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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics Letters

Explicit attack on the key in quantum cryptography (BB84 protocol) reaching the theoretical error limit Q c ≈ 11%

S. N. Molotkov, A. V. Timofeev

Published Jul 1, 2007• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

An explicit attack on the distributed key is presented for the BB84 quantum cryptography protocol. In this attack, the theoretical maximum of the eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) information on the key is reached at the minimum possible error Q at the receiver end. Eve’s maximum information is reached in collective measurements, which are constructed in the explicit form and are performed by Eve at the very end of the protocol. The situation in the critical error range 11% < Q c < 15% is determined.

DOI
10.1134/s0021364007100116

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An explicit attack on the distributed key is presented for the BB84 quantum cryptography protocol. In this attack, the theoretical maximum of the eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) information on the key is reached at the minimum possible error Q at the receiver end. Eve’s maximum information is reached in collective measurements, which are constructed in the explicit form and are performed by Eve at the very end of the protocol. The situation in the critical error range 11% < Q c < 15% is determined.
An attempt to eavesdrop a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, both in the two-state B92 and the four-state BB84 quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently form other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are included. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob. This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.
The extreme admissible error probability at the receiving end to which the secure key distribution is possible has been found. This result takes into account all possible attacks on the distributed key, including those that involve large quantum memory and the capability of an eavesdropper to perform collective measurements simultaneously over the entire transmitted sequence of quantum states. The critical error is independent of the parameters of a particular attack and is determined only in terms of the overlapping degree ε = |〈u 1|u 0〉¦ of information states and the fundamental functions of classical and quantum information theories. The latter functions are the capacity H(Q) of a classical binary communication channel and classical capacity Cˉ(ε)\bar C(\varepsilon )Cˉ(ε) of a binary quantum communication channel. The key compression degree after error correction is also expressed in terms of only the classical capacity Cˉ(ε)\bar C(\varepsilon )Cˉ(ε) of the quantum communication channel.
An attempt to eavesdrop on a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, in both the two-state B92 [B92 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)] and the four-state BB84 [BB84 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175--179] quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently from other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are covered. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi (rather than Shannon) information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob (rather than all bits). This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.
Evaluating the theoretical limit of the amount of information Eve can steal from a quantum key distribution protocol under given conditions is one of the most important things that need to be done in security proof. In addition to source loopholes and detection loopholes, channel attacks are considered to be the main ways of information leakage, while collective attacks are considered to be the most powerful active channel attacks. Here we deduce in detail the capability limit of Eve's collective attack in non-entangled quantum key distribution, like BB84 and measurement-device-independent protocols, and entangled quantum key distribution, like device-independent protocol, in which collective attack is composed of quantum weak measurement and quantum unambiguous state discrimination detection. The theoretical results show that collective attacks are equivalent in entangled and non-entangled quantum key distribution protocols. We also find that compared with the security proof based on entanglement purification, the security proof based on collective attack not only improves the system's tolerable bit error rate, but also improves the key rate.
A family of attacks on the BB84 protocol of quantum key distribution is explicitly constructed under which the lower bound of fundamental entropy uncertainty relations is attained in the asymptotic limit of long sequences. All attacks are parameterized by a single parameter Q, which has the meaning of error probability on the receiver side, is known to the eavesdropper, but is reliably unknown to legitimate users. The situation on the receiver side looks like a scheme with classical Bernoulli tests with unknown parameter Q. For the eavesdropper, the situation also looks like a Bernoulli scheme—tossing a coin with quantum states, where each message of the eavesdropper leads to a quantum state that is uniquely determined by the outcome of measurements on the receiver side. A statistical interpretation is given to the estimate of the error probability for Q and the key secrecy parameter εδ,n. It is shown that, for a given length n of a series of tests, the width δ of the confidence interval actually determines the accuracy of the estimate for the parameter Q and, accordingly, the key secrecy level—the value of the secrecy parameter εδ,n=2e−2δ2n{\varepsilon _{\delta ,n}} = 2{e^{ - 2{\delta ^2}n}}εδ,n​=2e−2δ2n .
Abstract: BB84 (Bennett and Brassard 1984) is one of the well known protocols of quantum keys distribution. It is built to allow two interlocutors commonly called Alice and Bob to share two similar binary keys and to detect the eavesdropper presence (the eavesdropper is commonly called Eve). However, Eve presence in a disturbed environment causes errors to the sifted keys and decreases the amount of secure information between Alice and Bob. One of the most important stages in BB84 protocol is to decide by using error probability estimation if we can continue the protocol phases or no. Indeed, this decision is function of some factors like: what is the amount of information that we will lose in the error correction phase? What is the degree of errors detected in our sifted keys? What is the origin of these errors: Eve strategy or the channel disturbance? For these reasons, we will study in this study some conditions to stop BB84 protocol in the context of depolarizing channel. We implement two types of eavesdropping strategy: Intercept and Resend and Cloning Attack.