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Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

A Discussion of the EPR Contained in Quantum Mechanical Terms without Arguments of Realities or Bell's Relations

Oreste Piccioni, Werner A. W. Mehlhop

Published Dec 1, 1986• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1111/j.1749-6632.1986.tb12448.x

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The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox that argues for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a description of physical reality has been put to rest by John Bell’s famous theorem, which inspired numerous experimental tests and brought about further affirmations of quantum reality. Nevertheless, in his writings and public presentations, Richard Feynman never acknowledged the significance of Bell’s contribution to the resolution of the EPR paradox. In this paper, we discuss several variants of the Bell inequalities (including one that was specifically espoused by Feynman), and explore the ways in which they demolish the arguments in favor of local hidden-variable theories. We also examine the roots of Feynman’s attitude toward Bell’s theorem in the context of Feynman’s special perspective on quantum mechanics.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) reality criterion is generalized to fit with the notion of positive-operator-valued observables occurring in quantum optics, stochastic quantum mechanics, and other fields of quantum physics. The resulting concept of unsharp reality for quantum systems is illustrated within stochastic spin space where it leads to a notion of unsharp spin property. Finally we investigate the possibility of joint spin measurements and give a brief discussion of the EPR-Bell argument for unsharp spin properties.
Abstract This essay has two main claims about EPR’s Reality Criterion. First, we claim that the application of the Reality Criterion makes an essential difference between the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments against quantum mechanics. We show that while the EPR argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, does derive that certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are incomplete, Einstein’s later arguments, making no use of the Reality Criterion, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation. We take this fact as an indication that the Reality Criterion is a crucial, indispensable component of the incompleteness argument(s). The second claim is more substantive. We argue that the Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause Principle. Finally, we relate this proposal to Tim Maudlin’s recent assertion that the Reality Criterion is an analytic truth.