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Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics Pacific Rim (CLEO-PR)

Two-state Quantum Cryptography With Noisy State-preparation

Masato Koashi, N. Imoto

Published Aug 24, 2005• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/cleopr.1997.610510

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Quantum cryptography protocols aimed at providing communication security are based on the fundamental principle of quantum physics that non-orthogonal quantum states cannot be perfectly distinguished. The majority of practically applicable quantum cryptography realizations belong to the so-called device-dependent class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. Security of the device-dependent protocols cannot be ensured without considering all the noises in the incorporated devices. Here, we analyze the influence of the preparation and detection noise on the loss control-based QKD that is built on continuous monitoring of the leakages in the fiber channel. By estimating the achievable secret key generation rates, we show the robustness of the loss control approach to trusted preparation and detection noises. Our findings demonstrate a positive impact of the trusted preparation noise on the QKD based on loss control for reverse and direct reconciliation scenarios.
Entanglement-measurement attack is one of the most famous attacks against quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography protocols, eavesdropping checking is an effective means to resist this attack. There are currently two commonly used eavesdropping checking methods: one is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal single-particle states as decoy states, and determine whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel by comparing the states obtained by measurements with the original states; The other is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal entangled states and use their entanglement correlations to judge whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel. In this paper, we theoretically demonstrate how quantum cryptography can utilize these two eavesdropping checking methods to resist entanglement-measurement attacks. We take the quantum cryptography protocols based on maximally entangled states as examples to demonstrate the proof process, transitioning from qubit-based protocols to qudit-based ones.