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Reply to Fleming

Thomas Pashby

Published Oct 2, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this reply to Prof. Fleming's response (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9695/) to my `Time and Quantum Theory: A History and A Prospectus' (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9995/) I take issue with two of his claims: (i) that quantum theory concerns the (potential) properties of eternally persisting objects; (ii) that there is a underdetermination problem for POVMs.

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Consistent treatments of quantum mechanics

Robert B. Griffiths

The Letters reply by Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, and Jeff Tollaksen gives a misleading impression of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics. As I pointed out in the same issue, consistent histories is an alternative to their time-symmetric formulation. It resolves the “collapse problem” of quantum foundations, which Aharonov and coauthors admit they have failed to do. However, that is not its only or even its principal virtue. It also solves what I call the second quantum measurement problem: how to infer from the measurement outcome the state of the measured system at an earlier time before the measurement took place. Thus the consistent histories approach, without any fuzzy references to “ensembles,” provides a proper probabilistic framework for inferring that Sx for a spin-1⁄2 particle actually was −1⁄2 before the measurement took place. This approach evades the criticisms expressed by Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson in their letters in the same issue.Furthermore, consistent histories, unlike certain aspects of the approach of Aharonov and coauthors, is fully consistent with the Hilbert-space structure of quantum mechanics introduced by John von Neumann and now taught to all students of the subject. Indeed, with a consistent histories analysis one can locate fairly precisely11. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 the error in reasoning that leads to claims such as that the measured spin of a spin-1⁄2 particle can equal 100.22. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 Claims about what weak measurements actually measure, when made by those who have not yet solved either the collapse problem or the second measurement problem, should be treated with great caution.The claim that the consistent histories approach is controversial was true back in the 1990s, and the controversy led to a clearer formulation of the interpretation. However, no significant problems have come to light in the decade since the publication of my book.33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. The fact that something has been ignored does not imply it is controversial. Admirers of Richard Feynman, some of whose writings were cited by Aharonov and coauthors in their reply, may be interested to know that shortly before his death he was quite sympathetic to an early form of the consistent histories or decoherent histories approach to understanding quantum mechanics (see PHYSICS TODAY, February 1999, page 11)—an open-mindedness worth imitating.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. Google Scholar© 2011 American Institute of Physics.

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The measurement problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up during the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy – or ‘completeness’ – of the orthodox (Copenhagen) theory.1 As we have seen, it is a topic central to Hanson’s thinking not only with regard to quantum mechanics but also for its wider bearing on the scope and limits of scientific knowledge, the theory-laden character of observations, and the underdetermination of theory by evidence.2 Thus it is frequently adduced in support of his proto-Kuhnian claim that scientists working within different paradigms must be thought of as observing different things or inhabiting ‘different worlds’.3 What I propose to do now is look in more detail at the arguments surrounding this topic and, especially, at various proposals – from Einstein down – for a realist construal of the quantum data (i.e., the empirical measurement-results) that would offer an alternative to Hanson’s idea of the uncertainty principle as placing an absolute limit on our knowledge of objects and events in the microphysical domain. Having set out his arguments already in chapters 4 and 5, I shall not make any further detailed reference to Hanson’s work but assume that the reader who has come this far will have them clearly in mind. Thus my purpose in the remainder of this book is to raise the question: what becomes of the paradigm-relativist approach to issues in the history and philosophy of science if it derives so much of its suasive force from an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has proved increasingly open to challenge?

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Reply to “Comment on ‘Past of a quantum particle’ ”

Lev Vaidman A

Misinterpretation in the preceding Comment of my recent analysis of the past of a photon is corrected. There is nothing in this analysis which is ``contrary to the usual quantum expectations'' but, nevertheless, it does provide ``further understanding and interpretation of the system considered.'' In particular, it indicates that the common sense argument used in the Comment should be abandoned.

arXiv:1310.1319•Physical Review A•Oct 29, 2013•46 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Past of a quantum particle revisited’ ”

Berthold‐Georg Englert, Kelvin Horia, Jibo Dai +2 more

We stand by our findings in Phys. Rev. A 96, 022126 (2017). In addition to refuting the invalid objections raised by Peleg and Vaidman, we report a retrocausation problem inherent in Vaidman's definition of the past of a quantum particle.

arXiv:1901.05673•Physical Review A•Feb 27, 2019•17 citations
In this reply to Prof. Fleming's response (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9695/) to my `Time and Quantum Theory: A History and A Prospectus' (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9995/) I take issue with two of his claims: (i) that quantum theory concerns the (potential) properties of eternally persisting objects; (ii) that there is a underdetermination problem for POVMs.
The Letters reply by Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, and Jeff Tollaksen gives a misleading impression of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics. As I pointed out in the same issue, consistent histories is an alternative to their time-symmetric formulation. It resolves the “collapse problem” of quantum foundations, which Aharonov and coauthors admit they have failed to do. However, that is not its only or even its principal virtue. It also solves what I call the second quantum measurement problem: how to infer from the measurement outcome the state of the measured system at an earlier time before the measurement took place. Thus the consistent histories approach, without any fuzzy references to “ensembles,” provides a proper probabilistic framework for inferring that Sx for a spin-1⁄2 particle actually was −1⁄2 before the measurement took place. This approach evades the criticisms expressed by Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson in their letters in the same issue.Furthermore, consistent histories, unlike certain aspects of the approach of Aharonov and coauthors, is fully consistent with the Hilbert-space structure of quantum mechanics introduced by John von Neumann and now taught to all students of the subject. Indeed, with a consistent histories analysis one can locate fairly precisely11. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 the error in reasoning that leads to claims such as that the measured spin of a spin-1⁄2 particle can equal 100.22. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 Claims about what weak measurements actually measure, when made by those who have not yet solved either the collapse problem or the second measurement problem, should be treated with great caution.The claim that the consistent histories approach is controversial was true back in the 1990s, and the controversy led to a clearer formulation of the interpretation. However, no significant problems have come to light in the decade since the publication of my book.33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. The fact that something has been ignored does not imply it is controversial. Admirers of Richard Feynman, some of whose writings were cited by Aharonov and coauthors in their reply, may be interested to know that shortly before his death he was quite sympathetic to an early form of the consistent histories or decoherent histories approach to understanding quantum mechanics (see PHYSICS TODAY, February 1999, page 11)—an open-mindedness worth imitating.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. Google Scholar© 2011 American Institute of Physics.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up during the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy – or ‘completeness’ – of the orthodox (Copenhagen) theory.1 As we have seen, it is a topic central to Hanson’s thinking not only with regard to quantum mechanics but also for its wider bearing on the scope and limits of scientific knowledge, the theory-laden character of observations, and the underdetermination of theory by evidence.2 Thus it is frequently adduced in support of his proto-Kuhnian claim that scientists working within different paradigms must be thought of as observing different things or inhabiting ‘different worlds’.3 What I propose to do now is look in more detail at the arguments surrounding this topic and, especially, at various proposals – from Einstein down – for a realist construal of the quantum data (i.e., the empirical measurement-results) that would offer an alternative to Hanson’s idea of the uncertainty principle as placing an absolute limit on our knowledge of objects and events in the microphysical domain. Having set out his arguments already in chapters 4 and 5, I shall not make any further detailed reference to Hanson’s work but assume that the reader who has come this far will have them clearly in mind. Thus my purpose in the remainder of this book is to raise the question: what becomes of the paradigm-relativist approach to issues in the history and philosophy of science if it derives so much of its suasive force from an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has proved increasingly open to challenge?