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IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

The one-time pad revisited

Christian Matt, Ueli M. Maurer

Published Jul 1, 2013• 29 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The one-time pad, the mother of all encryption schemes, is well known to be information-theoretically secure, in contrast to most encryption schemes used in practice, which are at most computationally secure. In this paper, we focus on another, completely different aspect in which the one-time pad is superior to normal encryption, and which surfaces only when the receiver (not only the eavesdropper) is considered potentially dishonest, as can be the case in a larger protocol context in which encryption is used as a sub-protocol. For example, such a dishonest receiver (who is, say, coerced by the eavesdropper) can in normal encryption verifiably leak the message to the eavesdropper by revealing the secret key. While this leakage feature can provably not be avoided completely, it is more limited if the one-time pad is used. We use the constructive cryptography framework to make these statements precise.

DOI
10.1109/isit.2013.6620718

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The one-time pad, the mother of all encryption schemes, is well known to be information-theoretically secure, in contrast to most encryption schemes used in practice, which are at most computationally secure. In this paper, we focus on another, completely different aspect in which the one-time pad is superior to normal encryption, and which surfaces only when the receiver (not only the eavesdropper) is considered potentially dishonest, as can be the case in a larger protocol context in which encryption is used as a sub-protocol. For example, such a dishonest receiver (who is, say, coerced by the eavesdropper) can in normal encryption verifiably leak the message to the eavesdropper by revealing the secret key. While this leakage feature can provably not be avoided completely, it is more limited if the one-time pad is used. We use the constructive cryptography framework to make these statements precise.
The classical limitation of one-time-pad (OTP) cryptography is the key-distribution problem: to send n bits of plaintext, the parties must already share n bits of pre-distributed key. Once the pad is exhausted, the parties must meet again to exchange new pad material. This is widely viewed as making pure OTP impractical for sustained communication. We present a protocol that resolves this limitation: once an initial pad of size N is shared in person, subsequent pad material is generated by one party from a true-random source and transmitted as encrypted payload over the existing OTP channel itself. The receiver decrypts using existing pad and appends the recovered random bytes to its local pad. Net pad balance after a refill operation is unchanged — bytes of old pad are spent to deliver an equal number of bytes of new pad — but the new material is fresh, secret, and uncompromised. We prove inductively that information-theoretic security of the new pad is preserved across arbitrary refill chains. The result is a protocol with all the security guarantees of classical OTP and none of its practical key-distribution limitation, given a single in-person bootstrap.
The problem of secure broadcasting with independent secret keys is studied. The particular scenario is analyzed in which a common message has to be broadcast to two legitimate receivers, while keeping an external eavesdropper ignorant of it. The transmitter shares independent secret keys of sufficiently high rates with both legitimate receivers, which can be used in different ways: they can be used as one-time pads to encrypt the common message, as fictitious messages for wiretap coding, or as a hybrid of these. In this paper, capacity results are established when the broadcast channels involving the three receivers are degraded. If both legitimate channels are degraded versions of the eavesdropper's channel, it is shown that the one-time pad approach is optimal for several cases, yielding corresponding capacity expressions. Alternatively, the wiretap coding approach is shown to be optimal if the eavesdropper's channel is degraded with respect to both legitimate channels, establishing capacity in this case as well. If the eavesdropper's channel is neither the strongest nor the weakest, an intricate scheme that carefully combines both concepts of one-time pad and wiretap coding with fictitious messages turns out to be capacity-achieving. Finally we also obtain some results for the general non-degraded broadcast channel.
Quantum information is a valuable resource which can be encrypted in order to protect it. We consider the size of the one-time pad that is needed to protect quantum information in a number of cases. The situation is dramatically different from the classical case: we prove that one can recycle the one-time pad without compromising security. The protocol for recycling relies on detecting whether eavesdropping has occurred, and further relies on the fact that information contained in the encrypted quantum state cannot be fully accessed. We prove the security of recycling rates when authentication of quantum states is accepted, and when it is rejected. We note that recycling schemes respect a general law of cryptography which we introduce relating the size of private keys, sent qubits, and encrypted messages. We discuss applications for encryption of quantum information in light of the resources needed for teleportation. Potential uses include the protection of resources such as entanglement and the memory of quantum computers. We also introduce another application: encrypted secret sharing and find that one can even reuse the private key that is used to encrypt a classical message. In a number of cases, one finds that the amount of private key needed for authentication or protection is smaller than in the general case.
The article proposes a type of post–quantum cryptographic algorithm based on hash function and One–Time Pad cipher. Due to inheriting a property called “perfect secrecy” of the One-Time Pad cipher, the algorithms constructed according to the method proposed here can resist various types of attacks with the help of quantum computers. In addition to high security, algorithms of this type also have the ability to authenticate the origin and integrity of the encrypted messages. On the other hand, the one-time key for encryption/decryption is established for each individual message while the management and distribution of the shared secret key between the sender/encryptor and receiver/decryptor is performed similar to symmetric – key cryptosystems being applied in practice.
Most cryptographic primitives require randomness (for example, to generate secret keys). Usually, one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but, conceivably, such primitives might be built under weaker, more realistic assumptions. This is known to be achievable for many authentication applications, when entropy alone is typically sufficient. In contrast, all known techniques for achieving privacy seem to fundamentally require (nearly) perfect randomness. We ask the question whether this is just a coincidence, or, perhaps, privacy inherently requires true randomness? We completely resolve this question for information-theoretic private-key encryption, where parties wish to encrypt a b-bit value using a shared secret key sampled from some imperfect source of randomness [special characters omitted]. Our main result shows that if such n-bit source [special characters omitted] allows for a secure encryption of b bits, where b > log n, then one can deterministically extract nearly b almost perfect random bits from [special characters omitted]. Further, the restriction that b > log n is nearly tight: there exist sources [special characters omitted] allowing one to perfectly encrypt (log n – loglog n) bits, but not to deterministically extract even a single slightly unbiased bit. Hence, to a large extent, true randomness is inherent for encryption : either the key length must be exponential in the message length b, or one can deterministically extract nearly b almost unbiased random bits from the key. In particular, the one-time pad scheme is essentially "universal". Our technique also extends to related primitives which are sufficiently binding and hiding, including computationally secure commitments and public-key encryption.
In quantum key distribution (QKD), public discussion over the authenticated classical channel inevitably leaks information about the raw key to a potential adversary, which must later be mitigated by privacy amplification. To limit this leakage, a one-time pad (OTP) has been proposed to protect message exchanges in various settings. Building on the security proof of Tomamichel and Leverrier, which is based on a non-asymptotic framework and considers the effects of finite resources, we extend the analysis to the OTP-protected scheme. We show that when the OTP key is drawn from the entropy pool of the same QKD session, the achievable quantum key rate is identical to that of the reference protocol with unprotected error-correction exchange. This equivalence holds for a fixed security level, defined via the diamond distance between the real and ideal protocols modeled as completely positive trace-preserving maps. At the same time, the proposed approach reduces the computational requirements: for non-interactive low-density parity-check codes, the encoding problem size is reduced by the square of the syndrome length, while privacy amplification requires less compression. The technique preserves security, avoids the use of QKD keys between sessions, and has the potential to improve performance.