Weber's conjecture (1886) governs three aspects of lattice-based cryptography: the solvability of the Principal Ideal Problem, the freeness of modules over rings of integers, and the tightness of worst-case-to-average-case reductions in Ring-LWE (R-LWE) and Module-LWE (MLWE). Existing verifications for
k≥9 rely on Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH). In this paper, we present the first unconditional proof for
k≤12. Our method combines the Fukuda-Komatsu computational sieve, inductive structure of the cyclotomic
Z2-tower, and Herbrand's theorem.
We present a framework for evaluating the concrete security assurances of cryptographic constructions given by the worst-case SIVP_γ to average-case SIS_{n,m,q,β} reductions. As part of this analysis, we present the tightness gaps for three worst-case SIVP_γ to average-case SIS_{n,m,q,β} reductions. We also analyze the hardness of worst-case SIVP_γ instances. \nWe apply our methodology to two SIS-based signature schemes, and compute the security guarantees that these systems get from reductions to worst-case SIVP_γ. We find that most of the presented reductions do not apply to the chosen parameter sets for the signature schemes. We propose modifications to the schemes to make the reductions applicable, and find that the worst-case security assurances of the (modified) signature schemes are, for both signature schemes, significantly lower than the amount of security previously claimed.