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ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority

Tal Rabin, Michael Ben-Or

Published Jan 1, 1989• 956 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Under the assumption that each participant can broadcast a message to all other participants and that each pair of participants can communicate secretly, we present a verifiable secret sharing protocol, and show that any multiparty protocol, or game with incomplete information, can be achieved if a majority of the players are honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional and does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability. Applications of these results to Byzantine Agreement are also presented.

DOI
10.1145/73007.73014

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Under the assumption that each participant can broadcast a message to all other participants and that each pair of participants can communicate secretly, we present a verifiable secret sharing protocol, and show that any multiparty protocol, or game with incomplete information, can be achieved if a majority of the players are honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional and does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability. Applications of these results to Byzantine Agreement are also presented.
Broadcast and verifiable secret sharing (VSS) are central building blocks for secure multi-party computation. These protocols are required to be resilient against a Byzantine adversary who controls at most t out of the n parties running the protocol. In this dissertation, we consider the design of fault-tolerant protocols for broadcast and verifiable secret sharing with stronger security guarantees and improved round complexity. Broadcast allows a party to send the same message to all parties, and all parties are assured they have received identical messages. Given a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and digital signatures, it is possible to construct broadcast protocols tolerating any number of corrupted parties. We address two important issues related to broadcast: (1) Almost all existing protocols do not distinguish between corrupted parties (who do not follow the protocol) and honest parties whose secret (signing) keys have been compromised (but who continue to behave honestly); (2) all existing protocols for broadcast are insecure against an adaptive adversary who can choose which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses. We propose new security models that capture these issues, and present tight feasibility and impossibility results. In the problem of verifiable secret sharing, there is a designated player who shares a secret during an initial sharing phase such that the secret is hidden from an adversary that corrupts at most t parties. In a subsequent reconstruction phase of the protocol, a unique secret, well-defined by the view of honest players in the sharing phase, is reconstructed. The round complexity of VSS protocols is a very important metric of their efficiency. We show two improvements regarding the round complexity of information-theoretic VSS. First, we construct an efficient perfectly secure VSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 corrupted parties that is simultaneously optimal in both the number of rounds and the number of invocations of broadcast. Second, we construct a statistically secure VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 corrupted parties that has optimal round complexity, and an efficient statistical VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 corrupted parties that requires one additional round.
Secret sharing and multiparty computation (also called "secure function evaluation") are fundamental primitives in modern cryptography, allowing a group of mutually distrustful players to perform correct, distributed computations under the sole assumption that some number of them will follow the protocol honestly. This paper investigates how much trust is necessary -- that is, how many players must remain honest -- in order for distributed quantum computations to be possible. We present a verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS) protocol, and a general secure multiparty quantum computation (MPQC) protocol, which can tolerate any \left[ {\frac{{n - 1}} {2}} \right] cheaters among n players. Previous protocols for these tasks tolerated \left[ {\frac{{n - 1}} {4}} \right] and \left[ {\frac{{n - 1}} {6}} \right] cheaters, respectively. The threshold we achieve is tight -- even in the classical case, "fair" multiparty computation is not possible if any set of n/2 players can cheat. Our protocols rely on approximate quantum errorcorrecting codes, which can tolerate a larger fraction of errors than traditional, exact codes. We introduce new families of authentication schemes and approximate codes tailored to the needs of our protocols, as well as new state purification techniques along the lines of those used in faulttolerant quantum circuits.
We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure. We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure. In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players. For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes. We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does not hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given blac...
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocols enable parties to share secrets while guaranteeing security (in particular, that all parties hold valid and consistent shares) even if the dealer or some of the participants are malicious. Most work on VSS focuses on the honest majority case, primarily since it enables one to guarantee output delivery (e.g., a corrupted recipient cannot prevent an honest dealer from sharing their value). Feldman's VSS is a well known and popular protocol for this task and relies on the discrete log hardness assumption. In this paper, we present a variant of Feldman's VSS for the dishonest majority setting and formally prove its security. Beyond the basic VSS protocol, we present a publicly-verifiable version, as well as show how to securely add participants to the sharing and how to refresh an existing sharing (all secure in the presence of a dishonest majority). We prove that our protocols are UC secure, for appropriately defined ideal functionalities.
Multiparty computation considers the design of protocols such that a set of n users U] ... lim each with their own secret input Xi, can compute a function Y =F(x], ... , x/J. In this paper, we study a requirement for devising non-interactive multiparty computation protocols and present the first non-interactive multiparty computation protocol, which has the following advantages: a) The amount of computation required by each participant is equal to the amount of computation in an ideal model (i.e. the proposed scheme is optimal). b) In the presence of passive adversaries, no set of less than n users can leam more than what is allowed in the underlying secret sharing scheme (other than the function value), c) In the presence of active adversaries (i.e, Byzantine faults are allowed), no set of less than nl2 users can either leam more than what is allowed in the underlying secret sharing scheme, nor can they dismpt the computation. d) The partial security provided in our scheme is unconditional. That is, the proposed scheme does not rely on any non-proven cryptographic assumption.