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The distribution postulate in Bohm's theory

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Mar 1, 1995• 27 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00763478

Related papers

Determinism and indeterminism in the quantum realm.

Jitendra Subramanyam

If there's one lesson that philosophers seem to have learned from quantum mechanics it is that the quantum realm is governed by indeterministic laws. However, in 1952 David Bohm constructed a deterministic theory and proved that it is empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. One of the three conditions that are together sufficient for the empirical adequacy of Bohm's theory is the statistical postulate. This postulate demands a very particular initial condition to hold for ensembles of quantum systems. I argue that the statistical postulate requires a justification. A justification would consist of showing how the dynamics of Bohm's theory is able to generate the initial conditions specified by the statistical postulate. I examine two deterministic justifications of the statistical postulate, one by Valentini and the other by Durr, Goldstein and Zanghi. I explain precisely the ways in which they are lacking. The basic problem is that crucial dynamical details are missing, ones needed to complete the justification. Whether these missing bits can be filled in is an open question. Until a justification is at hand, and its application to real-world ensembles is clarified, the empirical adequacy of Bohm's theory remains an open question. Bohm himself proposed a stochastic or indeterministic justification for the statistical postulate. It has been shown that the dynamics of this stochastic theory does not have the resources to justify the statistical postulate. In addition I show that the mathematical argument Bohm uses in his justification is flawed. Other stochastic theories do justify the statistical postulate but have other problems. The issue of indeterminism in the quantum realm is far from settled. Bohm's deterministic dynamics enables an investigation into the limits (if any) of a deterministic dynamics for the quantum realm. The properties of Bohm's deterministic equations of motion remain largely unknown. What we do know is that if the quantum realm is indeterministic it will not be for any of the reasons we have so far been given.

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The Distribution Postulate in Algorithmic Bohmian Mechanics

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In order to make the right empirical predictions Bohmian mechanics requires a special statistical boundary condition -- the distribution postulate -- but it is unclear how best to understand this condition. We show how one might use the theory of algorithmic randomness to formulate the distribution postulate as an objective constraining law. The framework requires us to say something about admissible quantum-mechanical states and measurements. In return, algorithmic Bohmian mechanics (aBM) guarantees the standard Born statistics for a collection of canonical quantum experiments in the limit, not just with high probability. The algorithmic distribution postulate provides a sharp typicality condition, clarifies the status of quantum probabilities in the deterministic theory, and provides a concrete example of how notions provided by the theory of algorithmic randomness can aid in specifying the content of a physical law.

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On the Explanation of Born-Rule Statistics in the de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory

Travis Norsen

The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory promises not only a realistic description of the microscopic world (in particular, a description in which observers and observation play no fundamental role) but also the ability to derive and explain aspects of the quantum formalism that are, instead, (awkwardly and problematically) postulated in orthodox versions of quantum theory. Chief among these are the various "measurement axioms" and in particular the Born rule expressing the probability distribution of measurement outcomes. Compared to other candidate non-orthodox quantum theories, the pilot-wave theory suffers from something of an embarrassment of riches in regard to explaining the Born rule statistics, in the sense that there exist, in the literature, not just one but two rather compelling proposed explanations. This paper is an attempt to critically review and clarify these two competing arguments. We summarize both arguments and also survey some objections that have been given against them. In the end, we suggest that there is somewhat less conflict between the two approaches than existing polemics might suggest, and that indeed elements from both arguments may be combined to provide a unified and fully-compelling explanation, from the postulated dynamical first principles, of the Born rule.

Entropy•May 31, 2018•43 citations

Bohm's Theorem

Mariangiola Dezani-ciancaglini A, Stefano Guerrini, Adolfo Piperno

•Jan 1, 2009•1 citation
If there's one lesson that philosophers seem to have learned from quantum mechanics it is that the quantum realm is governed by indeterministic laws. However, in 1952 David Bohm constructed a deterministic theory and proved that it is empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. One of the three conditions that are together sufficient for the empirical adequacy of Bohm's theory is the statistical postulate. This postulate demands a very particular initial condition to hold for ensembles of quantum systems. I argue that the statistical postulate requires a justification. A justification would consist of showing how the dynamics of Bohm's theory is able to generate the initial conditions specified by the statistical postulate. I examine two deterministic justifications of the statistical postulate, one by Valentini and the other by Durr, Goldstein and Zanghi. I explain precisely the ways in which they are lacking. The basic problem is that crucial dynamical details are missing, ones needed to complete the justification. Whether these missing bits can be filled in is an open question. Until a justification is at hand, and its application to real-world ensembles is clarified, the empirical adequacy of Bohm's theory remains an open question. Bohm himself proposed a stochastic or indeterministic justification for the statistical postulate. It has been shown that the dynamics of this stochastic theory does not have the resources to justify the statistical postulate. In addition I show that the mathematical argument Bohm uses in his justification is flawed. Other stochastic theories do justify the statistical postulate but have other problems. The issue of indeterminism in the quantum realm is far from settled. Bohm's deterministic dynamics enables an investigation into the limits (if any) of a deterministic dynamics for the quantum realm. The properties of Bohm's deterministic equations of motion remain largely unknown. What we do know is that if the quantum realm is indeterministic it will not be for any of the reasons we have so far been given.
In order to make the right empirical predictions Bohmian mechanics requires a special statistical boundary condition -- the distribution postulate -- but it is unclear how best to understand this condition. We show how one might use the theory of algorithmic randomness to formulate the distribution postulate as an objective constraining law. The framework requires us to say something about admissible quantum-mechanical states and measurements. In return, algorithmic Bohmian mechanics (aBM) guarantees the standard Born statistics for a collection of canonical quantum experiments in the limit, not just with high probability. The algorithmic distribution postulate provides a sharp typicality condition, clarifies the status of quantum probabilities in the deterministic theory, and provides a concrete example of how notions provided by the theory of algorithmic randomness can aid in specifying the content of a physical law.
The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory promises not only a realistic description of the microscopic world (in particular, a description in which observers and observation play no fundamental role) but also the ability to derive and explain aspects of the quantum formalism that are, instead, (awkwardly and problematically) postulated in orthodox versions of quantum theory. Chief among these are the various "measurement axioms" and in particular the Born rule expressing the probability distribution of measurement outcomes. Compared to other candidate non-orthodox quantum theories, the pilot-wave theory suffers from something of an embarrassment of riches in regard to explaining the Born rule statistics, in the sense that there exist, in the literature, not just one but two rather compelling proposed explanations. This paper is an attempt to critically review and clarify these two competing arguments. We summarize both arguments and also survey some objections that have been given against them. In the end, we suggest that there is somewhat less conflict between the two approaches than existing polemics might suggest, and that indeed elements from both arguments may be combined to provide a unified and fully-compelling explanation, from the postulated dynamical first principles, of the Born rule.