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American Journal of Physics

Concerning Einstein's, Podolsky's, and Rosen's Objection to Quantum Theory

C. A. Hooker

Published Jul 1, 1970• 16 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Professor J. Jauch, in his recent book, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, claims to resolve the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. Jauch's approach is representative of that adopted by the majority of physicists. I argue that, although Jauch does exhibit a consistent quantum formalism for dealing with situations of the type involved in the original paradox, that formalism, so far from doing away with the paradox, serves only to highlight the difficulties of providing an acceptable physical understanding of it. The paradox must remain, therefore, as a central clue in the search for a more adequate understanding of quantum theory.

DOI
10.1119/1.1976483

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Professor J. Jauch, in his recent book, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, claims to resolve the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. Jauch's approach is representative of that adopted by the majority of physicists. I argue that, although Jauch does exhibit a consistent quantum formalism for dealing with situations of the type involved in the original paradox, that formalism, so far from doing away with the paradox, serves only to highlight the difficulties of providing an acceptable physical understanding of it. The paradox must remain, therefore, as a central clue in the search for a more adequate understanding of quantum theory.
D. H. Sharp has recently argued that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen failed to make good their claim that elementary quantum theory provides only an incomplete description of physical reality. Sharp expounds in detail three criticisms (a fourth is mentioned) which focus largely on formal features of the quantum theory. I argue, on grounds centered largely in our search for an adequatephysical understandingof the micro domain, that each of these criticisms must be rejected. The original criticism of quantum theory reemerges as a still-important baseline in our search for an adequate understanding of quantum theory.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper [17] in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete.That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics.There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics.There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality.Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities).The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities.And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades.The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers.It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
Once upon a time the well-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics (one might even say the “traditional” paradoxes of quantum mechanics!—I refer here to paradoxes such as the Schrödinger cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox) seemed especially difficult because of the rather bizarre behavior of the wave packet under the von Neumann theory of measurement, to which behavior these paradoxical situations seemed to draw especial attention. Quite recently quantum theoretical accounts of the measurement process have been appearing which sidestep direct reference to such things as “contraction” of the wave packet (see, for example, Krips and Jauch). With this development it has become increasingly popular to take a “cool” approach to these paradoxes, arguing that the new approach to measurement provides a consistent, nonbizarre account of the physical situations and that the paradoxicality was due largely to intuitive blunders—even plausible intuitive blunders—accentuated (but also disguised) by the unfortunate features of the von Neumann approach to measurement. Both Krips and Jauch, for example, adopt this approach.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is an old problem which started back in 1935 with an article in Physical Review titled ‘Does Quantum Mechanics Describe Physical Reality Completely?’ These authors assert that quantum mechanics, being inconsistent, cannot describe physical reality completely. In the present paper the nature of the inconsistency will be analyzed and it will be shown that the E.P.R. paradox is essentially of formal nature and that the apparent formal inconsistency may be regarded as a consequence of unjustifiable presupposition. According to quantum mechanical theory the states of a microscopic system may be represented by state vectors and in the absence of any disturbance from outside the state vectors will change continuously with time according to Schrodinger's equation.