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CRC Press eBooks

Information is Inevitably Physical

Rolf W. Landauer

Published Nov 15, 2018• 48 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Information is inevitably tied to a physical representation, and therefore to all the possibilities and restrictions allowed by our real physical universe. The theory of computational limits is reviewed in a historical fashion. After some widespread initial errors, it was eventually understood that statistical mechanics and elementary quantum mechanics do not provide any limits. The energy requirements of the communications channel are particularly emphasized; it is an area where lower bounds, accepted for decades, are circumventable. The utility of the time-modulated potential going from monostability to bistability and back, is emphasized. Despite its use by von Neumann, Feynman, and many others, it has not received broad attention, i.e.by those not actually invoking it for their own purposes. I revisit my long-standing contention that our real universe does not permit the unlimited chain of infallible operations, envisioned in continuum mathematics, and that this has an influence on the ultimate nature of physical law. Finally, in the spirit of a volume dedicated to Richard Feynman’s impact, I deplore the strong effects of fashions in science.

DOI
10.1201/9780429500459-8

Related papers

Reversible Computation: Implications for Measurement, Communication, and Physical Law

Rolf W. Landauer

This short note is closer to an annotated bibliography, than to a real review. We allude to reversible computation, but do not repeat the many existing discussions. We point out that minimal energy dissipation requirements in classical measurement and in the communications channel are now understood as a result of the insights gained from the studies of reversible computation. In all three areas (computation, communication, and measurement) dissipation can be made as small as desired, per step, as long as information is not discarded. Erasure of information is not essential in computation or communication, but is needed to reset the meter after measurement. We speculate on the implications for physical law, arising from the likely limited computational recision available in the universe. We become even more speculative, and suggest that the ultimate physical laws, as a result of their limited precision, have something akin to a built-in noise source, and that this is the ultimate source of irreversibility.

Advanced series in applied physics•Jan 1, 1997•0 citations

The Physics of Information

Torsten A. Enßlin, Jens Jasche, John Skilling

What is information? A short answer could be: Anything that changes our minds and states of thinking! Information is virtual. It can be carried by speech, an image, scratches on a stone, patterns in a photon field, the connections of neurons in our brains or even by the wavefunction of an electron. Information does not depend on the actual means of transmission nor does its identity change when changing the carrier. Information is physical. It needs to be sustained by a physical substrate and rearranging that substrate to contain the wanted information requires to spend energy or work. Without a physical world, information can not be stored, processed, or transmitted. Our world is permeated with different representations of information. Actually Information about the physical laws governing our Universe can be found everywhere and in everything. Could it then be that the real fundamental elements of this world are tiny bits of information? Could we get it from bit?1 A number of researcher investigate this possibility, and several of their attempts to recover physical laws from the principles governing information are reported about in this special issue on physics of information. The articles by Gregg Jaeger,2 by Ariel Caticha,3 and by John Skilling and Kevin Knuth4 address the reconstruction of quantum mechanics from information theory. Furthermore, Kevin Knuth and James Walsh5 show how to recover space-time from particles sending each others signals in an initially geometry-free setting. A central element of most works on information is the concept of a probability. Probabilities can be defined via various routes. Most familiar might be their definitions by the frequentists school as relative frequencies of events (in the limit of infinite amounts of such). A more general definition of probabilities is the Bayesians' one, which regards probabilities as quantifiers of statements, expressing how much those should be expected to be true. Although this definition looks subjective on the first glance, it rests on a solid mathematical theorem by Richard Cox6 that any extension of binary logic to a continuum of single valued truthfulness quantifier that respects a minimum of requirements must be isomorphic to probability theory. And this definition turns out to embrace the frequentists' definition in case that infinite numbers of comparable events are actually available and can be counted. The majority of authors of this special issues seem to favor the Bayesian perspective, which is probably a result of our own, the guest editors', preference and not necessarily a reflection of the prevailing position of contemporary scientists. The different views on probabilities of frequentists and Bayesians are addressed by the article of Allen Caldwell.7 He builds a bridge between these antagonistic camps by explaining frequentists' constructions in a Bayesian language. In particular, his argumentation why the omnipresent p-value in statistical and experimental literature might often capture a relevant signal of model misfit is reassuring, given that a large fraction of our medical system is based on decisions backed up by p-values. A Bayesian might add that it would be even more reassuring, if a system rigorously build on logic and its continuous extension would be used for decisions affecting live-or-death questions. The laws governing probabilities themselves seem to reflect that of more elementary mathematical structures. Kevin Knuth shows how these emerge from lattice theory, which deals with relations in partially ordered sets like that of collections of possibilities.8 The sum rule of probability theory is a direct consequence of the underlying lattice structure. Interestingly, a number of other theories are resting also on such lattices and therefore exhibit their own versions of sum rules: measures of sets, mutual information, the Euler characteristics of topological spaces, as well as quantum mechanical interactions that are quantified by pairs of numbers, the real and imaginary parts of complex probability amplitudes (see also4). The theory of information has very practical application in physics and elsewhere. Manfred Opper discusses how the solutions of stochastic differential equations can be inferred via variational methods, which have their origin in thermodynamics.9 Torsten Enßlin introduces information field theory (IFT), the information theory for fields, as a means to infer the configuration of a physical field from incomplete and noisy data.10 The mathematical apparatus for this is that of quantum field theory (QFT), just with ordinary probabilities instead of complex probability amplitudes as in the latter. Could it be that the difference between IFT and QFT is just be the same as between classical information theory and quantum mechanics, the transition from real valued to complex valued quantifier for statements? Anyhow, any practical inference machinery, be it for dynamical systems or for fields, requires sophisticated numerical methods. Michael Betancourt reviews Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods to calculate expectation values over high dimensional probabilities.11 Theo Steininger and coworkers present the NIFTy3 software package for numerical information field theory calculations, which can handle very high dimensional field inference problems.12 Finally, in an article focused on the subtleties of the Monty Hall problem and mostly aiming at information theoretical entertainment, Torsten Enßlin and Margret Westercamp investigate the possibility that human intuition might be more rational than contemporary psychology thinks.13 A number of possible topics for an issue on physics of information are not addressed here. We would have loved to have articles on Landauer's principle, which states that erasing information has to cost energy, on QBism, a Bayesian version of quantum mechanics, on artificial and biological neural networks, as well as any other aspect of the information-soaked biological world. What has a reader of this special issue to be equipped with in order to follow the lines of thoughts? In addition to the usual physicist's education, the minimal additional equipment are the basics of probability theory and the concept of entropy. Most of the other concepts used in the articles rest on those and are introduced there. Let A, B, and C be propositions (or possibilities). The probability P ( A | B ) of A being true assuming that B is true is a number between 0 and 1, with P ( A | B ) = 1 expressing certainty of A under B ( B ⇒ A ) and P ( A | B ) = 0 expressing certainty of not A being the case under B ( B ⇒ ¬ A ).

Annalen der Physik•Mar 1, 2019•2 citations

Quantum Algorithmic Complexities

Fabio Benatti

As already emphasized in Chap. 4 information is physical and the limits to information processing tasks are ultimately set by the underlying physical laws. For instance, the standing models of computation are based on the physics of deterministic and/or stochastic classical processes; instead, quantum computation theory [84, 90, 156, 198, 266] studies the new possibilities offered by a model of computation based on quantum mechanical laws. The birth of such a theory finds a technological motivation in the high pace at which chip miniaturization proceeds.

Theoretical and mathematical physics•Jan 1, 2023•0 citations

Introduction

James Robert Brown

Feynman diagrams have fascinated physicists and philosophers since they were introduced to the world about 70 years ago. Clearly, they help in calculation; they have allowed nearly impossible problems to be solved with relative ease. This is agreed by all, but that is probably where the consensus ends. Are they pictures of physical processes? Are they just devices for keeping track of mathematical formulae, that do the real work? Are they some sort of mix of both?They are almost as famous as representations of the Bohr atom, even though most people could not give even a sketchy account of what they do. In spite of this they have taken on a role as a cultural icon. Feynman used them to decorate his own van (Fig. 1). The van was even used in an episode of the popular TV series The Big Bang Theory. They have been used as art work in everything from posters, to coffee mugs, to wallpaper. But none of this is particularly helpful in understanding how they work.If we ask working physicists who use Feynman diagrams what it is they are doing, we get a variety of responses. One is puzzlement; a shrug of indifference. Even those very skilled at using Feynman diagrams might be hard pressed to explain (to a philosopher’s satisfaction) what’s happening. After all, most of us can ride a bike but would be similarly hard pressed to explain in any detail what we’re doing. A more common response might go like this: The diagram, or series of diagrams, is a schematic picture of some physical process, say, two electrons interacting, which we then link to mathematical terms. After writing out the mathematical terms in the form of a series, we calculate and get the probability of an interaction happening. This sounds good initially, but runs into trouble when we ask what a “picture of a physical process” could mean? This is, after all, the quantum world where things do not move continuously through space and time. It seems doubtful the diagrams could be diagrams of things in the physical realm. They are connected to physical reality and they are connected to wonderfully accurate predictions. And yet, mystery remains.The following articles on Feynman diagrams address several timely issues, both historical and contemporary. These are metaphysical and epistemological questions related to models and how we represent the world. The papers are united by these themes, but otherwise are independent of one another. They are arranged alphabetically and can be read in any order.James Robert Brown, “How Do Feynman Diagrams Work?” takes the view that they are not representations or models of the world at all. Like others, he stresses that they cannot be pictures of reality, since, thanks to the Heisenberg relations, there can be no such thing as a trajectory. Rather than seek some other more abstract type of representation, he introduces a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive flow charts. The latter could be a representation of physical reality, but not the former. A prescriptive flow chart is more like a recipe to bake a cake. He takes Feynman diagrams to be this sort of thing.Mauro Dorato and Emanuele Rossanese, “The Nature of Representation in Feynman Diagrams,” also reject the idea that Feynman diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual physical processes. But unlike Brown, they do not abandon the thought that they can be models in some sense. They appeal to a famous account by RIG Hughes, known as the Denotation, Deduction, and Interpretation theory of models, where “models” are to be interpreted as merely inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.Letitia Meynell, “Picturing Feynman Diagrams and the Epistemology of Understanding,” assumes that Feynman diagrams are pictorial representations but agrees with Brown and Dorato and Rossanese that they do not represent actual physical processes. She then takes up the following puzzle: If Feynman diagrams represent states of affairs, but do not do so truthfully, what can their epistemic value be? She argues that Feynman diagrams have been epistemically powerful (at least in part) because, as pictorial representations, they facilitate an understanding of QED, and particle physics more generally. Appealing to Feynman’s own remarks, she draws out what it might mean to have an understanding of something that is not factive. Although her approach allows for a thin sense of substantively non-factive epistemic success, it is continuous with a factive sense of understanding that is more familiar in the sciences.Michael Stöltzner, “Feynman Diagrams: Modeling between Physics and Mathematics,” analyzes Feynman diagrams within the context of recent debates about models in science and against the backdrop of other diagrammatic methods in mathematical physics when dealing with infinite or asymptotic series. This allows one to avoid the dichotomy of whether Feynman diagrams represent mathematical or physical objects, or a mere tool mediating between them. Along those lines one does not, however, obtain a universal answer to the question as to what Feynman diagrams represent. A single Feynman diagram, in actual scientific practice, can stand for a single mathematical expression or for a physical phenomenon depending on whether the diagram stands for a single term in an infinite series or for a subseries that is given a physical interpretation. Stöltzner’s reading of the representation problem also derives support from the historical fact that Feynman was initially motivated by the Breit-Schrödinger model of a quivering electron and from interpreting this model within the context of stochastic processes.Adrian Wüthrich, “The Exigencies of War and the Stink of a Theoretical Problem,” approaches these topics from an historian’s point of view, shedding light on the issues by focussing on debates in this historical context. As he put it in his subtitle, Wüthrich’s aim is to understand the genesis of Feynman’s electrodynamics as mechanistic modelling at different levels. Feynman’s idiosyncratic method of dealing with quantum electrodynamic phenomena has been cast as an instance of a non-rigorous, modular and rule-based style of theorizing. Given such a characterization, it seems natural that significant changes in Feynman’s style were triggered by work he was assigned during World War II, where quick fixes may have counted more than derivations from first principles. Indeed, Feynman’s theoretical proposals of an improved electrodynamics do bear traces of Feynman’s war-related work, which immediately preceded it. However, Wüthrich explains, the attempt to apply the vocabulary of the “new mechanistic philosophy” to lesser known pieces of archival evidence brings to the fore a new kind of shift in Feynman’s style. Feynman’s disposition for such a shift may also have been fostered during the war, but it was forced upon him by a specific theoretical difficulty, which was largely unrelated to his war-time research.These articles contain some technicalities, but they should all be sufficiently accessible to general readers who would like to know more about Feynman diagrams and how they relate to theories, models, mathematics, and the world. The best philosophy of science is intimately linked to and draws upon current science and its history. It pays close attention to details: the details of theorizing, the details of models and how they function, the details of experimentation and measurement, and so on. We hope this collection of five articles on Feynman diagrams, by focussing closely on detail, will contribute to a better understanding of these strange but highly productive ciphers and symbols.

Perspectives on Science•Jul 31, 2018•1 citation

Information Physics: The New Frontier

Kevin H. Knuth, Ali Mohammad-djafari A, Jean‐François Bercher +1 more

At this point in time, two major areas of physics, statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, rest on the foundations of probability and entropy. The last century saw several significant fundamental advances in our understanding of the process of inference, which make it clear that these are inferential theories. That is, rather than being a description of the behavior of the universe, these theories describe how observers can make optimal predictions about the universe. In such a picture, information plays a critical role. What is more is that little clues, such as the fact that black holes have entropy, continue to suggest that information is fundamental to physics in general. In the last decade, our fundamental understanding of probability theory has led to a Bayesian revolution. In addition, we have come to recognize that the foundations go far deeper and that Cox's approach of generalizing a Boolean algebra to a probability calculus is the first specific example of the more fundamental idea of assigning valuations to partially-ordered sets. By considering this as a natural way to introduce quantification to the more fundamental notion of ordering, one obtains an entirely new way of deriving physical laws. I will introduce this new way of thinking by demonstrating how one can quantify partially-ordered sets and, in the process, derive physical laws. The implication is that physical law does not reflect the order in the universe, instead it is derived from the order imposed by our description of the universe. Information physics, which is based on understanding the ways in which we both quantify and process information about the world around us, is a fundamentally new approach to science.

arXiv:1009.5161•AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2011•22 citations

The physical limits of computing

Michael P. Frank

Many of the fundamental limits on information processing, from thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum mechanics, are only a few decades away. Novel physically motivated computing paradigms, such as reversible computing and quantum computing, may help in certain ways, but even they remain subject to some basic limits. One can arrive at several firm conclusions regarding upper bounds on the limits of computing. In this article, the author only reviews the fundamental technology-independent limits.

Computing in Science & Engineering•May 1, 2002•87 citations
Information is inevitably tied to a physical representation, and therefore to all the possibilities and restrictions allowed by our real physical universe. The theory of computational limits is reviewed in a historical fashion. After some widespread initial errors, it was eventually understood that statistical mechanics and elementary quantum mechanics do not provide any limits. The energy requirements of the communications channel are particularly emphasized; it is an area where lower bounds, accepted for decades, are circumventable. The utility of the time-modulated potential going from monostability to bistability and back, is emphasized. Despite its use by von Neumann, Feynman, and many others, it has not received broad attention, i.e.by those not actually invoking it for their own purposes. I revisit my long-standing contention that our real universe does not permit the unlimited chain of infallible operations, envisioned in continuum mathematics, and that this has an influence on the ultimate nature of physical law. Finally, in the spirit of a volume dedicated to Richard Feynman’s impact, I deplore the strong effects of fashions in science.
This short note is closer to an annotated bibliography, than to a real review. We allude to reversible computation, but do not repeat the many existing discussions. We point out that minimal energy dissipation requirements in classical measurement and in the communications channel are now understood as a result of the insights gained from the studies of reversible computation. In all three areas (computation, communication, and measurement) dissipation can be made as small as desired, per step, as long as information is not discarded. Erasure of information is not essential in computation or communication, but is needed to reset the meter after measurement. We speculate on the implications for physical law, arising from the likely limited computational recision available in the universe. We become even more speculative, and suggest that the ultimate physical laws, as a result of their limited precision, have something akin to a built-in noise source, and that this is the ultimate source of irreversibility.
What is information? A short answer could be: Anything that changes our minds and states of thinking! Information is virtual. It can be carried by speech, an image, scratches on a stone, patterns in a photon field, the connections of neurons in our brains or even by the wavefunction of an electron. Information does not depend on the actual means of transmission nor does its identity change when changing the carrier. Information is physical. It needs to be sustained by a physical substrate and rearranging that substrate to contain the wanted information requires to spend energy or work. Without a physical world, information can not be stored, processed, or transmitted. Our world is permeated with different representations of information. Actually Information about the physical laws governing our Universe can be found everywhere and in everything. Could it then be that the real fundamental elements of this world are tiny bits of information? Could we get it from bit?1 A number of researcher investigate this possibility, and several of their attempts to recover physical laws from the principles governing information are reported about in this special issue on physics of information. The articles by Gregg Jaeger,2 by Ariel Caticha,3 and by John Skilling and Kevin Knuth4 address the reconstruction of quantum mechanics from information theory. Furthermore, Kevin Knuth and James Walsh5 show how to recover space-time from particles sending each others signals in an initially geometry-free setting. A central element of most works on information is the concept of a probability. Probabilities can be defined via various routes. Most familiar might be their definitions by the frequentists school as relative frequencies of events (in the limit of infinite amounts of such). A more general definition of probabilities is the Bayesians' one, which regards probabilities as quantifiers of statements, expressing how much those should be expected to be true. Although this definition looks subjective on the first glance, it rests on a solid mathematical theorem by Richard Cox6 that any extension of binary logic to a continuum of single valued truthfulness quantifier that respects a minimum of requirements must be isomorphic to probability theory. And this definition turns out to embrace the frequentists' definition in case that infinite numbers of comparable events are actually available and can be counted. The majority of authors of this special issues seem to favor the Bayesian perspective, which is probably a result of our own, the guest editors', preference and not necessarily a reflection of the prevailing position of contemporary scientists. The different views on probabilities of frequentists and Bayesians are addressed by the article of Allen Caldwell.7 He builds a bridge between these antagonistic camps by explaining frequentists' constructions in a Bayesian language. In particular, his argumentation why the omnipresent p-value in statistical and experimental literature might often capture a relevant signal of model misfit is reassuring, given that a large fraction of our medical system is based on decisions backed up by p-values. A Bayesian might add that it would be even more reassuring, if a system rigorously build on logic and its continuous extension would be used for decisions affecting live-or-death questions. The laws governing probabilities themselves seem to reflect that of more elementary mathematical structures. Kevin Knuth shows how these emerge from lattice theory, which deals with relations in partially ordered sets like that of collections of possibilities.8 The sum rule of probability theory is a direct consequence of the underlying lattice structure. Interestingly, a number of other theories are resting also on such lattices and therefore exhibit their own versions of sum rules: measures of sets, mutual information, the Euler characteristics of topological spaces, as well as quantum mechanical interactions that are quantified by pairs of numbers, the real and imaginary parts of complex probability amplitudes (see also4). The theory of information has very practical application in physics and elsewhere. Manfred Opper discusses how the solutions of stochastic differential equations can be inferred via variational methods, which have their origin in thermodynamics.9 Torsten Enßlin introduces information field theory (IFT), the information theory for fields, as a means to infer the configuration of a physical field from incomplete and noisy data.10 The mathematical apparatus for this is that of quantum field theory (QFT), just with ordinary probabilities instead of complex probability amplitudes as in the latter. Could it be that the difference between IFT and QFT is just be the same as between classical information theory and quantum mechanics, the transition from real valued to complex valued quantifier for statements? Anyhow, any practical inference machinery, be it for dynamical systems or for fields, requires sophisticated numerical methods. Michael Betancourt reviews Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods to calculate expectation values over high dimensional probabilities.11 Theo Steininger and coworkers present the NIFTy3 software package for numerical information field theory calculations, which can handle very high dimensional field inference problems.12 Finally, in an article focused on the subtleties of the Monty Hall problem and mostly aiming at information theoretical entertainment, Torsten Enßlin and Margret Westercamp investigate the possibility that human intuition might be more rational than contemporary psychology thinks.13 A number of possible topics for an issue on physics of information are not addressed here. We would have loved to have articles on Landauer's principle, which states that erasing information has to cost energy, on QBism, a Bayesian version of quantum mechanics, on artificial and biological neural networks, as well as any other aspect of the information-soaked biological world. What has a reader of this special issue to be equipped with in order to follow the lines of thoughts? In addition to the usual physicist's education, the minimal additional equipment are the basics of probability theory and the concept of entropy. Most of the other concepts used in the articles rest on those and are introduced there. Let A, B, and C be propositions (or possibilities). The probability P ( A | B ) of A being true assuming that B is true is a number between 0 and 1, with P ( A | B ) = 1 expressing certainty of A under B ( B ⇒ A ) and P ( A | B ) = 0 expressing certainty of not A being the case under B ( B ⇒ ¬ A ).
As already emphasized in Chap. 4 information is physical and the limits to information processing tasks are ultimately set by the underlying physical laws. For instance, the standing models of computation are based on the physics of deterministic and/or stochastic classical processes; instead, quantum computation theory [84, 90, 156, 198, 266] studies the new possibilities offered by a model of computation based on quantum mechanical laws. The birth of such a theory finds a technological motivation in the high pace at which chip miniaturization proceeds.
Feynman diagrams have fascinated physicists and philosophers since they were introduced to the world about 70 years ago. Clearly, they help in calculation; they have allowed nearly impossible problems to be solved with relative ease. This is agreed by all, but that is probably where the consensus ends. Are they pictures of physical processes? Are they just devices for keeping track of mathematical formulae, that do the real work? Are they some sort of mix of both?They are almost as famous as representations of the Bohr atom, even though most people could not give even a sketchy account of what they do. In spite of this they have taken on a role as a cultural icon. Feynman used them to decorate his own van (Fig. 1). The van was even used in an episode of the popular TV series The Big Bang Theory. They have been used as art work in everything from posters, to coffee mugs, to wallpaper. But none of this is particularly helpful in understanding how they work.If we ask working physicists who use Feynman diagrams what it is they are doing, we get a variety of responses. One is puzzlement; a shrug of indifference. Even those very skilled at using Feynman diagrams might be hard pressed to explain (to a philosopher’s satisfaction) what’s happening. After all, most of us can ride a bike but would be similarly hard pressed to explain in any detail what we’re doing. A more common response might go like this: The diagram, or series of diagrams, is a schematic picture of some physical process, say, two electrons interacting, which we then link to mathematical terms. After writing out the mathematical terms in the form of a series, we calculate and get the probability of an interaction happening. This sounds good initially, but runs into trouble when we ask what a “picture of a physical process” could mean? This is, after all, the quantum world where things do not move continuously through space and time. It seems doubtful the diagrams could be diagrams of things in the physical realm. They are connected to physical reality and they are connected to wonderfully accurate predictions. And yet, mystery remains.The following articles on Feynman diagrams address several timely issues, both historical and contemporary. These are metaphysical and epistemological questions related to models and how we represent the world. The papers are united by these themes, but otherwise are independent of one another. They are arranged alphabetically and can be read in any order.James Robert Brown, “How Do Feynman Diagrams Work?” takes the view that they are not representations or models of the world at all. Like others, he stresses that they cannot be pictures of reality, since, thanks to the Heisenberg relations, there can be no such thing as a trajectory. Rather than seek some other more abstract type of representation, he introduces a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive flow charts. The latter could be a representation of physical reality, but not the former. A prescriptive flow chart is more like a recipe to bake a cake. He takes Feynman diagrams to be this sort of thing.Mauro Dorato and Emanuele Rossanese, “The Nature of Representation in Feynman Diagrams,” also reject the idea that Feynman diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual physical processes. But unlike Brown, they do not abandon the thought that they can be models in some sense. They appeal to a famous account by RIG Hughes, known as the Denotation, Deduction, and Interpretation theory of models, where “models” are to be interpreted as merely inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.Letitia Meynell, “Picturing Feynman Diagrams and the Epistemology of Understanding,” assumes that Feynman diagrams are pictorial representations but agrees with Brown and Dorato and Rossanese that they do not represent actual physical processes. She then takes up the following puzzle: If Feynman diagrams represent states of affairs, but do not do so truthfully, what can their epistemic value be? She argues that Feynman diagrams have been epistemically powerful (at least in part) because, as pictorial representations, they facilitate an understanding of QED, and particle physics more generally. Appealing to Feynman’s own remarks, she draws out what it might mean to have an understanding of something that is not factive. Although her approach allows for a thin sense of substantively non-factive epistemic success, it is continuous with a factive sense of understanding that is more familiar in the sciences.Michael Stöltzner, “Feynman Diagrams: Modeling between Physics and Mathematics,” analyzes Feynman diagrams within the context of recent debates about models in science and against the backdrop of other diagrammatic methods in mathematical physics when dealing with infinite or asymptotic series. This allows one to avoid the dichotomy of whether Feynman diagrams represent mathematical or physical objects, or a mere tool mediating between them. Along those lines one does not, however, obtain a universal answer to the question as to what Feynman diagrams represent. A single Feynman diagram, in actual scientific practice, can stand for a single mathematical expression or for a physical phenomenon depending on whether the diagram stands for a single term in an infinite series or for a subseries that is given a physical interpretation. Stöltzner’s reading of the representation problem also derives support from the historical fact that Feynman was initially motivated by the Breit-Schrödinger model of a quivering electron and from interpreting this model within the context of stochastic processes.Adrian Wüthrich, “The Exigencies of War and the Stink of a Theoretical Problem,” approaches these topics from an historian’s point of view, shedding light on the issues by focussing on debates in this historical context. As he put it in his subtitle, Wüthrich’s aim is to understand the genesis of Feynman’s electrodynamics as mechanistic modelling at different levels. Feynman’s idiosyncratic method of dealing with quantum electrodynamic phenomena has been cast as an instance of a non-rigorous, modular and rule-based style of theorizing. Given such a characterization, it seems natural that significant changes in Feynman’s style were triggered by work he was assigned during World War II, where quick fixes may have counted more than derivations from first principles. Indeed, Feynman’s theoretical proposals of an improved electrodynamics do bear traces of Feynman’s war-related work, which immediately preceded it. However, Wüthrich explains, the attempt to apply the vocabulary of the “new mechanistic philosophy” to lesser known pieces of archival evidence brings to the fore a new kind of shift in Feynman’s style. Feynman’s disposition for such a shift may also have been fostered during the war, but it was forced upon him by a specific theoretical difficulty, which was largely unrelated to his war-time research.These articles contain some technicalities, but they should all be sufficiently accessible to general readers who would like to know more about Feynman diagrams and how they relate to theories, models, mathematics, and the world. The best philosophy of science is intimately linked to and draws upon current science and its history. It pays close attention to details: the details of theorizing, the details of models and how they function, the details of experimentation and measurement, and so on. We hope this collection of five articles on Feynman diagrams, by focussing closely on detail, will contribute to a better understanding of these strange but highly productive ciphers and symbols.
At this point in time, two major areas of physics, statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, rest on the foundations of probability and entropy. The last century saw several significant fundamental advances in our understanding of the process of inference, which make it clear that these are inferential theories. That is, rather than being a description of the behavior of the universe, these theories describe how observers can make optimal predictions about the universe. In such a picture, information plays a critical role. What is more is that little clues, such as the fact that black holes have entropy, continue to suggest that information is fundamental to physics in general. In the last decade, our fundamental understanding of probability theory has led to a Bayesian revolution. In addition, we have come to recognize that the foundations go far deeper and that Cox's approach of generalizing a Boolean algebra to a probability calculus is the first specific example of the more fundamental idea of assigning valuations to partially-ordered sets. By considering this as a natural way to introduce quantification to the more fundamental notion of ordering, one obtains an entirely new way of deriving physical laws. I will introduce this new way of thinking by demonstrating how one can quantify partially-ordered sets and, in the process, derive physical laws. The implication is that physical law does not reflect the order in the universe, instead it is derived from the order imposed by our description of the universe. Information physics, which is based on understanding the ways in which we both quantify and process information about the world around us, is a fundamentally new approach to science.
Many of the fundamental limits on information processing, from thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum mechanics, are only a few decades away. Novel physically motivated computing paradigms, such as reversible computing and quantum computing, may help in certain ways, but even they remain subject to some basic limits. One can arrive at several firm conclusions regarding upper bounds on the limits of computing. In this article, the author only reviews the fundamental technology-independent limits.