis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (known as EPR) paradox, a striking and influential thought experiment intended to defy predictions of quantum mechanics, such as the one where measurements of spin along the different axes are incompatible. The purpose of this paper is to show that this hypothesis can be falsified by declining to paste together invariant-subspace lattices of contexts associated with the system (in other words, Boolean algebras or blocks) into one Hilbert lattice. Without such pasting, the EPR paradoxical inference cannot be reached.