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ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

Games for exchanging information

Gillat Kol, Moni Naor

Published May 17, 2008• 129 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We consider the rational versions of two of the classical problems in foundations of cryptography: secret sharing and multiparty computation, suggested by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004). Our goal is to design games and fair strategies that encourage rational participants to exchange information about their inputs for their mutual benefit, when the only mean of communication is a broadcast channel.

DOI
10.1145/1374376.1374437

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•Jan 1, 2003•10 citations
We consider the rational versions of two of the classical problems in foundations of cryptography: secret sharing and multiparty computation, suggested by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004). Our goal is to design games and fair strategies that encourage rational participants to exchange information about their inputs for their mutual benefit, when the only mean of communication is a broadcast channel.
We consider the problem of secret sharing among n rational players. This problem was introduced by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004), who claim that a solution is impossible for n = 2 but show a solution for the case n >= 3. Contrary to their claim, we show a protocol for rational secret sharing among n = 2 players; our protocol extends to the case n 3, where it is simpler than the Halpern-Teague solution and also o#ers a number of other advantages. We also show how to avoid the continual involvement of the dealer, in either our own protocol or that of Halpern and Teague. Our
Recent work has attempted to bridge the fields of Cryptography and Game Theory in order to create more robust protocols that allow for a variety of player types.A keystone functionality used in cryptography is Secret Sharing.While there are several well known, efficient protocols that implement Secret Sharing in the Cryptographic model, designing a Rational Secret Sharing protocol which works in the Game Theoretic model has proved challenging.In this thesis, we contrast several recently proposed protocols for Rational Secret Sharing based on their channel models, utility tolerances, equilibrium types, and efficiencies.We also discuss two more general results bridging Cryptography and Game Theory that can be used to construct Rational Secret Sharing protocols.Finally, we highlight several issues of context that influence the ways in which Rational Secret Sharing protocols might be used.
Rational secret sharing was first introduced by Halpern and Teague (STOC, 2004). Since then, a series of works have focused on designing rational secret sharing protocols. However, most existing solutions can share only one secret at one secret sharing process. To share multiple secrets such as m secrets, the dealer must redistribute shares for m times. In addition, previous works assume existence of broadcast channel which is not realistic. Motivated by those problems, this paper proposes a rational multi-secret sharing scheme, which combines the secret sharing scheme with game theory. In the protocol, the problem of sharing multiple secrets is addressed, and there are multiple secrets to be shared during one secret sharing process. Furthermore, this work starts off by constructing a protocol in simultaneous broadcast networks, and then we emulate the broadcast channel over point-to-point networks. Based on a computational assumption, we show that rational players have no incentive to deviate from the protocol and every player can obtain multi-secret fairly.
We consider the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague[3], where players prefer to get the secret than not to get the secret and with lower preference, prefer that as few of the other players get the secret. The impossibility of a deterministic protocol for rational secret sharing is proved by Halpern and Teague[3]. The impossibility result is based on the fact that a rational player always chooses a dominating strategy and so there is no incentive for a player to send his secret share. This rational behavior makes secret sharing impossible, but there is an interesting way by which we can force rational players to cooperate for achieving successful secret sharing. A rational player may be deterred from exploiting his short term advantage by the threat of punishment that reduces his long term payoff. This can be captured by the repeated interaction of players. Hence, we study rational secret sharing in a scenario, where players interact repeatedly in several rounds which enables the possibility of secret sharing among rational players. In our model, the dealer, instead of sending shares, forms polynomials of the secret shares and sends points on that polynomial (say subshares) to the players. The dealer constructs polynomials in a manner that the degrees of polynomials used differ by at most one and each player is not aware of the degree of polynomial employed for others. The players distribute shares in terms of subshares. We show a surprising result on the deterministic protocol for rational secret sharing problem in synchronous model. This is the first protocol that achieves rational secret sharing in a reasonable model to the best of our knowledge.
It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.