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In search of local beables

Peter J. Lewis

Published Sep 14, 2015• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

The call to supplement the quantum wave function with local beables is almost as old as quantum mechanics. But what exactly is the problem with the wave function as the representation of a quantum system? I canvass three potential problems with the wave function: the well-known problems of incompleteness and dimensionality, and the lesser known problem of non-locality introduced recently by Myrvold. Building on Myrvold's insight, I show that the standard ways of introducing local beables into quantum mechanics are unsuccessful. I consider whether we really need local beables, and assess the prospects for a new theory of local beables.

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J. S. Bell

This is a pretentious name for a theory which hardly exists otherwise, but which ought to exist. The name is deliberately modelled on 'the algebra of local observables'. The terminology, be-able as against observ-able, is not designed to frighten with metaphysic those dedicated to realphysic. It is chosen rather to help in making explicit some notions already implicit in, and basic to, ordinary quantum theory. For, in the words of Bohr, 'it is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms'. It is the ambition of the theory of local beables to bring these 'classical terms' into the equations, and not relegate them entirely to the surrounding talk.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 3, 2004•269 citations
The call to supplement the quantum wave function with local beables is almost as old as quantum mechanics. But what exactly is the problem with the wave function as the representation of a quantum system? I canvass three potential problems with the wave function: the well-known problems of incompleteness and dimensionality, and the lesser known problem of non-locality introduced recently by Myrvold. Building on Myrvold's insight, I show that the standard ways of introducing local beables into quantum mechanics are unsuccessful. I consider whether we really need local beables, and assess the prospects for a new theory of local beables.
In [2], a detailed argument is presented on a version of pilot-waves, given by at Theory of Exclusively Local Beables. What the author of [2] considers to be his crucial proposal is described in the title of section 3 as 'complicated, ugly, and highly contrived'. The reason for such a proposal is claimed to be the widespread perception among quantum physicists, according to which 'those sympathetic to the pilot-wave ontology no doubt expected that, for a system of N particles moving in three spatial dimensions, the theoretical description would be of N wave-particle pairs - each pair consisting of a point particle guided in some way by an associated wave propagating in 3-space. But Schroedinger's wave function for such an N-particle system was emphatically not a set of N (interacting) waves, each propagating in 3-space. It was, rather, a single wave propagating in the 3N-dimensional configuration space for the system', [2, p. 5]. In the present paper it is argued that the mentioned widespread expectation need not be seen as being betrayed by what actually happens. In particular, the construction in section 3 of [2] may be avoidable.
Abstract This chapter considers and responds to the objection that a wave function in a high-dimensional space cannot ultimately constitute the low-dimensional macroscopic objects of experience. It discusses two forms this objection takes: one based on the putative fact that our evidence for quantum theories consists of low-dimensional objects, and another based on the putative fact that quantum theories are about low-dimensional objects, that they have primitive ontologies of local beables. Even admitting that there may be something straightforward and comprehensible about the fundamental ontologies for quantum theories proposed by the wave function realist, the philosophers who raise these objections see a problem with these ontologies in that they cannot serve as the constitutive foundation for the world as we experience it. And this undermines the promise of wave function realism to serve as a framework for the interpretation of quantum theories.
We have developed a new dynamical theory that describes deterministic phenomena of very large scale of matter and the seemingly indeterministic experimental results on very small scale of matter in equal footing. This is done by introducing a new non-local ontological quantity, namely matter's knowledge on its own local position-beable. The matter's knowledge is given uniquely by a new non-local beable called "imaginability". The latter is an ontological concept giving a degree of imagination that the matter "could have" state than it actually has, replacing the conventional epistemological concept of probability. The classical objective notion of trajectories are given a new spirit. The classical mechanics turns out to its special case, whereas the Schrodinger's equation is recovered by neglecting sub-quantum fluctuations of the order of hbar2\\hbar^2hbar2. All the quantum mechanical results on spectrum of energy is confirmed. Furthermore, the Dirac-Von Newmann projection postulate is given a physical objective mechanism in term of a single experiment, and the Born's probability rule is given a derivation. Finally we show that our dynamical theory can be considered as a combination between the classical mechanics and the thermodynamics had it applies to a single particle.
This is a pretentious name for a theory which hardly exists otherwise, but which ought to exist. The name is deliberately modelled on 'the algebra of local observables'. The terminology, be-able as against observ-able, is not designed to frighten with metaphysic those dedicated to realphysic. It is chosen rather to help in making explicit some notions already implicit in, and basic to, ordinary quantum theory. For, in the words of Bohr, 'it is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms'. It is the ambition of the theory of local beables to bring these 'classical terms' into the equations, and not relegate them entirely to the surrounding talk.