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Journal of Physics Conference Series

Probability as a logic for measurement representations

Giovanni Battista Rossi, Francesco Crenna

Published Sep 6, 2013• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Measurement can be defined on the basis of the notion of empirical relation, which appears as a primitive term in the representational theory. Here a language is introduced for dealing with empirical relations and a probabilistic logic is applied to statements concerning them.
DOI
10.1088/1742-6596/459/1/012005

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In the representational approach, measurement is defined on the basis of primitive (in the context) notion of empirical relation. To account for measurement uncertainty, it is quite natural to consider probabilistic (or, more generally, non deterministic) empirical relations. Here the notion of probabilistic relation is investigated. After a brief historical outline, we point out that probabilistic relations appear in everyday measurement situation. To demonstrate this, a simple illustrative experiment has been developed, whose results are presented and discussed.
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Statistical physical theories are frequently formulated in terms of probabilistic structures founded on a ’’logic of experimentally verifiable propositions.’’ It is argued that to each experimentally verifiable proposition there corresponds an experimental procedure which, in general, alters the state of the system, and is completely characterized by a ’’measurement transformation’’ or ’’operation.’’ An analysis of the relations among these experimental procedures leads us to a ’’logic of operations’’ which is quite different from the ’’lattice theoretic logics’’ that are often considered (albeit inadequate empirical justification), as models for the calculus of experimentally verifiable propositions of quantum theory. It is seen that the quantum probability theory based on the logic of operations provides the proper mathematical framework for discussing the statistics of successive observations in quantum theory. We also indicate how a theory of quantum stochastic processes can be formulated in a way similar to the Kolmogorov formulation of the classical theory.
Quantum mechanics has several deficiencies as a complete theoretical description of the measurement process. Among them is the fact that the quantum mechanical description of correlations between the single measurements of a sequence is quite problematic. A single measurement is defined to be a preparation followed by an observation. In particular, one feels that an infinite sequence of such single measurements which corresponds to the measurement of a question O on a state η where η does not lie entirely in an eigenspace of O should generate a random output sequence. However, quantum mechanics seems to say nothing about this. In this paper, physical theories are defined in such a manner that correlations between single measurements are explicitly included. In particular, a physical theory is considered to be a mapping U, with domain in the set [Qsτ] of infinite instruction strings for carrying out infinite sequences of single measurements and range in the set of probability measures defined on A, the usual σ algebra of subsets of Ω. Ω is the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. A fundamental property which any valid physical theory must satisfy is that it agrees with experiment. It is proposed and discussed here that much of the intuitive meaning of agreement between a theory U and experiment with respect to H is given by the statement ∀Qsτ [U(Qsτ) defined⇒E(H,U(Qsτ),ψQsτ)],where U(Qsτ) is the probability measure U associates with the infinite instruction string Qsτ and ψQsτ is the outcome sequence obtained by carrying out Qsτ. E(H, U(Qsτ),ψQsτ) is the statement that all formulas in H with one free sequence variable which are true on Ω almost everywhere with respect to U(Qsτ) are true for ψQsτ. H is a subclass of the class of all formulas in a formal language L. A theorem is proved which states that, if U(Qsτ) corresponds to a nontrivial product probability measure and U H-agrees with experiment, then the outcome sequence ψQsτ is H-random. H-randomness is defined here in terms of the statement E(H, P, φ). Another property of a valid physical theory, which is defined here, is that, for some Qsτ, U(Qsτ) must be determinable on much of AH from ψQsτ. Sufficient conditions for this property to hold are given. AH is the class of all H definable subsets of Ω. Some properties of the statement E(H, P, φ) are given. Among other things, it is proved that, if E(H, P, φ) holds and P is a nontrivial probability measure on A, then φ is not definable in H.
We take the view that physical quantities are values generated by processes in measurement, not pre-existent objective quantities, and that a measurement result is strictly a product of the apparatus and the subject of the measurement. We habitually make an inaccurate statements when we speak of the measurement of a quantity by an apparatus. These statements can be formalised as a many valued logic with the structure of a vector space with a hermitian form in such a way as to generate probabilities in the results of measurement. The difference between this and classical probability theory is that we are not finding probabilities generated by unknown variables, but probabilities generated by unknown structure. We thus interpret quantum logic as the application of complex truth values to statements in an inaccurate language, and find that the properties of vector space hold for approximate measurement as well as for measurement of optimal accuracy, suggesting that Planck's constant governs the scale of the fundamental structures of matter.
The history of philosophy teaches us that metaphysical claims of sweeping generality are neither verifiable nor conclusively falsifiable. One can only aim at assessing their plausibility on the basis of the best available evidence provided by the sciences – both formal and empirical sciences. This is what has been done in this book in connection with the Principle of the Common Cause. In Chapter 2, Reichenbach's notion of common cause and the related Common Cause Principle was formulated explicitly in terms of classical, Kolmogorovian probability measure spaces. The Definition 2.4 of common cause followed Reichenbach's original definition closely, and insisting on the quite obvious methodological principle that probabilistic concepts and statements (in particular claims about random events being correlated or probabilistically independent) are only meaningful within the context of a fixed probability measure space in terms of which some segment of reality is modeled, we specified the notions of common cause incomplete and common cause complete probability theories: a theory was defined to be common cause complete if it contains a proper common cause of every correlation it predicts, common cause incomplete otherwise. (There is a strong version of common cause completeness as well: a probability space was defined to be strongly common cause closed if it contains common causes of all admissible types – Definition 4.4.) These explicitly defined notions form the basis on which one can start assessing the status of the Common Cause Principle in the spirit of empirical philosophy. Suppose we have an empirically confirmed scientific theory T describing some segment of reality using (possibly among other mathematical structures) a probability measure space ( X, S, p ).