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American Journal of Physics

Decay of a compound particle and the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument

J. Flores, Enrique Henestroza, Pier A. Mello, M. Moshińsky

Published Jan 1, 1981• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

By analyzing the decay of a compound system into two praticles, we show that measurements on particle 1 will define with an arbitrary degree of precision the coordinate and momenta of particle 2 at times large compared with the lifetime of the compound system, i.e., when the two particles no longer interact. Thus we have an example of the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument in which all the requirements of quantum mechanics are met. Criticism of the point of view they present should then center on their epistemological position (such as their definition of physical reality) rather than on their use of the quantum-mechanical formalism.

DOI
10.1119/1.12611

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By analyzing the decay of a compound system into two praticles, we show that measurements on particle 1 will define with an arbitrary degree of precision the coordinate and momenta of particle 2 at times large compared with the lifetime of the compound system, i.e., when the two particles no longer interact. Thus we have an example of the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument in which all the requirements of quantum mechanics are met. Criticism of the point of view they present should then center on their epistemological position (such as their definition of physical reality) rather than on their use of the quantum-mechanical formalism.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
This paper discusses the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox from a new point of view. In section II, the arguments by which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen reach their paradoxical conclusions are presented. They are found to rest on two critical assumptions: (a) that before a measurement is made on a system consisting of two non-interacting but correlated sub-systems, the state of the entire system is exactly represented by: (b) that the exact measurement of an observable A in one of the sub-systems is possible. In section III it is shown that assumption (b) is incorrect. Thus we conclude, as did Bohr, that the results of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are not valid. The arguments of section III are quite distinct from Bohr's, and therefore in Section IV this work is related to that of Bohr.