Practical quantum key distribution can be understood as a two-step procedure: in a first step two parties exchange quantum mechanical signals and perform measurements on them, in a second step auxiliary classical communication protocols are performed over an authenticated public channel to transform the data of the first step into an information-theoretic secure key. In this article we address the question of necessary conditions on the correlated (classical) data of the first step such that there can be a successful second step at all. As it turns out, a necessary condition is that these data, together with the knowledge about the physical set-up of sender and receiver, allow to establish a proof of effective entanglement between the two parties. We then demonstrate methods to systematically search for such a proof in basic settings, involving the 2-, 4-, and 6-state protocols.
Practical quantum key distribution can be understood as a two-step procedure: in a first step two parties exchange quantum mechanical signals and perform measurements on them, in a second step auxiliary classical communication protocols are performed over an authenticated public channel to transform the data of the first step into an information-theoretic secure key. In this article we address the question of necessary conditions on the correlated (classical) data of the first step such that there can be a successful second step at all. As it turns out, a necessary condition is that these data, together with the knowledge about the physical set-up of sender and receiver, allow to establish a proof of effective entanglement between the two parties. We then demonstrate methods to systematically search for such a proof in basic settings, involving the 2-, 4-, and 6-state protocols.
A necessary precondition for secure quantum key distribution is that sender and receiver can prove the presence of entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively distributed between them. In order to deliver this entanglement proof one can use the class of entanglement witness (EW) operators that can be constructed from the available measurements results. This class of EWs can be used to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of quantum correlations even when a quantum state cannot be completely reconstructed. The set of optimal EWs for two well-known entanglement-based (EB) schemes, the six-state and the four-state EB protocols, has been obtained recently [M. Curty et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 217903 (2004).] Here we complete these results, now showing specifically the analysis for the case of prepare and measure (PM) schemes. For this, we investigate the signal states and detection methods of the four-state and the two-state PM schemes. For each of these protocols we obtain a reduced set of EWs. More importantly, each set of EWs can be used to derive a necessary and sufficient condition to prove that quantum correlations are present in these protocols.
A necessary precondition for secure quantum key distribution (QKD) is that sender and receiver can prove the presence of entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively distributed between them. In order to deliver this entanglement proof one can use the class of entanglement witness operators that can be constructed from the available measurements results. This criterion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of quantum correlations even when a quantum state cannot be completely reconstructed. We apply such analysis to three well‐known qubit‐based QKD protocols, namely the 6‐state, the 4‐state and the 2‐state protocols.
In contrast to classical public-key cryptosystems, where the security of encoded messages relies on on computational assumptions, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two distant parties to establish a shared secret key that, when combined with a one-time pad, provides information-theoretically secure encryption, provided that the QKD protocol is supported by a rigorous security proof. In the last decades, security proofs robust against a wide range of eavesdropping strategies have established the theoretical soundness of several QKD protocols. However, most proofs are based on idealized models of the physical systems involved in such protocols and often include assumptions that are not satisfied in practical implementations. This mismatch creates a gap between theoretical security guarantees and actual experimental realizations, making QKD protocols vulnerable to attacks. To ensure the security of real-world QKD systems, it is therefore essential to account for imperfections in security analyses. In this article, we present an overview of recent analytical and numerical developments in QKD security proofs, which provide a versatile approach for incorporating imperfections and re-establishing the security of quantum communication protocols under realistic conditions.
We demonstrate that a necessary precondition for an unconditionally secure quantum key distribution is that both sender and receiver can use the available measurement results to prove the presence of entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively distributed between them. One can thus systematically search for entanglement using the class of entanglement witness operators that can be constructed from the observed data. We apply such analysis to two well-known quantum key distribution protocols, namely, the 4-state protocol and the 6-state protocol. As a special case, we show that, for some asymmetric error patterns, the presence of entanglement can be proven even for error rates above 25% (4-state protocol) and 33% (6-state protocol).
In this thesis, we investigate the uses of entanglement and its verification in quantum communication. Typically, it is the presence of entanglement which allows quantum communication protocols to outperform their classical counterparts, or to achieve tasks which are infeasible with classical physics. Therefore, the verification of entanglement can provide fundamental tests to certify that experimental implementations of such protocols operate quantum mechanically. The main object here is to develop a verification procedure which is adaptable to a wide range of applications, and whose implementation has low requirements on experimental resources. We present such a procedure in the form of the Expectation Value Matrix. The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapters 1 and 2 give a short introduction and background information on quantum theory and the quantum states of light. In particular, we discuss the basic postulates of quantum mechanics, quantum state discrimination, the description of quantum light and the homodyne detector. Chapter 3 gives a brief introduction to quantum information and in particular to entanglement, and we discuss the basics of quantum key distribution and teleportation. The general framework of the Expectation Value Matrix is introduced. The main matter of this thesis is contained in the subsequent three chapters, which describe different quantum communication protocols and the corresponding adaptation of the entanglement verification method. The subject of Chapter 4 is quantum key distribution, where the detection of entanglement is a means of excluding intercept-resend attacks, and the presence of quantum correlations in the raw data is a necessary precondition for the generation of secret key. We investigate a continuous-variable version of the two-state protocol and develop the Expectation Value Matrix method for such qubit-mode systems. Furthermore, we analyse the role of the phase reference with respect to the security of the protocol and raise awareness of a corresponding security threat. For this, we adapt the verification method to different settings of Stokes operator measurements. In Chapter 5, we investigate quantum memory channels and propose a fundamental bench- mark for these based on the verification of entanglement. After describing some physical effects which can be used for the coherent storage of light, we focus on the storage of squeezed light. This situation requires an extension of our verification procedure to sources of mixed input states. We propose such an extension, and give a detailed analysis of its application to squeezed thermal states, displaced thermal states and mixed qubit states. This is supplemented by finding the optimal entanglement-breaking channels for each of these situations, which provides us with an indication of the strength of the extension to our entanglement criterion. The subject of Chapter 6 is also the benchmarking of quantum memory or teleportation experiments. Considering a number of recently published benchmark criteria, we investigate the question which one is most useful to actual experiments. For this, a criterion must be both strong, i.e., easy to overcome, and it must be implementable with a reasonable amount of experimental resources. We first compare the different criteria for typical settings and sort them according to their resilience to excess noise. Then, we introduce a further improvement to the Expectation Value Matrix method, which results in the desired optimal benchmark criterion. Finally, we investigate naturally occurring phase fluctuations and find them to further simplify the implementation of our criterion. Thus, we formulate the first truly useful way of validating experiments for the quantum storage or transmission of light.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols rely on authenticated classical communication. Typical QKD security proofs are carried out in an idealized setting where authentication is assumed to behave honestly: it never aborts, and all classical messages are delivered faithfully with their original timing preserved. Authenticated channels that can be constructed in practice have different properties. Most critically, such channels may abort asymmetrically, such that only the receiving party may detect an authentication failure while the sending party remains unaware. Furthermore, an adversary may delay, reorder, or block classical messages. This discrepancy means that existing security proofs under honest authentication do not directly establish security in the practical authentication setting. We address this gap using an existing security definition from the literature that permits asymmetric aborts while retaining secrecy of any key produced and agreement of the keys whenever both parties accept. Our main result is a reduction theorem showing that, under mild and easily satisfied protocol conditions, any QKD protocol proven secure under the honest authentication setting, for the standard security definition with symmetric aborts, remains secure under a practical authentication setting, for the weaker security definition that allows for asymmetric aborts. This result allows all existing QKD proofs to be retroactively lifted to the practical authentication setting (with asymmetric aborts) with a minor protocol tweak.