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Journal of Mathematical Physics

Compatibility of state assignments

N. David Mermin

Published Sep 1, 2002• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Rudolf Peierls raised the question of when different density matrices can characterize the knowledge available to different people about one and the same physical system. I describe counterexamples to the condition he imposed on such state assignments, and suggest what the correct condition ought to be.
DOI
10.1063/1.1495897

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Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder Whose knowledge? Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder "Whose knowledge?" Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
The state that an observer attributes to a quantum system depends on the information available to that observer. If two or more observers have different information about a single system, they will in general assign different states. Is there any restriction on what states can be assigned, given reasonable assumptions about how the observers use their information? We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a group of general density matrices to characterize what different people may know about one and the same physical system. These conditions are summarized by a single criterion, which we term compatibility.