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New Journal of Physics

The criterion for time symmetry of probabilistic theories and the reversibility of quantum mechanics

Andrew Holster

Published Oct 9, 2003• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Physicists routinely claim that the fundamental laws of physics are 'time symmetric' or 'time reversal invariant' or 'reversible'. In particular, it is claimed that the theory of quantum mechanics is time symmetric. But it is shown in this paper that the orthodox analysis suffers from a fatal conceptual error, because the logical criterion for judging the time symmetry of probabilistic theories has been incorrectly formulated. The correct criterion requires symmetry between future-directed laws and past-directed laws. This criterion is formulated and proved in detail. The orthodox claim that quantum mechanics is reversible is re-evaluated. The property demonstrated in the orthodox analysis is shown to be quite distinct from time reversal invariance. The view of Satosi Watanabe that quantum mechanics is time asymmetric is verified, as well as his view that this feature does not merely show a de facto or 'contingent' asymmetry, as commonly supposed, but implies a genuine failure of time reversal invariance of the laws of quantum mechanics. The laws of quantum mechanics would be incompatible with a time-reversed version of our universe.

DOI
10.1088/1367-2630/5/1/130

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Physicists routinely claim that the fundamental laws of physics are 'time symmetric' or 'time reversal invariant' or 'reversible'. In particular, it is claimed that the theory of quantum mechanics is time symmetric. But it is shown in this paper that the orthodox analysis suffers from a fatal conceptual error, because the logical criterion for judging the time symmetry of probabilistic theories has been incorrectly formulated. The correct criterion requires symmetry between future-directed laws and past-directed laws. This criterion is formulated and proved in detail. The orthodox claim that quantum mechanics is reversible is re-evaluated. The property demonstrated in the orthodox analysis is shown to be quite distinct from time reversal invariance. The view of Satosi Watanabe that quantum mechanics is time asymmetric is verified, as well as his view that this feature does not merely show a de facto or 'contingent' asymmetry, as commonly supposed, but implies a genuine failure of time reversal invariance of the laws of quantum mechanics. The laws of quantum mechanics would be incompatible with a time-reversed version of our universe.
In this paper I shall shed some doubts on a widely-held claim: standard quantum mechanics is time-reversal invariant, and thereby, blind to the direction of time. Building bridges between physics and philosophy, I shall argue that such a claim features some puzzling assumptions that are frequently overlooked in the literature. In particular, I shall first argue that the claim involves some methodological and metaphysical commitments that should be evaluated more prudently from philosophy and from physics. Second, I shall point out that the common inference that goes from symmetry to metaphysical conclusions needs some correction and refinement to be acceptable for time symmetry and the debate around the arrow of time
In a classical mechanical world, the fundamental laws of nature are reversible. The laws of nature treat the past and future as mirror images of each other. Temporally asymmetric phenomena are ultimately said to arise from initial conditions. But are the laws of nature also reversible in a quantum world? This paper argues that they are not, that time in a quantum world prefers a particular ‘hand’ or ordering. I argue, first, that the probabilistic algorithm used in the theory picks out a preferred direction of time for almost all interpretations of the theory, and second, that contrary to the received wisdom the Schrödinger evolution is also irreversible. The status of Wigner reversal invariance is then discussed. I conclude that the quantum world is fundamentally irreversible, but manages to appear (thanks to Wigner reversal invariance) reversible at the classical level.
The aim of this paper is to analyze time‐asymmetric quantum mechanics with respect to the problems of irreversibility and of time’s arrow. We begin with arguing that both problems are conceptually different. Then, we show that, contrary to a common opinion, the theory’s ability to describe irreversible quantum processes is not a consequence of the semigroup evolution laws expressing the non‐time‐reversal invariance of the theory. Finally, we argue that time‐asymmetric quantum mechanics, either in Prigogine’s version or in Bohm’s version, does not solve the problem of the arrow of time because it does not supply a substantial and theoretically founded criterion for distinguishing between the two directions of time.
Dynamical collapse models embody the idea of a physical collapse of the wave function in a mathematically well-defined way. They involve modifications to the standard rules of quantum theory in order to describe collapse as a physical process. This appears to introduce a time reversal asymmetry into the dynamics since the state at any given time depends on collapses in the past but not in the future. Here we challenge this conclusion by demonstrating that, subject to specified model constraints, collapse models can be given a structurally time symmetric formulation in which the collapse events are the primitive objects of the theory. Three different examples of time asymmetries associated with collapse models are then examined and in each case it is shown that the same dynamical rule determining the collapse events works in both the forward and backward in time directions. Any physically observed time asymmetries that arise in such models are due to the asymmetric imposition of initial or final time boundary conditions, rather than from an inherent asymmetry in the dynamical law. This is the standard explanation of time asymmetric behaviour resulting from time symmetric laws.
Symmetries have a crucial role in today's physics. In this thesis, we are mostly concerned with time reversal invariance (T-symmetry). A physical system is time reversal invariant if its underlying laws are not sensitive to the direction of time. There are various accounts of time reversal transformation resulting in different views on whether or not a given theory in physics is time reversal invariant. With a focus on quantum mechanics, I describe the standard account of time reversal and compare it with my alternative account, arguing why it deserves serious attention. Then, I review three known ways to T-violation in quantum mechanics, and explain two unique experiments made to detect it in the neutral K and B mesons.
This dissertation is about the sense in which the laws of quantum theory distinguish between the past and the future. I begin with an account of what it means for quantum theory to make such a distinction, by providing a novel derivation of the meaning of "time reversal." I then show that if Galilei invariant quantum theory does distinguish a preferred direction in time, then this has consequences for the ontology of the theory. In particular, it requires matter to admit "internal" degrees of freedom, in that the position observable generates a maximal abelian algebra. I proceed to show that this is not a purely quantum phenomenon, but can be expressed in classical mechanics as well. I then illustrate three routes for generating quantum systems that distinguish a preferred temporal direction in this way.