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Journal of Mathematical Physics

A histories approach to quantum mechanics

Stanley Gudder

Published Nov 1, 1998• 17 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A histories approach to quantum mechanics is formulated without the consistency requirement. Plausible, physically motivated axioms for a history structure are presented. In this structure, the consistency requirement is unnecessary because the joint sequential distributions are already probability measures. It is shown that the logic of a history structure is a temporal effect algebra and conversely, any temporal effect algebra is isomorphic to the logic of a history structure. When this general framework is specialized to a Hilbert space context, it reduces to a previously studied formalism.

DOI
10.1063/1.532592

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A histories approach to quantum mechanics is formulated without the consistency requirement. Plausible, physically motivated axioms for a history structure are presented. In this structure, the consistency requirement is unnecessary because the joint sequential distributions are already probability measures. It is shown that the logic of a history structure is a temporal effect algebra and conversely, any temporal effect algebra is isomorphic to the logic of a history structure. When this general framework is specialized to a Hilbert space context, it reduces to a previously studied formalism.
A formulation of the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics in terms of generalized observables (POV measures) and effect operators is provided. The usual notion of ‘‘history’’ is generalized to the notion of ‘‘effect history.’’ The space of effect histories carries the structure of a D-poset. Recent results of J. D. Maitland Wright imply that every decoherence functional defined for ordinary histories can be uniquely extended to a bi-additive decoherence functional on the space of effect histories. Omnès’ logical interpretation is generalized to the present context. The result of this work considerably generalizes and simplifies the earlier formulation of the consistent effect histories approach to quantum mechanics communicated in a previous work of this author.
A system of quantum reasoning for a closed system is developed by treating nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory. The sample space corresponds to a decomposition, as a sum of orthogonal projectors, of the identity operator on a Hilbert space of histories. Provided a consistency condition is satisfied, the corresponding Boolean algebra of histories, called a framework, can be assigned probabilities in the usual way, and within a single framework quantum reasoning is identical to ordinary probabilistic reasoning. A refinement rule, which allows a probability distribution to be extended from one framework to a larger (refined) framework, incorporates the dynamical laws of quantum theory. Two or more frameworks which are incompatible because they possess no common refinement cannot be simultaneously employed to describe a single physical system. Logical reasoning is a special case of probabilistic reasoning in which (conditional) probabilities are 1 (true) or 0 (false). As probabilities are only meaningful relative to some framework, the same is true of the truth or falsity of a quantum description. The formalism is illustrated using simple examples, and the physical considerations which determine the choice of a framework are discussed. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.
An axiomatic development of dynamics of systems in the framework of histories is given which contains the history versions of classical and traditional quantum mechanics as special cases. We consider theories which admit a quasitemporal structure (a generalization of the concept of time using partial semigroups) and whose “single time” propositions have the mathematical structure of a logic; isomorphism of logics at different “instants of time” is not assumed. The concept of directed partial semigroup is introduced to incorporate the concept of direction of flow of time in quasitemporal theories. Starting with a few simple axioms, the space of history propositions is explicitly constructed and shown to be an orthoalgebra (as envisaged in the scheme of Isham and Linden [J. Math. Phys. 35, 5452–5476 (1994)]); its subspace consisting of history filters (“homogeneous histories”) is a meet semilattice. The partial semigroups employed allow semi-infinite irreducible decompositions.
A measurement-independent formulation of quantum mechanics called ‘regular histories’ (RH) is presented, able to reproduce the predictions of the standard formalism without the need to for a quantum-classical divide or the presence of an observer. It applies to closed systems and features no wave-function collapse. Weights are assigned only to histories satisfying a criterion called ‘regularity’. As the set of regular histories is not closed under the Boolean operations this requires a new con- cept of weight, called ‘likelihood’. Remarkably, this single change is enough to overcome many of the well-known obstacles to a sensible interpretation of quantum mechanics. For example, Bell’s theorem, which makes essential use of probabilities, places no constraints on the locality properties of a theory based on likelihoods. Indeed, RH is both counter- factually definite and free from action-at-a-distance. Moreover, in RH the meaningful histories are exactly those that can be witnessed at least in principle. Since it is especially difficult to make sense of the concept of probability for histories whose occurrence is intrinsically indeterminable, this makes likelihoods easier to justify than probabilities. Interaction with the environment causes the kinds of histories relevant at the macroscopic scale of human experience to be witnessable and indeed to generate Boolean algebras of witnessable histories, on which likelihoods reduce to ordinary probabilities. Further- more, a formal notion of inference defined on regular histories satisfies, when restricted to such Boolean algebras, the classical axioms of implication, explaining our perception of a largely classical world. Even in the context of general quantum histories the rules of reasoning in RH are remark- ably intuitive. Classical logic must only be amended to reflect the fundamental premise that one cannot meaningfully talk about the occurrence of unwitnessable histories. Crucially, different histories with the same ‘physical content’ can be interpreted in the same way and independently of the family in which they are expressed. RH thereby rectifies a critical flaw of its inspiration, the consistent histories (CH) approach, which requires either an as yet unknown set selection rule or a paradigm shift towards an un- conventional picture of reality whose elements are histories-with-respect-to-a-framework. It can be argued that RH compares favourably with other proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics in that it resolves the measurement problem while retaining an essentially classical worldview without parallel universes, a framework-dependent reality or action-at-a-distance.
An introduction is given to an algebraic formulation and generalisation of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory. The main technical tool in this theory is an orthoalgebra of history propositions that serves as a generalised temporal analogue of the lattice of propositions of standard quantum logic. Particular emphasis is placed on those cases in which the history propositions can be represented by projection operators in a Hilbert space, and on the associated concept of a `history group'.
Precise rules are developed in order to formalize the reasoning processes involved in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the help of analogies from classical physics. A classical or quantum description of a mechanical system involves a {\it framework}, often chosen implicitly, and a {\it statement} or assertion about the system which is either true or false within the framework with which it is associated. Quantum descriptions are no less ``objective'' than their classical counterparts, but differ from the latter in the following respects: (i) The framework employs a Hilbert space rather than a classical phase space. (ii) The rules for constructing meaningful statements require that the associated projectors commute with each other and, in the case of time-dependent quantum histories, that consistency conditions be satisfied. (iii) There are incompatible frameworks which cannot be combined, either in constructing descriptions or in making logical inferences about them, even though any one of these frameworks may be used separately for describing a particular physical system. A new type of ``generalized history'' is introduced which extends previous proposals by Omnès, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and a corresponding consistency condition which does not involve density matrices or single out a direction of time. Applications which illustrate the formalism include: measurements of spin, two-slit diffraction, and the emergence of the classical world from a fully quantum description.