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Physical Review Letters

Quantum mechanics, local realistic theories, and Lorentz-invariant realistic theories

Lucién Hardy

Published May 18, 1992• 745 citations
Publisher

Abstract

First, we demonstrate Bell's theorem, without using inequalities, for an experiment with two particles. Then we show that, if we assume realism and we assume that the ``elements of reality'' corresponding to Lorentz-invariant observables are themselves Lorentz invariant, we can derive a contradiction with quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.68.2981

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First, we demonstrate Bell's theorem, without using inequalities, for an experiment with two particles. Then we show that, if we assume realism and we assume that the ``elements of reality'' corresponding to Lorentz-invariant observables are themselves Lorentz invariant, we can derive a contradiction with quantum mechanics.
The singlet state of two spin-32\frac{3}{2}23​ particles allows a proof of Bell's theorem without inequalities with two distinguishing features: any local observable can be regarded as an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen element of reality, and the contradiction with local realism occurs not only for some specific local observables but for any rotation whereof.
This thesis addresses some of the consequences of giving quantum mechanics a realist interpretation. We consider three main topics: wave-particle duality, locality, and Lorentz invariance. First we show that classical particles alone or classical waves alone cannot explain all single particle quantum phenomena. Then we consider the possibility that a quantum particle is composed of a particle and a wave, both being taken to exist objectively. We are able to demonstrate the reality of empty waves (that is, waves without a particle) if we make three realist motivated assumptions. The main part of this thesis concerns locality. In 1964 Bell demonstrated that a local realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is not possible by deriving a set of inequalities that apply to two particle systems. More recently Greenberger, Home, and Zeilinger have demonstrated this for systems with more than two particles without the need for inequalities. We present a new way to derive Bell inequalities for two particles and show how this can be extended to systems with more than two particles. A number of proposals for experiments to test local realism are put forward. In particular, we show how it is possible to demonstrate the nonlocality of a single photon. A new demonstration of Bell's theorem is presented for two particles but without inequalities. A realizable quantum optical version is proposed and inequalities are proposed which would be required in a non-ideal experiment. Finally, the question of Lorentz invariance is considered. We define a condition for the existence of elements of reality and a condition for the Lorentz invariance of these elements of reality. Then we show that, by considering a particular gedanken experiment, we obtain a contradiction demonstrating that Lorentz-invariant realistic interpretations of quantum theory are not possible.
Having elsewhere refuted Bell’s theorem irrefutably with elementary mathematics, we here advance Einstein’s ideas similarly with a classical Lorentz-invariant theory, observationally-indistinguishable from quantum mechanics. Given that our elementary theory is straight-forward and non-mysterious, we provide an Einsteinian—a specifically local and truly realistic—advance toward understanding the classical nature of physical reality at the quantum level. We thus resolve Bell’s dilemma in Einstein’s favor: as Bell half-expected, he and his supporters were being rather silly.
Locality and realism are two main assumptions in deriving Bell's inequalities. Though the experimentally demonstrated violations of Bell's inequalities rule out local realism, it is, however, not clear what role each of the two assumptions solely plays in the observed violations. Here we show that two testable inequalities for the statistical predictions of two-qubit systems can be derived by assuming either locality or realism. It turns out that quantum mechanics respects a nonlocal classical realism, and it is locality that is incompatible with experimental observations and quantum mechanics.
We examine a gedanken experiment described by Hardy, which purports to prove that the ``elements of reality'' corresponding to Lorentz-invariant observables cannot themselves be Lorentz invariant without violating quantum mechanics. We consider a number of criticisms of this proof and show that these criticisms are not convincing. We demonstrate that the contradiction, which arises in the gedanken experiment and forms the basis of Hardy's proof, has nothing to do with realism, but is a consequence of the well-known noncovariance of the reduction postulate. A reexamination of the gedanken experiment, using a more appropriate formalism, helps to clarify its implications. We conclude with a brief appraisal of realist interpretations of quantum mechanics in the relativistic domain.