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Social Studies of Science

The Crisis in Physics: Dialectical Materialism and Quantum Theory

Andrew Cross

Published Nov 1, 1991• 61 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper examines the resurgence of interest in the interpretation of quantum theory which occurred in the late 1940s and 1950s, and seeks to uncover its political origins in a perceived clash between the post-War Stalinist interpretation of dialectical materialism and the `Copenhagen' interpretation of quantum mechanics. In examining the debate that followed this renewed interest, certain issues concerning scientific argument are touched upon. These relate particularly to the progress of scientific dispute in a context in which no appeal to experiment can be made. This unusual state of affairs raises questions as to whether such disputes can be resolved, and if so, how. In order to explore these questions, the outcomes of the debates in the USSR and in the West are discussed.

DOI
10.1177/030631291021004005

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This paper examines the resurgence of interest in the interpretation of quantum theory which occurred in the late 1940s and 1950s, and seeks to uncover its political origins in a perceived clash between the post-War Stalinist interpretation of dialectical materialism and the `Copenhagen' interpretation of quantum mechanics. In examining the debate that followed this renewed interest, certain issues concerning scientific argument are touched upon. These relate particularly to the progress of scientific dispute in a context in which no appeal to experiment can be made. This unusual state of affairs raises questions as to whether such disputes can be resolved, and if so, how. In order to explore these questions, the outcomes of the debates in the USSR and in the West are discussed.
Most proponents of dialectical materialism claim it to be the most coherent understanding of developments within sciences.Hence, it should concern them that there exist seemingly contradictory dialectical materialist understandings of the accepted theory of micro physics.Among physicists who accept dialectical materialism, there are ones who argue in favour of the standard interpretation of quantum physics, as well as others who oppose it.We discuss arguments of two such physicists, Valdimir Fock and David Bohm.They both give physical arguments against the neo-Kantian and positivist elements of the dominant Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.While Bohm uses the notion of 'qualitative infinity of nature' against the maximalist form of this interpretation, Fock defends a minimalist form of this interpretation with the argument of the 'relativity to the means of observation'.Similarly, their proposals differ on the key question of the origin of randomness in quantum measurements.Despite having a consistent formalism, there are gaps in the physical understanding of quantum physics, and at least part of their divergent interpretations relates to these gaps.It is argued that the divergent views of Bohm and Fock should not be read polemically.Rather, they together help develop a more comprehensive characterization of dialectical materialism as a worldview in development.Arguments of Bohm and Fock explore and substantiate materialist and dialectical themes in physics.Their divergence shows that dialectical materialism cannot pre-empt science.In fact, as sciences discover new properties of matter, dialectical materialism needs to continually renew its repertory of generalized concepts to grasp these properties.
According to the standard view, the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum mechanics originated in discussions between Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927, and was defended by Bohr in his classic debate with Einstein. Yet recent scholarship has shown Bohr's views were never widely accepted, let alone properly understood, by his contemporaries, many of whom held divergent views of the ‘Copenhagen orthodoxy’. This paper examines how the ‘myth of the Copenhagen interpretation’ was constructed by situating it in the context of Soviet Marxist critique of quantum mechanics in the 1950s and the response by physicists such as Heisenberg and Rosenfeld.
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
In 1951, David Bohm created a realistic interpretation of quantum theory.His theory stood in contradiction to the hegemonic standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the quantum mechanical wave function describes a purely mathematical probability amplitude.Bohm's worldview, based on dialectical materialism, contributed substantially to the construction of new physical entities in his theory and led him to work intensively on the philosophy of science.His example shows that the ideology and political attitude of a physicist can play a major role in the construction of scientific theories and entities, with the important reservation that a change in social context was the necessary impulse for Bohm's work.
Abstract While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate. This essay offers a diagnosis of this situation and outlines a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent essays.