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European Journal of Physics

A comment on `EPR and the Copenhagen interpretation'

J. M. Domingos, Fernando Nogueira, Maria Helena Caldeira, F. Sampaio dos Aidos

Published Mar 1, 1998• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We comment on a recently published criticism of our analysis of the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.
DOI
10.1088/0143-0807/19/2/015

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The `Copenhagen-interpretation' analysis of the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in a recent paper by Domingos, Nogueira, Caldeira and dos Aidos is criticized as a misrepresentation of both the EPR argument and the Copenhagen interpretation. Zusammenfassung. In einem kürzlichen Artikel haben Domingos, Nogueira, Caldeira und dos Aidos das Einstein - Podolsky - Rosen (EPR) Paradoxon mit Hilfe der `Kopenhagener Interpretation' analysiert. Wir kritisieren hier diesen Ansatz als Fehlinterpretation sowohl des EPR-Arguments als auch der Kopenhagener Interpretation.
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The presented dissertation deals with how to interpret the conception of reality within both the assumed metaphysical frameworks of the proponents of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The hypothesis of the dissertation is based on assumption that EPR operated with presuppositions stemming from classical-physical determinism (e.g., the concept of particle independence) that, at the time of their paradox's formulation, no longer corresponded to the contemporary level of knowledge. In contrast, the Copenhagen interpretation operates with a concept of reality that significantly differs from the metaphysics of classical physics. This dissertation identifies the EPR proponents' approach to reality as philosophical foundationalism and interprets it using the philosophy and semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce as a dualism that does not respect the essential role of representation in development of scientific theories. The aim is to present a metaphysical and semiotic framework that would be complementary to the interpretation of quantum mechanics as an indeterministic theory which understands the representation of probability and uncertainty inherent in quantum mechanical descriptions as intrinsic parts of the conception of reality, rather...