Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings

High Entropy Random Selection Protocols

Nikolay Vereshchagin, Harry Buhrman, Cristandl, Matthias, Michal Koucký, Zvi Lotker, Boaz Patt-Shamir

Published Jan 1, 2008• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We study the two party problem of randomly selecting a string among all the strings of length n. We want the protocol to have the property that the output distribution has high entropy, even when one of the two parties is dishonest and deviates from the protocol. We develop protocols that achieve high, close to n, entropy. In the literature the randomness guarantee is usually expressed as being close to the uniform distribution or in terms of resiliency. The notion of entropy is not directly comparable to that of resiliency, but we establish a connection between the two that allows us to compare our protocols with the existing ones. We construct an explicit protocol that yields entropy n - O(1) and has 4log^* n rounds, improving over the protocol of Goldwasser et al. that also achieves this entropy but needs O(n) rounds. Both these protocols need O(n^2) bits of communication. Next we reduce the communication in our protocols. We show the existence, non-explicitly, of a protocol that has 6-rounds, 2n + 8log n bits of communication and yields entropy n- O(log n) and min-entropy n/2 - O(log n). Our protocol achieves the same entropy bound as the recent, also non-explicit, protocol of Gradwohl et al., however achieves much higher min-entropy: n/2 - O(log n) versus O(log n). Finally we exhibit very simple explicit protocols. We connect the security parameter of these geometric protocols with the well studied Kakeya problem motivated by harmonic analysis and analytical number theory. We are only able to prove that these protocols have entropy 3n/4 but still n/2 - O(log n) min-entropy. Therefore they do not perform as well with respect to the explicit constructions of Gradwohl et al. entropy-wise, but still have much better min-entropy. We conjecture that these simple protocols achieve n -o(n) entropy. Our geometric construction and its relation to the Kakeya problem follows a new and different approach to the random selection problem than any of the previously known protocols.

DOI
10.4230/dagsemproc.07411.5

Related papers

High Entropy Random Selection Protocols (Extended Abstract)

Harry Buhrman, Matthias Christandl, Michal Kouck +3 more

Abstract. We study the two party problem of randomly selecting a string among all the strings of length n. We want the protocol to have the property that the output distribution has high entropy, even when one of the two parties is dishonest and deviates from the protocol. We develop protocols that achieve high, close to n, entropy. In the literature the randomness guarantee is usually expressed as being close to the uniform distribution or in terms of resiliency. The notion of entropy is not directly comparable to that of resiliency, but we establish a connection between the two that allows us to compare our protocols with the existing ones. We construct an explicit protocol that yields entropy n − O(1) and has 4log ∗ n rounds, improving over the protocol of Goldreich et al. [3] that also achieves this entropy but needs O(n) rounds. Both these protocols need O(n 2) bits of communication. Next we reduce the communication in our protocols. We show the existence, nonexplicitly, of a protocol that has 6 rounds, 2n + 8log n bits of communication

•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

The round complexity of two-party random selection

Saurabh Sanghvi, Salil Vadhan

We study the round complexity of two-party protocols for generating a random n-bit string such that the output is guaranteed to have bounded bias (according to some measure) even if one of the two parties deviates from the protocol (even using unlimited computational resources). Specifically, we require that the output's statistical difference from the uniform distribution on zon is bounded by a constant less than 1.We present a protocol for the above problem that has 2 log*n+O(1) rounds, improving a 2n-round protocol that follows from the work of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial (FOCS'91). Like the GGL protocol, our protocol actually provides a stronger guarantee, ensuring that the output lands in any set T⊆zon of density μ with probability at most O(√μ+δ), where δ is an arbitarily small constant.We then prove a matching lower bound, showing that any protocol guaranteeing bounded statistical difference requires at least log*n - log* log*n-O(1) rounds. As far as we know, this is the first nontrivial lower bound on the round complexity of random selection protocols (of any type) that does not impose additional constraints (e.g. on communication or "simulatability").We also state several results for the case when the output's bias is measured by the maximum multiplicative factor by which a party can increase the probability of a set T ⊆ zon.

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•May 22, 2005•14 citations

The Round Complexity of Two-Party Random Selection

Saurabh Sanghvi, Salil Vadhan

We study the round complexity of two-party protocols for generating a random n-bit string such that the output is guaranteed to have bounded “bias,” even if one of the two parties deviates from the protocol (possibly using unlimited computational resources). Specifically, we require that the output's statistical difference from the uniform distribution on $\{0,1\}^n$ is bounded by a constant less than 1. We present a protocol for the above problem that has $2 \log^* n + O(1)$ rounds, improving a previous $2n$-round protocol of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial (FOCS '91). Like the GGL Protocol, our protocol actually provides a stronger guarantee, ensuring that the output lands in any set $T \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ of density $\mu$ with probability at most $O(\sqrt{\mu + \delta})$, where $\delta$ may be an arbitrarily small constant. We then prove a nearly matching lower bound, showing that any protocol guaranteeing bounded statistical difference requires at least $\log^* n - \log^* \log^* n - O(1)$ rounds. We also prove several results for the case when the output's bias is measured by the maximum multiplicative factor by which a party can increase the probability of a set $T \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$.

SIAM Journal on Computing•Jan 1, 2008•9 citations

The Role of Interaction in Common Randomness and Secret Key Generation

Noah Golowich

In this work we study the problems of common randomness generation (CRG) and secret key generation (SKG). In the CRG problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, receive samples X and Y, respectively, from some joint source distribution μ. The two parties wish to agree on a key consisting of many bits of randomness, by exchanging messages that depend on each party’s respective input and the previous messages. The SKG problem is the same as CRG, except that an eavesdropper who observes the messages must not be able to determine much information about the key. We study the tradeoff between the minimum total length of all messages for a protocol generating a given number of bits of randomness and the minimum possible number of rounds in such a protocol. We construct a source distribution parametrized by positive integers r, n, and l, achieving such a tradeoff in a strong sense: when Alice and Bob can use r + 2 rounds of communication and l ≥ n, they can agree on l bits of entropy by communicating only O(log n) bits, but when they are restricted to r rounds of communication, they require communication of Ω(n^(1/2) / poly log(n)) bits to agree on l bits of entropy. We also prove an analogous result for the setting in which Alice and Bob can amortize, meaning that they receive N i.i.d. samples of (X, Y) from μ, and the communication and key length, respectively, are measured by the ratio of the actual number of bits communicated and the actual key length, respectively, to N.

•Aug 23, 2019•0 citations

On Randomness Complexity of 1-Private Protocols

Samuel Dittmer, Rafail Ostrovsky

In the field of information-theoretic cryptography, randomness complexity is a key metric for protocols for private computation, that is, the number of random bits needed to realize the protocol. Although some general bounds are known, even for the relatively simple example of 1-private computation of n-party AND, the exact complexity is unknown. We study two settings. First, we consider the model of Goyal, Ishai, and Song (Crypto '22) where helper parties without any inputs are allowed to assist in the computation. In this setting, we show that two random bits always suffice to compute an arbitrary Boolean circuit C 1-privately: a single designated inputless helper flips the two bits and privately distributes the derived one-time bits to the other helper parties and the input parties as they are needed. We give an explicit construction using seven helper parties per AND gate and three helper parties per XOR gate (plus the single global randomness dealer). Moreover, two random bits are necessary already for the AND functionality (by a reduction to the standard no-helper model together with the lower bound of Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, Prouff, Rosén, Thillard and Vergnaud (TCC '19), and therefore the worst-case helper-party randomness complexity is exactly 2 bits. Second, in the setting without helper parties, we improve the upper bound from Couteau and Rosén (Asiacrypt '22) on the (asymptotic) randomness complexity of n-party AND from 6 to 5 bits. That is, we give a 1-private protocol for computing the AND of n parties' inputs requiring 5 bits of randomness, for all n ≥ 6. Our construction, like that of Couteau and Rosén, uses a single party to flip the 5 bits and distribute the required derived values during the execution. Our approach to both problems is built around a more systematic exploration of techniques for recycling randomness across sub-computations. As part of resolving the second problem, we isolate an exact local-independence combinatorial object called a Sliding-Window Independence Generator, or a SWIG. A (k,m)-SWIG is a linear generator from a k-bit seed to m ≥ k output bits, where every cyclic length-k sliding window chosen from m output bits is perfectly uniform. We give an explicit (k,m)-SWIG for every k ≥ 1 and every m ≥ k and use a (5,n-1)-SWIG in our no-helper AND protocol.

Leibniz international proceedings in informatics•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations

A Tight Lower Bound on Adaptively Secure Full-Information Coin Flip

Iftach Haitner, Yonatan Karidi-Heller

In a distributed coin-flipping protocol, Blum [ACM Transactions on Computer Systems ’83], the parties try to output a common (close to) uniform bit, even when some adversarially chosen parties try to bias the common output. In an adaptively secure full-information coin flip, Ben-Or and Linial [FOCS ’85], the parties communicate over a broadcast channel, and a computationally unbounded adversary can choose which parties to corrupt along the protocol execution. Ben-Or and Linial proved that the n -party majority protocol is resilient to \(O(\sqrt {n})\) corruptions, and conjectured this is a tight upper bound for any n -party protocol (of any round complexity). Their conjecture was proved to be correct, up to polylogarithmic factors, for single-turn (each party sends a single message) single-bit (a message is one bit) protocols Lichtenstein et al. [Combinatorica ’89], symmetric protocols Goldwasser et al. [ICALP ’15], and recently for (arbitrary message length) single-turn protocols Tauman Kalai et al. [DISC ’18]. Yet, the question of many-turn protocols was left entirely open. In this work, we close the above gap, proving that no n -party protocol (of any round complexity) is resilient to \(\Omega (\sqrt {n} \cdot \log ^3 n)\) adaptive corruptions. Namely, majority is the optimal coin-flipping protocol against adaptive adversaries (up to polylogarithmic factors).

arXiv:2005.01565•Journal of the ACM•Nov 1, 2020•15 citations
We study the two party problem of randomly selecting a string among all the strings of length n. We want the protocol to have the property that the output distribution has high entropy, even when one of the two parties is dishonest and deviates from the protocol. We develop protocols that achieve high, close to n, entropy. In the literature the randomness guarantee is usually expressed as being close to the uniform distribution or in terms of resiliency. The notion of entropy is not directly comparable to that of resiliency, but we establish a connection between the two that allows us to compare our protocols with the existing ones. We construct an explicit protocol that yields entropy n - O(1) and has 4log^* n rounds, improving over the protocol of Goldwasser et al. that also achieves this entropy but needs O(n) rounds. Both these protocols need O(n^2) bits of communication. Next we reduce the communication in our protocols. We show the existence, non-explicitly, of a protocol that has 6-rounds, 2n + 8log n bits of communication and yields entropy n- O(log n) and min-entropy n/2 - O(log n). Our protocol achieves the same entropy bound as the recent, also non-explicit, protocol of Gradwohl et al., however achieves much higher min-entropy: n/2 - O(log n) versus O(log n). Finally we exhibit very simple explicit protocols. We connect the security parameter of these geometric protocols with the well studied Kakeya problem motivated by harmonic analysis and analytical number theory. We are only able to prove that these protocols have entropy 3n/4 but still n/2 - O(log n) min-entropy. Therefore they do not perform as well with respect to the explicit constructions of Gradwohl et al. entropy-wise, but still have much better min-entropy. We conjecture that these simple protocols achieve n -o(n) entropy. Our geometric construction and its relation to the Kakeya problem follows a new and different approach to the random selection problem than any of the previously known protocols.
Abstract. We study the two party problem of randomly selecting a string among all the strings of length n. We want the protocol to have the property that the output distribution has high entropy, even when one of the two parties is dishonest and deviates from the protocol. We develop protocols that achieve high, close to n, entropy. In the literature the randomness guarantee is usually expressed as being close to the uniform distribution or in terms of resiliency. The notion of entropy is not directly comparable to that of resiliency, but we establish a connection between the two that allows us to compare our protocols with the existing ones. We construct an explicit protocol that yields entropy n − O(1) and has 4log ∗ n rounds, improving over the protocol of Goldreich et al. [3] that also achieves this entropy but needs O(n) rounds. Both these protocols need O(n 2) bits of communication. Next we reduce the communication in our protocols. We show the existence, nonexplicitly, of a protocol that has 6 rounds, 2n + 8log n bits of communication
We study the round complexity of two-party protocols for generating a random n-bit string such that the output is guaranteed to have bounded bias (according to some measure) even if one of the two parties deviates from the protocol (even using unlimited computational resources). Specifically, we require that the output's statistical difference from the uniform distribution on zon is bounded by a constant less than 1.We present a protocol for the above problem that has 2 log*n+O(1) rounds, improving a 2n-round protocol that follows from the work of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial (FOCS'91). Like the GGL protocol, our protocol actually provides a stronger guarantee, ensuring that the output lands in any set T⊆zon of density μ with probability at most O(√μ+δ), where δ is an arbitarily small constant.We then prove a matching lower bound, showing that any protocol guaranteeing bounded statistical difference requires at least log*n - log* log*n-O(1) rounds. As far as we know, this is the first nontrivial lower bound on the round complexity of random selection protocols (of any type) that does not impose additional constraints (e.g. on communication or "simulatability").We also state several results for the case when the output's bias is measured by the maximum multiplicative factor by which a party can increase the probability of a set T ⊆ zon.
We study the round complexity of two-party protocols for generating a random n-bit string such that the output is guaranteed to have bounded “bias,” even if one of the two parties deviates from the protocol (possibly using unlimited computational resources). Specifically, we require that the output's statistical difference from the uniform distribution on {0,1}n\{0,1\}^n{0,1}n is bounded by a constant less than 1. We present a protocol for the above problem that has 2log⁡∗n+O(1)2 \log^* n + O(1)2log∗n+O(1) rounds, improving a previous 2n2n2n-round protocol of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial (FOCS '91). Like the GGL Protocol, our protocol actually provides a stronger guarantee, ensuring that the output lands in any set T⊆{0,1}nT \subseteq \{0,1\}^nT⊆{0,1}n of density μ\muμ with probability at most O(μ+δ)O(\sqrt{\mu + \delta})O(μ+δ​), where δ\deltaδ may be an arbitrarily small constant. We then prove a nearly matching lower bound, showing that any protocol guaranteeing bounded statistical difference requires at least log⁡∗n−log⁡∗log⁡∗n−O(1)\log^* n - \log^* \log^* n - O(1)log∗n−log∗log∗n−O(1) rounds. We also prove several results for the case when the output's bias is measured by the maximum multiplicative factor by which a party can increase the probability of a set T⊆{0,1}nT \subseteq \{0,1\}^nT⊆{0,1}n.
In this work we study the problems of common randomness generation (CRG) and secret key generation (SKG). In the CRG problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, receive samples X and Y, respectively, from some joint source distribution μ. The two parties wish to agree on a key consisting of many bits of randomness, by exchanging messages that depend on each party’s respective input and the previous messages. The SKG problem is the same as CRG, except that an eavesdropper who observes the messages must not be able to determine much information about the key. We study the tradeoff between the minimum total length of all messages for a protocol generating a given number of bits of randomness and the minimum possible number of rounds in such a protocol. We construct a source distribution parametrized by positive integers r, n, and l, achieving such a tradeoff in a strong sense: when Alice and Bob can use r + 2 rounds of communication and l ≥ n, they can agree on l bits of entropy by communicating only O(log n) bits, but when they are restricted to r rounds of communication, they require communication of Ω(n^(1/2) / poly log(n)) bits to agree on l bits of entropy. We also prove an analogous result for the setting in which Alice and Bob can amortize, meaning that they receive N i.i.d. samples of (X, Y) from μ, and the communication and key length, respectively, are measured by the ratio of the actual number of bits communicated and the actual key length, respectively, to N.
In the field of information-theoretic cryptography, randomness complexity is a key metric for protocols for private computation, that is, the number of random bits needed to realize the protocol. Although some general bounds are known, even for the relatively simple example of 1-private computation of n-party AND, the exact complexity is unknown. We study two settings. First, we consider the model of Goyal, Ishai, and Song (Crypto '22) where helper parties without any inputs are allowed to assist in the computation. In this setting, we show that two random bits always suffice to compute an arbitrary Boolean circuit C 1-privately: a single designated inputless helper flips the two bits and privately distributes the derived one-time bits to the other helper parties and the input parties as they are needed. We give an explicit construction using seven helper parties per AND gate and three helper parties per XOR gate (plus the single global randomness dealer). Moreover, two random bits are necessary already for the AND functionality (by a reduction to the standard no-helper model together with the lower bound of Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, Prouff, Rosén, Thillard and Vergnaud (TCC '19), and therefore the worst-case helper-party randomness complexity is exactly 2 bits. Second, in the setting without helper parties, we improve the upper bound from Couteau and Rosén (Asiacrypt '22) on the (asymptotic) randomness complexity of n-party AND from 6 to 5 bits. That is, we give a 1-private protocol for computing the AND of n parties' inputs requiring 5 bits of randomness, for all n ≥ 6. Our construction, like that of Couteau and Rosén, uses a single party to flip the 5 bits and distribute the required derived values during the execution. Our approach to both problems is built around a more systematic exploration of techniques for recycling randomness across sub-computations. As part of resolving the second problem, we isolate an exact local-independence combinatorial object called a Sliding-Window Independence Generator, or a SWIG. A (k,m)-SWIG is a linear generator from a k-bit seed to m ≥ k output bits, where every cyclic length-k sliding window chosen from m output bits is perfectly uniform. We give an explicit (k,m)-SWIG for every k ≥ 1 and every m ≥ k and use a (5,n-1)-SWIG in our no-helper AND protocol.
In a distributed coin-flipping protocol, Blum [ACM Transactions on Computer Systems ’83], the parties try to output a common (close to) uniform bit, even when some adversarially chosen parties try to bias the common output. In an adaptively secure full-information coin flip, Ben-Or and Linial [FOCS ’85], the parties communicate over a broadcast channel, and a computationally unbounded adversary can choose which parties to corrupt along the protocol execution. Ben-Or and Linial proved that the n -party majority protocol is resilient to O(n)O(\sqrt {n})O(n​) corruptions, and conjectured this is a tight upper bound for any n -party protocol (of any round complexity). Their conjecture was proved to be correct, up to polylogarithmic factors, for single-turn (each party sends a single message) single-bit (a message is one bit) protocols Lichtenstein et al. [Combinatorica ’89], symmetric protocols Goldwasser et al. [ICALP ’15], and recently for (arbitrary message length) single-turn protocols Tauman Kalai et al. [DISC ’18]. Yet, the question of many-turn protocols was left entirely open. In this work, we close the above gap, proving that no n -party protocol (of any round complexity) is resilient to Ω(n⋅log⁡3n)\Omega (\sqrt {n} \cdot \log ^3 n)Ω(n​⋅log3n) adaptive corruptions. Namely, majority is the optimal coin-flipping protocol against adaptive adversaries (up to polylogarithmic factors).