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Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series A Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character

A collision problem in the wave mechanics

C. G. DARWIN

Published Jun 4, 1929• 49 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In the present work the wave mechanics are applied to the discussion of a collision problem of a more complicated type than has, I think, hitherto been done. Though there is nothing very new in the process it is rather interesting to see how a wave function behaves which involves two bodies, and is therefore outside our ordinary space intuitions. But the work had a much more general aim, as an attempt to see whether a sharper line of demarcation could be drawn between the particle-like and the wave-like properties of matter. Put briefly, I take a problem which would be regarded at first sight as irreconcilable with a pure wave theory, but thoroughly typical of the behaviour of particles, and show how in fact the correct result arises naturally from the consideration of wave alone. I have been led in this way to certain not very original speculation on the basis of the quantum theory and these are given at the end of the paper. These are not in the least intended to be a general formulation of the theory, but rather as an examination of a particular type of attempted formulation. I fear that the views expressed will be found partly obvious and perhaps partly inconsistent or even erroneous. My excuse for giving them is that the quantum theory seem already sufficiently developed for us to attempt something more than a mathematical formulation of it, and that a generally accepted physical understanding will be more quickly reached by agreement or disagreement with expressed opinions, than by waiting for the arrival of a full-grown theory. It has been an extraordinarily difficult task to express the ideas I intended, and I wish to thank Prof. D. R. Hartree for many valuable criticisms of my first attempts to do so, though he must be exonerated from all blame if the final result is unintelligible or erroneous. 1. The quantum mechanics have been expressed in a variety of ways, which place the emphasis differently, but it has been shown that they are all exactly equivalent, so what may choose which we will. I shall use the following description, limiting myself to the simpler cases which do not involve considerations of relativity. We take a partial differential equation of the wave type, set down according to certain rules depending on the particular system considered. We solve this subject to certain boundary conditions, expressive of all the limitations imposed by silts, mirrors, diffraction, gratings, moving shutters, etc., that may occur in the proposed system, and obtain as result the wave function Ψ, a function of all the co-ordinates of the system and of the time. From this we from a set of functions, of which the simplest is |Ψ|2; this process may be called taking the intensities. We next have to prepare for the particle aspect, by applying certain rules so as to normalise the intensities, a process entirely foreign to the idea of waves. Finally, we make the interpretation, in which we say that the normalised intensities measure the probability of the particles having such and such positions, momenta, energies, etc., and these are the results verified by observation.

DOI
10.1098/rspa.1929.0123

Related papers

Notes on the theory of radiation

C. G. DARWIN

Abstract It will probably be agreed that among all the recent developments of the quantum theory, one of the least satisfactory is the theory of radiation. The present paper is intended as a preliminary to a new line of attack on the subject. It was begun some time ago, but owing to lack of success in carrying it to a conclusion, its publication has been much delayed. In the meantime other papers have appeared, which in some respects follow the same train of thought. The authors of these works have carried their methods further in some directions than I have attempted, but there is still perhaps room for the discussion of a number of questions from the rather different point of view adopted here. 1. The main principle of the present work is the idea that, since matter and light both possess the dual characters of particle and wave, a similar mathematical treatment ought to be applied to both, and that this has not yet bee done as fully as should be possible. Whereas we have a fairly complete calculus for dealing with the behaviour of any number of electrons or atoms, for photons the existing processes are much less satisfactory. The central difficulty, which makes it hard to apply the ordinary methods of wave mechanics to light, is the fact that (at least according to our present ideas) photons can be created and annihilated, and to represent this in a wave system we have to be able to think of a medium suddenly coming into existence and then going out again, when the light that it was carrying is absorbed. Such behaviour is a grave difficulty in the way of allowing us to think of the photon as a wave, and tends to make us think with more favour of its particle aspect, until we recall that after all it is quite unlike any known particle to come into existence and later to disappear without trace. The theories at present current, such as that of Heisenberg and Pauli, avoid these difficulties because they are mainly formal generalisations of the classical theory; this frees them from the above difficulties, but they pay for it in being highly abstract, and, as it has turned out, rather unsuccessful.

Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series A Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character•May 2, 1932•101 citations

On the foundations of the electron wave equation

Samuel Roslington Milner

Abstract 1. There are two problems which are fundamental to wave mechanics— that of deducing from first principles the properties of the wave field of ψ, by means of which, on modern theory, the mechanical properties of matter are to be described, and that of formulating a logical description of the properties of matter in terms of ψ. The former only of these problems is discussed in this communication. In spite of many valuable papers that have been published on the subject of Dirac’s remarkable wave equation, the derivation of the equation still seemed (to the present writer, at any rate,) to include some obscurities which could perhaps be removed. To some extent this is owing to the development of the equation, as a matter of historical necessity, having come about by successive extensions to classical mechanics; so that some difficulties have been produced by the fundamental relativity considerations having been introduced into the theory at a late stage, instead of in their proper place at the beginning. In what follows, by treating the problem from the beginning as a four-dimensional one, a deduction of the wave equation free from empirical steps is, I think, obtained, while also certain new features of the equation are brought to light. 2. The Principle of Action.—The method of four-dimensional mechanics is to assume that the motions of bodies in the world can be represented by “tracks,” or curved lines, in a “fourfold.” (This last term will be used here to mean a four-dimensional manifold with Euclidian geometry, i. e., in which ds2 = dxi2 (i = 1, . . . 4).) (1) Uniform motion in the world is represented by straight line tracks in the fourfold, and the “classical relativity” laws of motion are derived by formulating the simplest mathematical specification of curved tracks which will represent the non-uniform motions of bodies that are usually observed in the world.

Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series A Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character•Feb 1, 1933•1 citation

The Basic Approach

Our goal in this treatment of quantum theory is to provide those aspects of the theory which are most needed for a modem understanding of the world of our experience. Central to this are the many approximations which have turned out to be successful for estimating the properties of matter and predicting the events which occur on a microscopic scale. In that sense the goal is entirely pragmatic, but any study of quantum theory cannot help but raise deep philosophical questions. Perhaps the only real understanding of the theory is through a familiarity with how it works out for many different problems. It seems unlikely that understanding comes from thinking about some complicated extreme case, such as Schroedinger's cat. The approach we take here bypasses much of the question by starting with a single premise of wave-particle duality, from which follows all of quantum theory and its interpretation. Any remaining problems are made moot by the quantum-mechanical view that questions are meaningful only if there is some conceivable experimental way to test the answers. In keeping with this pragmatic approach we will not emphasize mathematical derivations, nor carry out the detailed analysis of harmonic-oscillator states, hydrogen wavefunctions, or angular momentum, which are part of almost all texts in quantum theory. We treat the simplest case in detail, state the general results, and see that they are the plausible generalizations. We leave the more detailed analysis to other texts. The one we used for the course at Stanford was Kroemer's Quantum Mechanics for Engineers and Materials Scientists , which served very well.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Jul 1, 2000•0 citations

The properties of wave tensors

Arthur Stanley Eddington

Abstract 1. In wave-mechanics there occur in addition to the ordinary physical vectors and tensors the four-valued quantities Ψ, Ψ introduced by Dirac. In this combination certain relations of invariance in regard to transformation appear which had escaped the ordinary tensor calculus. If we call the new type of quantity involving Ψ and its combinations Ψ-tensor, the position is that we cannot reach Ψ-tensors from the calculus of ordinary space tensors, but we can reach space tensors from a calculus of Ψ-tensors. I have shown that although Ψ-vectors cannot be expressed in terms of space vectors, mixed Ψ-tensors can be immediately resolved into space vectors. The present paper contains a simplification and systematisation of my earlier work on the Ψ-tensor calculus as well as a number of new results. The particular point round which the new results centre is as follows. The Ψ-tensors occurring in wave-mechanics are the product of two Ψ-vectors (Ψ, Ψ), and apparently the primary reason for introducing the unobservable quantity Ψ rather than working with physical tensors throughout is to impose this condition. I therefore examine the question: If we impose the condition that a wave tensor is the product of two Ψ-vectors, what is the corresponding restriction on the physical tensors equivalent to it ? The answer is (§7) that whatever is described by two Ψ-vectors Ψ, Ψ can equivalently be described by two space vectors of equal length at right angles to one another. One of these is the momentum vector; the other (generally ignored in current investigations) presumably represents positional relations (co-ordinates or distance); or rather I would regard it as the source of positional relations, which can only become explicit in more complicated developments involving many particles. The ordinary wave equation for one particle is obtained as an identity.

Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series A Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character•Sep 1, 1931•4 citations

Wave mechanics

Guido Bacciagaluppi, Antony Valentini

Under this name at present two theories are being carried on, which are indeed closely related but not identical. The first, which follows on directly from the famous doctoral thesis by L. de Broglie, concerns waves in three-dimensional space. Because of the strictly relativistic treatment that is adopted in this version from the outset, we shall refer to it as the four-dimensional wave mechanics. The other theory is more remote from Mr de Broglie's original ideas, insofar as it is based on a wave-like process in the space of position coordinates (q-space) of an arbitrary mechanical system. We shall therefore call it the multi-dimensional wave mechanics. Of course this use of the q-space is to be seen only as a mathematical tool, as it is often applied also in the old mechanics; ultimately, in this version also, the process to be described is one in space and time. In truth, however, a complete unification of the two conceptions has not yet been achieved. Anything over and above the motion of a single electron could be treated so far only in the multi-dimensional version; also, this is the one that provides the mathematical solution to the problems posed by the Heisenberg–Born matrix mechanics. For these reasons I shall place it first, hoping in this way also to illustrate better the characteristic difficulties of the as such more beautiful four-dimensional version.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 22, 2009•2 citations

The World in the Wave Function

David J. Wallace

David Lewis famously quipped that he was willing to take metaphysical lessons from quantum mechanics only when it cleaned up its own act by providing interpretations or modifications of the formalism shorn of appeal to consciousness, irreducibly macroscopic notions, or outright instrumentalism. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, multiple approaches to quantum mechanics had been developed to a degree which met Lewis’s challenge: dynamical-collapse theories, Bohm-style hidden-variable theories, and Everett-style many-worlds theories, for all their respective problems and challenges, all offer ways of understanding quantum mechanics that metaphysicians can reasonably engage with. And so the last twenty years have seen a resurgence in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, the question of what ontology and ideology is appropriate to a quantum universe. The metaphysics of quantum mechanics is not independent of the quantum measurement problem but does not coincide with it, either: there is a widespread view that adopting, say, the Everett interpretation still leaves significant ontological questions undecided, and conversely, a given answer to those questions might answer them for a dynamical-collapse theory too.Wave function realism has become a leading contender for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, particularly in the case of dynamical-collapse and Everettian approaches. The starting point is nonrelativistic quantum mechanics expressed in configuration space: mathematically, the subject matter of the theory is a complex function of 3N variables, evolving under the Schrödinger equation (perhaps interrupted by occasional stochastic collapses). Traditionally those 3N variables are interpreted as the three coordinates of position of N particles—but in wave function realism, they are interpreted as points in a new, high-dimensional space. Quantum mechanics, according to the wave function realist, fundamentally concerns the undulations of the wave function in this space; three-dimensional goings-on are emergent, high-level, derivative.Alyssa Ney has been a leading figure in the development of wave function realism for most of its existence. Her articles advocating and developing the position have been highly influential, and the present book can be seen as the culmination of this line of her research and is the definitive statement of wave function realism as of 2021. Despite its comparative brevity, the book is too rich to be adequately described—far less critiqued—in this brief review; my goal is to give an overview of the main themes and arguments, and to make a few critical remarks along the way.The World in the Wavefunction is not formally divided into parts, but it can profitably be thought of that way. Chapters 1 through 3 develop the core case for wave function realism. Chapter 4 defends the position from the frequent criticism that it is restricted to nonrelativistic physics, by providing a version of wave function realism appropriate to quantum field theory. And chapters 5 through 7 are an extended exploration of how the observed three-dimensional world can be understood as emerging from a high-dimensional fundamental reality.The case Ney makes in chapters 1 through 3 for wavefunction realism is modest and cautious. In chapter 1 she provides a fairly standard—though elegantly expressed—case for the prima facie plausibility of wave function realism simply based on the fact that standard formulations of quantum mechanics are written in 3N dimensions, and on the (related) fact that entanglement means we cannot interpret quantum mechanics simply in terms of spatially localized particles and nothing else. But in chapter 2 she explicitly argues against any attempt to strengthen these plausibility arguments into reasons why wave function realism must be adopted; indeed, she provides a detailed and sympathetic taxonomy of the alternatives to wave function realism that have been developed, all of which she regards as entirely viable. (Chapter 2 of the book could profitably be used as introductory reading for a general graduate course on quantum metaphysics.) For Ney, the question of which metaphysics to adopt is a standard metaphysician’s question, to be answered by weighing strengths and weaknesses of the various alternatives against one another.In chapter 3, Ney identifies two such strengths for wave function realism. First, it is separable: we can specify the complete state of the universe point-by-point on the fundamental space, without any need to appeal to irreducible holism. Second, it is dynamically local: expressed in 3N-dimensional space, the Schrödinger dynamics involve no action at a distance.Ney makes the case for separability at length. Her case for dynamical locality is brief: she regards it as a straightforward consequence of the fact that the Schrödinger equation is a differential equation, so that the rate of change of the wave function at a point x depends only on the wave function arbitrarily close to x. But I think there is more worth investigating here: after all, the nonrelativistic Schrödinger equation may be a differential equation, but it is a parabolic differential equation, with no maximum speed of propagation: the rate of change of the wave function at x may depend only on a neighborhood of x, but the value of the wavefunction at x an arbitrarily short time later depends on the wave function everywhere in space. (And this is not—or not straightforwardly—just an artifact of ignoring relativity.)But in any case, why think that a separable, local theory is preferable to the alternative? Ney claims that separability and locality are more intuitive and lead to a more comprehensible ontology—and she makes an unabashed defense of intuitiveness and explicability as theoretical virtues. She is quite explicit that her reasons are pragmatic: intuitive theories benefit students and teachers; they are better suited to help us develop new theories; they speak better to the reasons why many students (Ney included) want to study physics in the first place. The implied metaphilosophy here is fascinating and it would be good to see it developed further in subsequent work: Ney seems to reject the mainstream modern approach to ontology (in which these pragmatic virtues are not obviously relevant to the truth of wave function realism) in favor of something neo-Carnapian where (so far as I can see) the goal of a quantum ontology is to help us get a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics, and that’s all there is to it. This also fits naturally with the pluralism she urges, in which approaches other than hers can also be valuable.Chapter 4—on relativistic generalizations of wavefunction realism—attempts both a conceptual and a technical task. The conceptual task is to argue that wavefunction realism per se is not wedded to any particular theory or choice of Hilbert-space basis within the theory: rather, wave function realism is any strategy that reifies a high-dimensional space in order to produce a separable local quantum ontology. If so, there is no block in principle to a relativistic generalization of the approach: we just need to find some appropriate high-dimensional space to describe the quantum state in relativistic quantum theory.The general philosophical point is well taken and convincingly defended (though it’s important to note that while arbitrary choices of Hilbert-space basis will give a separable theory, there is no reason to assume they will give a dynamically local theory: even something as simple as shifting from the position to the momentum basis in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics transforms the Schrödinger equation into something explicitly nonlocal). Unfortunately, I don’t think Ney succeeds in giving a clear statement of the high-dimensional space she has in mind for quantum field theory. This is one place where her laudable goal of making the book intelligible to nonspecialists becomes problematic: she makes many suggestive and interesting comments on quantum field theory, but there is no explicit, precise, mathematical statement of her view that can be contrasted with the explicit, precise, mathematical representation of the state in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a complex function on 3N-dimensional space.In the last part of the book—concerned with the emergence of ordinary three-dimensional ontology—Ney begins (chapter 5) by rebutting influential arguments by Tim Maudlin, Valia Allori, Sheldon Goldstein, and others that it is empirically incoherent for a physical theory not to make precise, nonemergent, nonderivative statements about matter in three-dimensional space (for a theory not to have a primitive ontology, to use the standard term for it). Ney argues—persuasively, to me—that it is perfectly compatible with the way science usually works for a theory to make statements about the observable only in an indirect, derivative way, so that while it might be a desideratum for a theory to have a primitive ontology, it is not compulsory for it to do so in order to be empirically adequate. She goes on, though, to note that a satisfactory quantum metaphysics had better recover the existence of ordinary three-dimensional objects, on Moorean grounds: we are really confident that those objects exist!Chapter 6 is largely critical: an extended exegesis of the functionalist strategy for recovering higher-order ontology developed by David Albert, myself, and others. She raises two main criticisms of the functionalist strategy: it fails to distinguish between the wave function simulating three-dimensional objects and constituting those objects; it is restricted to recovering classical three-dimensional ontology, whereas we want to recover quantum-mechanical phenomena in three dimensions too. (The former objection is a development of criticisms by Bradley Monton, Tim Maudlin, and others; the latter is novel so far as I know.) For reasons of space, I won’t attempt to reply on behalf of the functionalist, but Ney certainly puts the challenge with admirable clarity.The final chapter of the book presents Ney’s positive account of emergent ontology, based not on functionalism but on considerations of symmetry (though she concedes that the separation is not completely sharp). Simplifying Ney’s subtle position: the permutation symmetries of quantum mechanics give a clear dynamical reason to regard certain decompositions of 3N-dimensional space (intuitively: those that decompose it into the N-fold product of Euclidean space) as preferred; that then licenses the metaphysical hypothesis that a localized wave function in 3N-dimensional space has, as its parts, particles in three-dimensional space. If the wave function is not localized (as will be the case generically, at least for the Everett interpretation), then we can think of those particles as being partially localized in various different regions of space.I have to say that I am not convinced this works, at least without a dynamical-collapse mechanism: in the Everett interpretation, it will yield an ontology where all the particles are completely delocalized. We only see a somewhat localized description of matter in three dimensions when we restrict to an Everett branch, and that restriction is normally motivated on functionalist grounds. But this may simply reflect subtleties of Ney’s intriguing proposal that I am not fully grasping at present.In summary, I congratulate Ney for a rich, subtle, and provocative account of wave function realism. Her edited collection of papers (coedited with Albert), The Wave Function, set the agenda for much of the metaphysics of quantum mechanics in the 2010s; The World in the Wave Function has a good chance of doing the same for the 2020s.

The Philosophical Review•Oct 1, 2022•2 citations
Abstract In the present work the wave mechanics are applied to the discussion of a collision problem of a more complicated type than has, I think, hitherto been done. Though there is nothing very new in the process it is rather interesting to see how a wave function behaves which involves two bodies, and is therefore outside our ordinary space intuitions. But the work had a much more general aim, as an attempt to see whether a sharper line of demarcation could be drawn between the particle-like and the wave-like properties of matter. Put briefly, I take a problem which would be regarded at first sight as irreconcilable with a pure wave theory, but thoroughly typical of the behaviour of particles, and show how in fact the correct result arises naturally from the consideration of wave alone. I have been led in this way to certain not very original speculation on the basis of the quantum theory and these are given at the end of the paper. These are not in the least intended to be a general formulation of the theory, but rather as an examination of a particular type of attempted formulation. I fear that the views expressed will be found partly obvious and perhaps partly inconsistent or even erroneous. My excuse for giving them is that the quantum theory seem already sufficiently developed for us to attempt something more than a mathematical formulation of it, and that a generally accepted physical understanding will be more quickly reached by agreement or disagreement with expressed opinions, than by waiting for the arrival of a full-grown theory. It has been an extraordinarily difficult task to express the ideas I intended, and I wish to thank Prof. D. R. Hartree for many valuable criticisms of my first attempts to do so, though he must be exonerated from all blame if the final result is unintelligible or erroneous. 1. The quantum mechanics have been expressed in a variety of ways, which place the emphasis differently, but it has been shown that they are all exactly equivalent, so what may choose which we will. I shall use the following description, limiting myself to the simpler cases which do not involve considerations of relativity. We take a partial differential equation of the wave type, set down according to certain rules depending on the particular system considered. We solve this subject to certain boundary conditions, expressive of all the limitations imposed by silts, mirrors, diffraction, gratings, moving shutters, etc., that may occur in the proposed system, and obtain as result the wave function Ψ, a function of all the co-ordinates of the system and of the time. From this we from a set of functions, of which the simplest is |Ψ|2; this process may be called taking the intensities. We next have to prepare for the particle aspect, by applying certain rules so as to normalise the intensities, a process entirely foreign to the idea of waves. Finally, we make the interpretation, in which we say that the normalised intensities measure the probability of the particles having such and such positions, momenta, energies, etc., and these are the results verified by observation.
Abstract It will probably be agreed that among all the recent developments of the quantum theory, one of the least satisfactory is the theory of radiation. The present paper is intended as a preliminary to a new line of attack on the subject. It was begun some time ago, but owing to lack of success in carrying it to a conclusion, its publication has been much delayed. In the meantime other papers have appeared, which in some respects follow the same train of thought. The authors of these works have carried their methods further in some directions than I have attempted, but there is still perhaps room for the discussion of a number of questions from the rather different point of view adopted here. 1. The main principle of the present work is the idea that, since matter and light both possess the dual characters of particle and wave, a similar mathematical treatment ought to be applied to both, and that this has not yet bee done as fully as should be possible. Whereas we have a fairly complete calculus for dealing with the behaviour of any number of electrons or atoms, for photons the existing processes are much less satisfactory. The central difficulty, which makes it hard to apply the ordinary methods of wave mechanics to light, is the fact that (at least according to our present ideas) photons can be created and annihilated, and to represent this in a wave system we have to be able to think of a medium suddenly coming into existence and then going out again, when the light that it was carrying is absorbed. Such behaviour is a grave difficulty in the way of allowing us to think of the photon as a wave, and tends to make us think with more favour of its particle aspect, until we recall that after all it is quite unlike any known particle to come into existence and later to disappear without trace. The theories at present current, such as that of Heisenberg and Pauli, avoid these difficulties because they are mainly formal generalisations of the classical theory; this frees them from the above difficulties, but they pay for it in being highly abstract, and, as it has turned out, rather unsuccessful.
Abstract 1. There are two problems which are fundamental to wave mechanics— that of deducing from first principles the properties of the wave field of ψ, by means of which, on modern theory, the mechanical properties of matter are to be described, and that of formulating a logical description of the properties of matter in terms of ψ. The former only of these problems is discussed in this communication. In spite of many valuable papers that have been published on the subject of Dirac’s remarkable wave equation, the derivation of the equation still seemed (to the present writer, at any rate,) to include some obscurities which could perhaps be removed. To some extent this is owing to the development of the equation, as a matter of historical necessity, having come about by successive extensions to classical mechanics; so that some difficulties have been produced by the fundamental relativity considerations having been introduced into the theory at a late stage, instead of in their proper place at the beginning. In what follows, by treating the problem from the beginning as a four-dimensional one, a deduction of the wave equation free from empirical steps is, I think, obtained, while also certain new features of the equation are brought to light. 2. The Principle of Action.—The method of four-dimensional mechanics is to assume that the motions of bodies in the world can be represented by “tracks,” or curved lines, in a “fourfold.” (This last term will be used here to mean a four-dimensional manifold with Euclidian geometry, i. e., in which ds2 = dxi2 (i = 1, . . . 4).) (1) Uniform motion in the world is represented by straight line tracks in the fourfold, and the “classical relativity” laws of motion are derived by formulating the simplest mathematical specification of curved tracks which will represent the non-uniform motions of bodies that are usually observed in the world.
Our goal in this treatment of quantum theory is to provide those aspects of the theory which are most needed for a modem understanding of the world of our experience. Central to this are the many approximations which have turned out to be successful for estimating the properties of matter and predicting the events which occur on a microscopic scale. In that sense the goal is entirely pragmatic, but any study of quantum theory cannot help but raise deep philosophical questions. Perhaps the only real understanding of the theory is through a familiarity with how it works out for many different problems. It seems unlikely that understanding comes from thinking about some complicated extreme case, such as Schroedinger's cat. The approach we take here bypasses much of the question by starting with a single premise of wave-particle duality, from which follows all of quantum theory and its interpretation. Any remaining problems are made moot by the quantum-mechanical view that questions are meaningful only if there is some conceivable experimental way to test the answers. In keeping with this pragmatic approach we will not emphasize mathematical derivations, nor carry out the detailed analysis of harmonic-oscillator states, hydrogen wavefunctions, or angular momentum, which are part of almost all texts in quantum theory. We treat the simplest case in detail, state the general results, and see that they are the plausible generalizations. We leave the more detailed analysis to other texts. The one we used for the course at Stanford was Kroemer's Quantum Mechanics for Engineers and Materials Scientists , which served very well.
Abstract 1. In wave-mechanics there occur in addition to the ordinary physical vectors and tensors the four-valued quantities Ψ, Ψ introduced by Dirac. In this combination certain relations of invariance in regard to transformation appear which had escaped the ordinary tensor calculus. If we call the new type of quantity involving Ψ and its combinations Ψ-tensor, the position is that we cannot reach Ψ-tensors from the calculus of ordinary space tensors, but we can reach space tensors from a calculus of Ψ-tensors. I have shown that although Ψ-vectors cannot be expressed in terms of space vectors, mixed Ψ-tensors can be immediately resolved into space vectors. The present paper contains a simplification and systematisation of my earlier work on the Ψ-tensor calculus as well as a number of new results. The particular point round which the new results centre is as follows. The Ψ-tensors occurring in wave-mechanics are the product of two Ψ-vectors (Ψ, Ψ), and apparently the primary reason for introducing the unobservable quantity Ψ rather than working with physical tensors throughout is to impose this condition. I therefore examine the question: If we impose the condition that a wave tensor is the product of two Ψ-vectors, what is the corresponding restriction on the physical tensors equivalent to it ? The answer is (§7) that whatever is described by two Ψ-vectors Ψ, Ψ can equivalently be described by two space vectors of equal length at right angles to one another. One of these is the momentum vector; the other (generally ignored in current investigations) presumably represents positional relations (co-ordinates or distance); or rather I would regard it as the source of positional relations, which can only become explicit in more complicated developments involving many particles. The ordinary wave equation for one particle is obtained as an identity.
Under this name at present two theories are being carried on, which are indeed closely related but not identical. The first, which follows on directly from the famous doctoral thesis by L. de Broglie, concerns waves in three-dimensional space. Because of the strictly relativistic treatment that is adopted in this version from the outset, we shall refer to it as the four-dimensional wave mechanics. The other theory is more remote from Mr de Broglie's original ideas, insofar as it is based on a wave-like process in the space of position coordinates (q-space) of an arbitrary mechanical system. We shall therefore call it the multi-dimensional wave mechanics. Of course this use of the q-space is to be seen only as a mathematical tool, as it is often applied also in the old mechanics; ultimately, in this version also, the process to be described is one in space and time. In truth, however, a complete unification of the two conceptions has not yet been achieved. Anything over and above the motion of a single electron could be treated so far only in the multi-dimensional version; also, this is the one that provides the mathematical solution to the problems posed by the Heisenberg–Born matrix mechanics. For these reasons I shall place it first, hoping in this way also to illustrate better the characteristic difficulties of the as such more beautiful four-dimensional version.
David Lewis famously quipped that he was willing to take metaphysical lessons from quantum mechanics only when it cleaned up its own act by providing interpretations or modifications of the formalism shorn of appeal to consciousness, irreducibly macroscopic notions, or outright instrumentalism. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, multiple approaches to quantum mechanics had been developed to a degree which met Lewis’s challenge: dynamical-collapse theories, Bohm-style hidden-variable theories, and Everett-style many-worlds theories, for all their respective problems and challenges, all offer ways of understanding quantum mechanics that metaphysicians can reasonably engage with. And so the last twenty years have seen a resurgence in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, the question of what ontology and ideology is appropriate to a quantum universe. The metaphysics of quantum mechanics is not independent of the quantum measurement problem but does not coincide with it, either: there is a widespread view that adopting, say, the Everett interpretation still leaves significant ontological questions undecided, and conversely, a given answer to those questions might answer them for a dynamical-collapse theory too.Wave function realism has become a leading contender for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, particularly in the case of dynamical-collapse and Everettian approaches. The starting point is nonrelativistic quantum mechanics expressed in configuration space: mathematically, the subject matter of the theory is a complex function of 3N variables, evolving under the Schrödinger equation (perhaps interrupted by occasional stochastic collapses). Traditionally those 3N variables are interpreted as the three coordinates of position of N particles—but in wave function realism, they are interpreted as points in a new, high-dimensional space. Quantum mechanics, according to the wave function realist, fundamentally concerns the undulations of the wave function in this space; three-dimensional goings-on are emergent, high-level, derivative.Alyssa Ney has been a leading figure in the development of wave function realism for most of its existence. Her articles advocating and developing the position have been highly influential, and the present book can be seen as the culmination of this line of her research and is the definitive statement of wave function realism as of 2021. Despite its comparative brevity, the book is too rich to be adequately described—far less critiqued—in this brief review; my goal is to give an overview of the main themes and arguments, and to make a few critical remarks along the way.The World in the Wavefunction is not formally divided into parts, but it can profitably be thought of that way. Chapters 1 through 3 develop the core case for wave function realism. Chapter 4 defends the position from the frequent criticism that it is restricted to nonrelativistic physics, by providing a version of wave function realism appropriate to quantum field theory. And chapters 5 through 7 are an extended exploration of how the observed three-dimensional world can be understood as emerging from a high-dimensional fundamental reality.The case Ney makes in chapters 1 through 3 for wavefunction realism is modest and cautious. In chapter 1 she provides a fairly standard—though elegantly expressed—case for the prima facie plausibility of wave function realism simply based on the fact that standard formulations of quantum mechanics are written in 3N dimensions, and on the (related) fact that entanglement means we cannot interpret quantum mechanics simply in terms of spatially localized particles and nothing else. But in chapter 2 she explicitly argues against any attempt to strengthen these plausibility arguments into reasons why wave function realism must be adopted; indeed, she provides a detailed and sympathetic taxonomy of the alternatives to wave function realism that have been developed, all of which she regards as entirely viable. (Chapter 2 of the book could profitably be used as introductory reading for a general graduate course on quantum metaphysics.) For Ney, the question of which metaphysics to adopt is a standard metaphysician’s question, to be answered by weighing strengths and weaknesses of the various alternatives against one another.In chapter 3, Ney identifies two such strengths for wave function realism. First, it is separable: we can specify the complete state of the universe point-by-point on the fundamental space, without any need to appeal to irreducible holism. Second, it is dynamically local: expressed in 3N-dimensional space, the Schrödinger dynamics involve no action at a distance.Ney makes the case for separability at length. Her case for dynamical locality is brief: she regards it as a straightforward consequence of the fact that the Schrödinger equation is a differential equation, so that the rate of change of the wave function at a point x depends only on the wave function arbitrarily close to x. But I think there is more worth investigating here: after all, the nonrelativistic Schrödinger equation may be a differential equation, but it is a parabolic differential equation, with no maximum speed of propagation: the rate of change of the wave function at x may depend only on a neighborhood of x, but the value of the wavefunction at x an arbitrarily short time later depends on the wave function everywhere in space. (And this is not—or not straightforwardly—just an artifact of ignoring relativity.)But in any case, why think that a separable, local theory is preferable to the alternative? Ney claims that separability and locality are more intuitive and lead to a more comprehensible ontology—and she makes an unabashed defense of intuitiveness and explicability as theoretical virtues. She is quite explicit that her reasons are pragmatic: intuitive theories benefit students and teachers; they are better suited to help us develop new theories; they speak better to the reasons why many students (Ney included) want to study physics in the first place. The implied metaphilosophy here is fascinating and it would be good to see it developed further in subsequent work: Ney seems to reject the mainstream modern approach to ontology (in which these pragmatic virtues are not obviously relevant to the truth of wave function realism) in favor of something neo-Carnapian where (so far as I can see) the goal of a quantum ontology is to help us get a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics, and that’s all there is to it. This also fits naturally with the pluralism she urges, in which approaches other than hers can also be valuable.Chapter 4—on relativistic generalizations of wavefunction realism—attempts both a conceptual and a technical task. The conceptual task is to argue that wavefunction realism per se is not wedded to any particular theory or choice of Hilbert-space basis within the theory: rather, wave function realism is any strategy that reifies a high-dimensional space in order to produce a separable local quantum ontology. If so, there is no block in principle to a relativistic generalization of the approach: we just need to find some appropriate high-dimensional space to describe the quantum state in relativistic quantum theory.The general philosophical point is well taken and convincingly defended (though it’s important to note that while arbitrary choices of Hilbert-space basis will give a separable theory, there is no reason to assume they will give a dynamically local theory: even something as simple as shifting from the position to the momentum basis in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics transforms the Schrödinger equation into something explicitly nonlocal). Unfortunately, I don’t think Ney succeeds in giving a clear statement of the high-dimensional space she has in mind for quantum field theory. This is one place where her laudable goal of making the book intelligible to nonspecialists becomes problematic: she makes many suggestive and interesting comments on quantum field theory, but there is no explicit, precise, mathematical statement of her view that can be contrasted with the explicit, precise, mathematical representation of the state in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a complex function on 3N-dimensional space.In the last part of the book—concerned with the emergence of ordinary three-dimensional ontology—Ney begins (chapter 5) by rebutting influential arguments by Tim Maudlin, Valia Allori, Sheldon Goldstein, and others that it is empirically incoherent for a physical theory not to make precise, nonemergent, nonderivative statements about matter in three-dimensional space (for a theory not to have a primitive ontology, to use the standard term for it). Ney argues—persuasively, to me—that it is perfectly compatible with the way science usually works for a theory to make statements about the observable only in an indirect, derivative way, so that while it might be a desideratum for a theory to have a primitive ontology, it is not compulsory for it to do so in order to be empirically adequate. She goes on, though, to note that a satisfactory quantum metaphysics had better recover the existence of ordinary three-dimensional objects, on Moorean grounds: we are really confident that those objects exist!Chapter 6 is largely critical: an extended exegesis of the functionalist strategy for recovering higher-order ontology developed by David Albert, myself, and others. She raises two main criticisms of the functionalist strategy: it fails to distinguish between the wave function simulating three-dimensional objects and constituting those objects; it is restricted to recovering classical three-dimensional ontology, whereas we want to recover quantum-mechanical phenomena in three dimensions too. (The former objection is a development of criticisms by Bradley Monton, Tim Maudlin, and others; the latter is novel so far as I know.) For reasons of space, I won’t attempt to reply on behalf of the functionalist, but Ney certainly puts the challenge with admirable clarity.The final chapter of the book presents Ney’s positive account of emergent ontology, based not on functionalism but on considerations of symmetry (though she concedes that the separation is not completely sharp). Simplifying Ney’s subtle position: the permutation symmetries of quantum mechanics give a clear dynamical reason to regard certain decompositions of 3N-dimensional space (intuitively: those that decompose it into the N-fold product of Euclidean space) as preferred; that then licenses the metaphysical hypothesis that a localized wave function in 3N-dimensional space has, as its parts, particles in three-dimensional space. If the wave function is not localized (as will be the case generically, at least for the Everett interpretation), then we can think of those particles as being partially localized in various different regions of space.I have to say that I am not convinced this works, at least without a dynamical-collapse mechanism: in the Everett interpretation, it will yield an ontology where all the particles are completely delocalized. We only see a somewhat localized description of matter in three dimensions when we restrict to an Everett branch, and that restriction is normally motivated on functionalist grounds. But this may simply reflect subtleties of Ney’s intriguing proposal that I am not fully grasping at present.In summary, I congratulate Ney for a rich, subtle, and provocative account of wave function realism. Her edited collection of papers (coedited with Albert), The Wave Function, set the agenda for much of the metaphysics of quantum mechanics in the 2010s; The World in the Wave Function has a good chance of doing the same for the 2020s.