The paper contains a relatively non-technical summary of some recent work by the author and Jeremy Butterfield. The goal is to find a way of assigning meaningful truth values to propositions in quantum theory: something that is not possible in the normal, instrumentalist interpretation. The key mathematical tool is presheaf theory where multi-valued, contextual truth values arise naturally. We show how this can be applied to quantum theory, with the ‘contexts’ chosen to be Boolean subalgebras of the set of all projection operators.
The paper contains a relatively non-technical summary of some recent work by the author and Jeremy Butterfield. The goal is to find a way of assigning meaningful truth values to propositions in quantum theory: something that is not possible in the normal, instrumentalist interpretation. The key mathematical tool is presheaf theory where multi-valued, contextual truth values arise naturally. We show how this can be applied to quantum theory, with the ‘contexts’ chosen to be Boolean subalgebras of the set of all projection operators.
Quantum logic has been introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann as an attempt to base the logical primitives, the propositions and the relations and operations among them, on quantum theoretical entities, and thus on the related empirical evidence of the quantum world. We give a brief outline of quantum logic, and some of its algebraic properties, such as nondistributivity, whereby emphasis is given to concrete experimental setups related to quantum logical entities. A probability theory based on quantum logic is fundamentally and sometimes even spectacularly different from probabilities based on classical Boolean logic. We give a brief outline of its nonclassical aspects; in particular violations of Boole-Bell type consistency constraints on joint probabilities, as well as the Kochen-Specker theorem, demonstrating in a constructive, finite way the scarcity and even nonexistence of two-valued states interpretable as classical truth assignments. A more complete introduction of the author can be found in the book "Quantum Logic" (Springer, 1998)
The logic of approximation gives a precise mathematical formulation to the notion of approximate truth and to deductions based on it. We study properties of quantum propositions expressed in this logic, in connection to a modal accessibility predicate which induces a metric on the set of states of a mechanical system. We then relate the logic to some quantum logical calculi, and discuss possible applications to probability theory and to the Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics. Natural deductions in mathematical logic are concerned with expressions of the form Ft-$ (read: ‘I’ yields @‘), where @ is a formula of a certain formal language L and I is a set of formulae of L . Semantically, the expression Ft@ means: ‘if all formulae in the set F are true then $J is also true’. In this paper we deal with natural deductions applied to the natural sciences, in particular to physics. The problem is that in the context of scientific theories we cannot always speak about (absolute) truth: we have to take into account the uncertainties and errors arising in experiments and
According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false; they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I construct a lattice of future-tense propositions, with truth values in the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of a history.
In an empirical logic, an experimentally verifiable proposition P relating to a quantum system is assigned the value of either true of false if the system is in the pure state that belongs or, respectively, does not belong to the Hilbert subspace that represents P. Determined in such a way, truth or falsity of P can be termed “a factual truth-value” of P. In this present paper, it is proposed to consider “a counter-factual truth-value” of P, i.e., either of the values, true or false, that might have been taken by P if the system had been in a pure state belonging to a Hilbert subspace that does not represent P. The assumption that it is always possible to speak meaningfully of counter-factual truth-values of experimental propositions can be called “the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness.” As shown in this paper, this hypothesis lies at the basis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (known as EPR) paradox, a striking and influential thought experiment intended to defy predictions of quantum mechanics, such as the one where measurements of spin along the different axes are incompatible. The purpose of this paper is to show that this hypothesis can be falsified by declining to paste together invariant-subspace lattices of contexts associated with the system (in other words, Boolean algebras or blocks) into one Hilbert lattice. Without such pasting, the EPR paradoxical inference cannot be reached.
Some notes about quantum physics, an interpretation if one wishes, are put forward, insisting on `closely following the mathematics/formalism, the `nuts and bolts of what quantum physics says'. These, basically well-known, issues seem to highlight some rather bold points about the `logic' aspect in quantum physics, necessarily restricting when and which logic may be admissible. And one may understand why that path is hardly followed in the literature. The mathematics/formalism of quantum, compared with classical, physics, may be fairly basically characterized by non-commutative algebras replacing commutative. These classically appearing, in fact, in dealing with systems of possibilities (say, all possible planetary motions under gravity of which one is the actual one). In particular, contrary to too common usage, the quantum non-commutativity should make it impossible to simply `transcend' the `system of possibilities' aspect into a `yes-no' logic essential for an `actual world'. One may have the latter only in a `haven' of approximately commutative algebras of `quasi-classical macroscopic observables', and moreover that `yes-no actual world' would plainly be an `extra ingredient' to the base quantum theory itself.
What is the role of topos theory in the topos models for quantum theory as used by Isham, Butterfield, Döring, Heunen, Landsman, Spitters, and others? In other words, what is the interplay between physical motivation for the models and the mathematical framework used in these models? Concretely, we show that the presheaf topos model of Butterfield, Isham, and Döring resembles classical physics when viewed from the internal language of the presheaf topos, similar to the copresheaf topos model of Heunen, Landsman, and Spitters. Both the presheaf and copresheaf models provide a “quantum logic” in the form of a complete Heyting algebra. Although these algebras are natural from a topos theoretic stance, we seek a physical interpretation for the logical operations. Finally, we investigate dynamics. In particular, we describe how an automorphism on the operator algebra induces a homeomorphism (or isomorphism of locales) on the associated state spaces of the topos models, and how elementary propositions and truth values transform under the action of this homeomorphism. Also with dynamics the focus is on the internal perspective of the topos.