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IEIE Transactions on Smart Processing and Computing

An Improvement of Certification-based One-Round Tripartite Key Agreement Protocols

Kambombo Mtong, Eun‐Jun Yoon

Published Oct 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Key agreement protocols allow multi-parties exchanging public information to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an insecure network. Since Joux first published the pairing-based one round tripartite key agreement protocol, many authenticated protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, many of them have been broken while others have been shown to be deficient in some desirable security attributes. In 2004, Cheng et al. presented two protocols aimed at strengthening Shim’s certificate-based and Zhang et al.’s tripartite identitybased protocols. This paper reports that 1) In Cheng et al.’s identity-based protocol, an adversary can extract long-term private keys of all the parties involved; and 2) Cheng et al.’s certificationbased protocol is weak against key integrity attacks. This paper suggests possible remedies for the security flaws in both protocols and then presents a modified Cheng et al.’s identity-based, oneround tripartite protocol that is more secure than the original protocol.

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Key agreement protocols allow multi-parties exchanging public information to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an insecure network. Since Joux first published the pairing-based one round tripartite key agreement protocol, many authenticated protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, many of them have been broken while others have been shown to be deficient in some desirable security attributes. In 2004, Cheng et al. presented two protocols aimed at strengthening Shim’s certificate-based and Zhang et al.’s tripartite identitybased protocols. This paper reports that 1) In Cheng et al.’s identity-based protocol, an adversary can extract long-term private keys of all the parties involved; and 2) Cheng et al.’s certificationbased protocol is weak against key integrity attacks. This paper suggests possible remedies for the security flaws in both protocols and then presents a modified Cheng et al.’s identity-based, oneround tripartite protocol that is more secure than the original protocol.
The tripartite authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality to subsequent communications among three parties over an insecure public network. In recent years, several identity-based and certificate less tripartite AKA protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately, most of them are insecure. In this paper, we analyze an identity-based tripartite AKA protocol and a certificate less tripartite AKA protocol. Our cryptanalysis shows that one neither meets the desirable security properties.
A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which can subsequently be used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. Since Joux has pioneered the notion of pairing-based tripartite key agreement protocol, various group key agreement schemes have been proposed after then. In 2003, Liu et al. proposed a tripartite identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol using bilinear pairings. Although the scheme is claimed to be efficient and secure, we discover that it is in fact breakable. In this paper, we highlight the flaw by demonstrating an insider impersonation attack on the scheme and suggest a few enhancements to conquer the defect.
Two-Party Authenticated key agreement protocol is essential for setting up the common session key for parties to establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. Most of proposed schemes require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. So such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis two schemes recently proposed by Cao etc., and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with more desired security attributes, which need no pairing operations while still achieve nice computational efficiency. These security attributes include known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. Moreover, it captures the enhanced security attributes known session-specific temporary key information secrecy, which means that even the ephemeral secret key were compromised, the adversary can hardly acquire the agreed session key.
Abstract—Two-party authenticated key agreement protocol is used to authenticate entities and establish session keys in an open network in order to provide secure communications between two parties. Several security attributes are highly desired for such protocols, such as perfect forward secrecy (the corruption of long-term keys of all the entities should not compromise any session key), PKG forward secrecy (the corruption of the PKG's master key in the ID-based system should not compromise the established session keys), and known session-key specific temporary information secrecy (The exposure of private temporary information should not compromise the secrecy of generated session keys). In 2005, Choie et al. proposed three identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols from pairings. Our analysis shows that they all didn't provide protection against known session-key specific temporary information attack and some of them are vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attack, such as the key replicating attack. We analyze some of the attacks under the BR93 security model. Index Terms—key agreement protocol, known session-key specific temporary information secrecy, key replicating attack, security model I.