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World Futures

Possibility, Actuality, and Freewill

Robert J. Valenza

Published Feb 13, 2008• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I describe recent developments of Conway and Kochen on the physical meaning of freewill and their theorem that the assertion of freewill for human beings, in their specific sense, implies the same for elementary particles. This description is given in simplified metaphorical terms that nonetheless address the key physical axioms and essential analytic content of their argument. I then give points of contact of our metaphor with the full technical analysis of the cited authors and conclude with some associated metaphysical speculations. These include the implications of the freewill theorem for dual aspect theories and, in particular, for process metaphysics.

DOI
10.1080/02604020701845582

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I describe recent developments of Conway and Kochen on the physical meaning of freewill and their theorem that the assertion of freewill for human beings, in their specific sense, implies the same for elementary particles. This description is given in simplified metaphorical terms that nonetheless address the key physical axioms and essential analytic content of their argument. I then give points of contact of our metaphor with the full technical analysis of the cited authors and conclude with some associated metaphysical speculations. These include the implications of the freewill theorem for dual aspect theories and, in particular, for process metaphysics.
If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world share the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly a certain goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which the aim can be achieved or not by the one who determines the target. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, the determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior. Quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world involving a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature. There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors (Conway and Kochen 2006; 2009). Any quantum system either a human or an electron or whatever else has always a choice: Its behavior is not predetermined by its past. This is a physical law. It implies that a form of information, the quantum information underlies all existing for the unit of the quantity of information is an elementary choice: either a bit or a quantum bit (qubit).
Conway and Kochen have presented a "free will theorem" (Notices of the AMS 56, pgs. 226-232 (2009)) which they claim shows that "if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles." In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition "MIN" motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this conclusion is not correct, while for deterministic models it is not new.
I begin with description of quantum entanglement and its relevance to the EPR-type experiments, which played a decisive role in rejecting determinism and hidden-variable theories. Thereby I prove the closely-related Kochen-Specker paradox, on which also the main object of my paper, the recently published Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem, is founded. It is being shown there, on the basis of three physical axioms, following from the special theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, that if the choice for a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. Therefor the response of the particles can be seen as free. In conclusion I mention some critical remarks on the theorem, expressed in subsequent responses to the original article.
Through both an historical and philosophical analysis of the concept of possibility, we show how including both potentiality and actuality as part of the real is both compatible with experience and contributes to solving key problems of fundamental process and emergence. The book is organized into four main sections that incorporate our routes to potentiality: (1) potentiality in modern science [history and philosophy; quantum physics and complexity]; (2) Relational Realism [ontological interpretation of quantum physics; philosophy and logic]; (3) Process Physics [ontological interpretation of relativity theory; physics and philosophy]; (4) on speculative philosophy and physics [limitations and approximations; process philosophy]. We conclude that certain fundamental problems in modern physics require complementary analyses of certain philosophical and metaphysical issues, and that such scholarship reveals intrinsic features and limits of determinism, potentiality and emergence that enable, among others, important progress on the quantum theory of measurement problem and new understandings of emergence.
The two theories that revolutionized physics in the twentieth century, relativity and quantum mechanics, are full of predictions that defy common sense. Recently, we used three such paradoxical ideas to prove "The Free Will Theorem" (strengthened here), which is the culmination of a series of theorems about quantum mechanics that began in the 1960s. It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle's response (to be pedantic—the universe's response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe.
Metaphysical models by which we understand the fundamental make-up of our universe are all the more plausible when informed by empirically confirmed scientific theory. I have argued that contemporary physics tells us that there are no elementary particles , in any metaphysically serious sense of the word “particle”. Quantum phenomena are not concrete particular entities. The replacement of quantum mechanics by quantum field theory has major consequences for our metaphysics, in that it calls into question the tradition of according categorial priority to particular entities. Instead, categorial priority should be accorded to generic processes. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.