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Zeitschrift für Naturforschung A

Sein oder Nichtsein als Grundfrage der Quantenphysik / To he or not to be as basic question in quantum physics

Fritz Bopp

Published Feb 1, 1984• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The question is often asked how to interprete quantum physics. That question does not arise in classical physics, since Newton's axioms are immediately connected with basic ideas and experiences. The same is possible in quantum physics, if we remember how elementary particle physicists describe their experiments. As Helmholtz has pointed out. the basic assumption of classical physics is that of geneidentity. That means: Bodies remain the same during their motion. Obviously, that is no longer true in quantum physics. Particles can be created and annihilated. Therefore creation and annihilation must be considered as basic processes. Motion only occurs, if a particle is annihilated in a certain point, if an equal one is created in an infinitesimally neighbouring point, and if this process is continuously going on during a certain time. Motions of that kind are compatible with the existence of some manifest creation and annihilation processes. If we accept this idea, quantum physics can be derived from first principles. As in classical physics, we know therefore what happens from the very beginning. Thus questions of interpretation become dispensable. A particular mathematical method is used to exhaust continua. The theory is formulated in a finite lattice, whose point density and extension equally go to infinity. All calculations are therefore performed in a finite dimensional Hilbert space. The results are however related to an infinite dimensional one. Earlier calculations may, therefore, be essentially correct, though they must be rejected in theories which are based on manifestly infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces. Here limiting processes do not occur in the state space. They are only admissible for numerical results.

DOI
10.1515/zna-1984-0201

Related papers

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

From classical to quantum mechanics: “How to translate physical ideas into mathematical language”

Hervé Bergeron

Following previous works by E. Prugovečki [Physica A 91A, 202 (1978) and Stochastic Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Space–time (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986)] on common features of classical and quantum mechanics, we develop a unified mathematical framework for classical and quantum mechanics (based on L2-spaces over classical phase space), in order to investigate to what extent quantum mechanics can be obtained as a simple modification of classical mechanics (on both logical and analytical levels). To obtain this unified framework, we split quantum theory in two parts: (i) general quantum axiomatics (a system is described by a state in a Hilbert space, observables are self-adjoints operators, and so on) and (ii) quantum mechanics proper that specifies the Hilbert space as L2(Rn); the Heisenberg rule [pi,qj]=−iℏδij with p=−iℏ∇, the free Hamiltonian H=−ℏ2Δ/2m and so on. We show that general quantum axiomatics (up to a supplementary “axiom of classicity”) can be used as a nonstandard mathematical ground to formulate physical ideas and equations of ordinary classical statistical mechanics. So, the question of a “true quantization” with “ℏ” must be seen as an independent physical problem not directly related with quantum formalism. At this stage, we show that this nonstandard formulation of classical mechanics exhibits a new kind of operation that has no classical counterpart: this operation is related to the “quantization process,” and we show why quantization physically depends on group theory (the Galilei group). This analytical procedure of quantization replaces the “correspondence principle” (or canonical quantization) and allows us to map classical mechanics into quantum mechanics, giving all operators of quantum dynamics and the Schrödinger equation. The great advantage of this point of view is that quantization is based on concrete physical arguments and not derived from some “pure algebraic rule” (we exhibit also some limit of the correspondence principle). Moreover spins for particles are naturally generated, including an approximation of their interaction with magnetic fields. We also recover by this approach the semi-classical formalism developed by E. Prugovečki [Stochastic Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Space–time (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986)].

arXiv:quant-ph/0102084•Journal of Mathematical Physics•Sep 1, 2001•12 citations

Foundations of quantum mechanics?

Göran Lindblad

Does quantum mechanics have unsolved foundational problems? Is there a dividing line between the quantum and classical descriptions of the world? In this paper, I give an elementary introduction to the mathematical aspects of quantum and classical models which have prompted such questions.

Physica Scripta•Jun 28, 2011•30 citations

Quantenphysikalischer Zustandsraum im Kontinuum / Quantum physical state space in continua

Fritz Bopp

Abstract As previously shown, quantum physics for single pairs of creation and annihilation processes may be derived from first principles. Quantum physics at all can be therefore considered as an interplay of such elementary processes. This is easily possible if the number of pairs of processes is finite. Difficulties arise only for infinite numbers. The difficulties are similar to those occurring in the derivation of the equation for an oscillating string from that for an oscillator chain. It is true that the spectra of both systems are not continuously connected. However, a weaker theorem is more important: The chain eigenvalue of each order converges to the string one of the same order for an infinitely growing number of oscillators of a certain kind. Therefore both systems are continuously connected in the sense of semiconvergency. Exhausting the space continuum with a sequence of lattices equably becomming infinitely large and fine, the infinitely dimensional Hilbertspace is steadily connected with the finitely dimensional one in the sense of semiconvergency. It will be shown that the Hilbert spaces in the sequence of lattices yield the suitable tool for quantum physics as an interplay in the mentioned sense. This kind of Hilbert space, the so-called rational one, must be preferred in physics rather than the real one introduced by Hilbert, since all theories in physics are based on a finite number of data. In particular, we formulate Dirac's equation in the rational Hilbert space. It is shown that, even in quantum physics, a theorem of classical physics remains true, according to which relativity results from certain principles formulating most obvious experiences. We obtain the Lorentz invariant Dirac equation mainly from a modification of Newtons definition II according to which p = Hυ/c2 (instead of p = m υ).

Zeitschrift für Naturforschung A•Mar 1, 1984•1 citation

The foundations of quantum mechanics

Frederick G. Werner

What are the leading problems of quantum physics today? Where does reduction of the wave-packet occur? Why single-valued wave functions? To what extent have relativity theory and quantum theory really been united consistently? Does it make sense to speak of “quantum mechanical action at a distance”? What is the significance of electromagnetic potentials in the quantum domain? What does a leading quantum physicist have to say about the physicist's picture of nature?

Physics Today•Jan 1, 1964•34 citations

Macroscopic World and Microscopic World

Takao Tati

A physical picture of macroscopic and microscopic worlds is presented. In the space-time description, both the macroscopic and microscopic worlds are described simultaneously in space-time being a single boundless four dimensional continuum in which the motion of the observer is represented as a world line. In our picture, the space-time description is valid only for the macroscopic world and the microscopic world is local in the sense that it is described in a finite space associated with each point of the macroscopic space-time. In this case, space-time does not exist in the microscopic world in which the observer can not move. For the description of our picture, the language of the non-space-time description is necessary in which space-time is not presupposed. We can utilize the space-time description for the macroscopic world and, at the same time, we have a theory of finite degree of freedom describing creations and annihilations of elementary particles in the microscopic world free from the divergence difficulty, instead of the divergent quantum field theory in the space-time description which is considered in our picture a limit of an approximation like the ideal gas in gas theories. The finite degree of freedom is given by a one-particle state-vector space of a finite dimension from which the second quantization leads to a state-vector space of a countable dimension (a Hilbert space) for the theory of creations and annihilations of elementary particles describing a local microscopic world. The relation between microscopic worlds associated with different macroscopic space-time points is given by a dynamical principle up to a phase factor due to possible fluctuations of phases of local state-vector spaces. The experiment on interference of light performed recently by Franson and Potocki is interpreted in terms of fluctuation of the local phases and is considered to support the theory of finite degree of freedom which leads to the idea of local microscopic worlds.

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 1986•4 citations
The question is often asked how to interprete quantum physics. That question does not arise in classical physics, since Newton's axioms are immediately connected with basic ideas and experiences. The same is possible in quantum physics, if we remember how elementary particle physicists describe their experiments. As Helmholtz has pointed out. the basic assumption of classical physics is that of geneidentity. That means: Bodies remain the same during their motion. Obviously, that is no longer true in quantum physics. Particles can be created and annihilated. Therefore creation and annihilation must be considered as basic processes. Motion only occurs, if a particle is annihilated in a certain point, if an equal one is created in an infinitesimally neighbouring point, and if this process is continuously going on during a certain time. Motions of that kind are compatible with the existence of some manifest creation and annihilation processes. If we accept this idea, quantum physics can be derived from first principles. As in classical physics, we know therefore what happens from the very beginning. Thus questions of interpretation become dispensable. A particular mathematical method is used to exhaust continua. The theory is formulated in a finite lattice, whose point density and extension equally go to infinity. All calculations are therefore performed in a finite dimensional Hilbert space. The results are however related to an infinite dimensional one. Earlier calculations may, therefore, be essentially correct, though they must be rejected in theories which are based on manifestly infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces. Here limiting processes do not occur in the state space. They are only admissible for numerical results.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Following previous works by E. Prugovečki [Physica A 91A, 202 (1978) and Stochastic Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Space–time (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986)] on common features of classical and quantum mechanics, we develop a unified mathematical framework for classical and quantum mechanics (based on L2-spaces over classical phase space), in order to investigate to what extent quantum mechanics can be obtained as a simple modification of classical mechanics (on both logical and analytical levels). To obtain this unified framework, we split quantum theory in two parts: (i) general quantum axiomatics (a system is described by a state in a Hilbert space, observables are self-adjoints operators, and so on) and (ii) quantum mechanics proper that specifies the Hilbert space as L2(Rn); the Heisenberg rule [pi,qj]=−iℏδij with p=−iℏ∇, the free Hamiltonian H=−ℏ2Δ/2m and so on. We show that general quantum axiomatics (up to a supplementary “axiom of classicity”) can be used as a nonstandard mathematical ground to formulate physical ideas and equations of ordinary classical statistical mechanics. So, the question of a “true quantization” with “ℏ” must be seen as an independent physical problem not directly related with quantum formalism. At this stage, we show that this nonstandard formulation of classical mechanics exhibits a new kind of operation that has no classical counterpart: this operation is related to the “quantization process,” and we show why quantization physically depends on group theory (the Galilei group). This analytical procedure of quantization replaces the “correspondence principle” (or canonical quantization) and allows us to map classical mechanics into quantum mechanics, giving all operators of quantum dynamics and the Schrödinger equation. The great advantage of this point of view is that quantization is based on concrete physical arguments and not derived from some “pure algebraic rule” (we exhibit also some limit of the correspondence principle). Moreover spins for particles are naturally generated, including an approximation of their interaction with magnetic fields. We also recover by this approach the semi-classical formalism developed by E. Prugovečki [Stochastic Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Space–time (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986)].
Abstract As previously shown, quantum physics for single pairs of creation and annihilation processes may be derived from first principles. Quantum physics at all can be therefore considered as an interplay of such elementary processes. This is easily possible if the number of pairs of processes is finite. Difficulties arise only for infinite numbers. The difficulties are similar to those occurring in the derivation of the equation for an oscillating string from that for an oscillator chain. It is true that the spectra of both systems are not continuously connected. However, a weaker theorem is more important: The chain eigenvalue of each order converges to the string one of the same order for an infinitely growing number of oscillators of a certain kind. Therefore both systems are continuously connected in the sense of semiconvergency. Exhausting the space continuum with a sequence of lattices equably becomming infinitely large and fine, the infinitely dimensional Hilbertspace is steadily connected with the finitely dimensional one in the sense of semiconvergency. It will be shown that the Hilbert spaces in the sequence of lattices yield the suitable tool for quantum physics as an interplay in the mentioned sense. This kind of Hilbert space, the so-called rational one, must be preferred in physics rather than the real one introduced by Hilbert, since all theories in physics are based on a finite number of data. In particular, we formulate Dirac's equation in the rational Hilbert space. It is shown that, even in quantum physics, a theorem of classical physics remains true, according to which relativity results from certain principles formulating most obvious experiences. We obtain the Lorentz invariant Dirac equation mainly from a modification of Newtons definition II according to which p = Hυ/c2 (instead of p = m υ).
A physical picture of macroscopic and microscopic worlds is presented. In the space-time description, both the macroscopic and microscopic worlds are described simultaneously in space-time being a single boundless four dimensional continuum in which the motion of the observer is represented as a world line. In our picture, the space-time description is valid only for the macroscopic world and the microscopic world is local in the sense that it is described in a finite space associated with each point of the macroscopic space-time. In this case, space-time does not exist in the microscopic world in which the observer can not move. For the description of our picture, the language of the non-space-time description is necessary in which space-time is not presupposed. We can utilize the space-time description for the macroscopic world and, at the same time, we have a theory of finite degree of freedom describing creations and annihilations of elementary particles in the microscopic world free from the divergence difficulty, instead of the divergent quantum field theory in the space-time description which is considered in our picture a limit of an approximation like the ideal gas in gas theories. The finite degree of freedom is given by a one-particle state-vector space of a finite dimension from which the second quantization leads to a state-vector space of a countable dimension (a Hilbert space) for the theory of creations and annihilations of elementary particles describing a local microscopic world. The relation between microscopic worlds associated with different macroscopic space-time points is given by a dynamical principle up to a phase factor due to possible fluctuations of phases of local state-vector spaces. The experiment on interference of light performed recently by Franson and Potocki is interpreted in terms of fluctuation of the local phases and is considered to support the theory of finite degree of freedom which leads to the idea of local microscopic worlds.