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International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)

A tight estimation of the security gap over the fast fading wiretap channel

Marco Baldi, Marco Bianchi, Nicola Maturo, Franco Chiaraluce

Published Jul 1, 2013• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a tight estimation of the security gap for the wiretap channel with fast Rayleigh fading. The error rate has already been used as a practical physical layer security metric, and the security gap has been defined to exploit such a metric over the wiretap channel with additive white Gaussian noise. We study two different approaches for estimating the security gap also over a fast fading wiretap channel. The first approach is quite conservative, and tends to overestimate the security gap. The second approach instead allows to perform a more realistic evaluation, and to highlight the gain achievable through information scrambling and coding, even when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channels are known only in statistical terms.

DOI
10.1109/iwcmc.2013.6583549

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In this paper, we provide a tight estimation of the security gap for the wiretap channel with fast Rayleigh fading. The error rate has already been used as a practical physical layer security metric, and the security gap has been defined to exploit such a metric over the wiretap channel with additive white Gaussian noise. We study two different approaches for estimating the security gap also over a fast fading wiretap channel. The first approach is quite conservative, and tends to overestimate the security gap. The second approach instead allows to perform a more realistic evaluation, and to highlight the gain achievable through information scrambling and coding, even when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channels are known only in statistical terms.
Using the error rate as a metric is useful for assessing the performance of actual transmission schemes from the physical layer security viewpoint. The security gap concept has been used over the additive white Gaussian noise channel as a practical measure for combined reliability and security. In this paper, the definition of security gap is extended to a wire-tap channel with fast fading. Our aim is to show that by introducing scrambling and error correction coding can significantly reduce the required quality difference between the channel of the authorized user and that of the unauthorized one.
We study the secrecy capacity of fast fading channels under imperfect main channel (between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver) estimation at the transmitter. Lower and upper bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity are derived for a class of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) fading channels. The achievable rate follows from a standard wiretap code in which a simple on-off power control is employed along with a Gaussian input. The upper bound is obtained using an appropriate correlation scheme of the main and eavesdropper channels and is the best known upper bound so far. The upper and lower bounds coincide with recently derived ones in case of perfect main CSI. Furthermore, the upper bound is tight in case of no main CSI, where the secrecy capacity is equal to zero. Asymptotic analysis at high and low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is also given. At high SNR, we show that the capacity is bounded by providing upper and lower bounds that depend on the channel estimation error. At low SNR, however, we prove that the secrecy capacity is asymptotically equal to the capacity of the main channel as if there were no secrecy constraint. Numerical results are provided for i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channels.
We consider a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) scenario, where a signal is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with one legitimate receiver with which the transmitter communicates and one honest-but-curious target that the transmitter wants to sense. The secure ISAC channel is modeled as two state-dependent fast-fading channels with correlated Rayleigh fading coefficients and independent additive Gaussian noise components. Delayed channel outputs are fed back to the transmitter to improve the communication performance and to estimate the channel state sequence. We establish and illustrate an achievable secrecy-distortion region for degraded secure ISAC channels under correlated Rayleigh fading, for which we show that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise is not a sufficient statistic. We also evaluate the inner bound for a large set of parameters to derive practical design insights. The presented results include parameter ranges for which the secrecy capacity of a classical wiretap channel setup is surpassed and for which the channel capacity is approached. Thus, we illustrate for correlated Rayleigh fading cases that our secure ISAC methods can (i) eliminate the need for the legitimate receiver to have a statistical advantage over the eavesdropper and (ii) provide communication security with minimal rate penalty.
A (layered) broadcast approach is studied for fading wiretap channels. The basic idea is to employ superposition coding to encode information into a number of layers and use stochastic encoding for each layer to keep the corresponding information secret from an eavesdropper. The legitimate receiver successively decodes information one layer after another by canceling the interference caused by the layers that the receiver has already decoded. The advantage of this approach is that the transmitter does not need to know the channel states to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, but can still securely transmit certain layers of information to the legitimate receiver. The layers that can be securely transmitted are determined by the channel states to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The Gaussian wiretap channel with fixed channel gains is first studied to illustrate the idea of the broadcast approach. Three cases of block fading wiretap channels with a stringent delay constraint are then studied, in which either the legitimate receiver's channel, the eavesdropper's channel, or both channels are fading. For each case, the secrecy rate that can be achieved by using the broadcast approach is obtained, and the optimal power allocation over the layers (or the conditions on the optimal power allocation) is also derived.
The ergodic secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is known when the main channel (between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver) state information (CSI) is perfect at the transmitter and the coherence period is sufficiently large to enable random coding arguments in each block. In a fast fading scenario, when the codeword length spans many coherence periods, the secrecy capacity is still not known. In this paper, we present a framework that characterizes this secrecy capacity under imperfect main channel estimation at the transmitter. Inner and outer bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity are derived for a class of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) fading channels. The achievable rate is a simple on-off scheme using a Gaussian input. The upper bound is obtained using an appropriate correlation scheme of the main and the eavesdropper channels. The upper and the lower bounds coincide with recently derived ones in the perfect main CSI extreme. Furthermore, the lower bound matches the upper bound in no main CSI extreme, where the secrecy capacity is equal to zero. Numerical results are provided for independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading channels.
In this two-part paper, we consider the transmission of confidential data over wireless wiretap channels. The first part presents an information-theoretic problem formulation in which two legitimate partners communicate over a quasi-static fading channel and an eavesdropper observes their transmissions through another independent quasi-static fading channel. We define the secrecy capacity in terms of outage probability and provide a complete characterization of the maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper is unable to decode any information. In sharp contrast with known results for Gaussian wiretap channels (without feedback), our contribution shows that in the presence of fading information-theoretic security is achievable even when the eavesdropper has a better average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the legitimate receiver - fading thus turns out to be a friend and not a foe. The issue of imperfect channel state information is also addressed. Practical schemes for wireless information-theoretic security are presented in Part II, which in some cases comes close to the secrecy capacity limits given in this paper.