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Measurements according to "Consistent Quantum Theory"

Elias Okon, Daniel Sudarsky

Published Sep 3, 2013• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We critically evaluate the treatment of the notion of measurement in the Consistent Histories approach to quantum mechanics. We find such treatment unsatisfactory because it relies, often implicitly, on elements external to the provided formalism. In particular, when dealing with measurement scenarios, the formalism, in order to be informative, needs to assume that after measurements measuring apparatuses are always in states of well defined pointer positions. The problem is that there is nothing in the formalism to justify this assumption. We conclude that the Consistent Histories approach, contrary to what is claimed by its proponents, fails to provide a truly satisfactory resolution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.

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3 On the Consistency of the Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics

Elias Okon, Daniel Sudarsky

Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1

•Jan 11, 2013•30 citations

Is the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics consistent?

Elias Okon

The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.

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Consistent treatments of quantum mechanics

Robert B. Griffiths

The Letters reply by Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, and Jeff Tollaksen gives a misleading impression of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics. As I pointed out in the same issue, consistent histories is an alternative to their time-symmetric formulation. It resolves the “collapse problem” of quantum foundations, which Aharonov and coauthors admit they have failed to do. However, that is not its only or even its principal virtue. It also solves what I call the second quantum measurement problem: how to infer from the measurement outcome the state of the measured system at an earlier time before the measurement took place. Thus the consistent histories approach, without any fuzzy references to “ensembles,” provides a proper probabilistic framework for inferring that Sx for a spin-1⁄2 particle actually was −1⁄2 before the measurement took place. This approach evades the criticisms expressed by Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson in their letters in the same issue.Furthermore, consistent histories, unlike certain aspects of the approach of Aharonov and coauthors, is fully consistent with the Hilbert-space structure of quantum mechanics introduced by John von Neumann and now taught to all students of the subject. Indeed, with a consistent histories analysis one can locate fairly precisely11. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 the error in reasoning that leads to claims such as that the measured spin of a spin-1⁄2 particle can equal 100.22. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 Claims about what weak measurements actually measure, when made by those who have not yet solved either the collapse problem or the second measurement problem, should be treated with great caution.The claim that the consistent histories approach is controversial was true back in the 1990s, and the controversy led to a clearer formulation of the interpretation. However, no significant problems have come to light in the decade since the publication of my book.33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. The fact that something has been ignored does not imply it is controversial. Admirers of Richard Feynman, some of whose writings were cited by Aharonov and coauthors in their reply, may be interested to know that shortly before his death he was quite sympathetic to an early form of the consistent histories or decoherent histories approach to understanding quantum mechanics (see PHYSICS TODAY, February 1999, page 11)—an open-mindedness worth imitating.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. Google Scholar© 2011 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Oct 1, 2011•1 citation

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It has been suggested that the measuring apparatus used to measure quantum systems ought to be idealized as consisting of an infinite number of quantum systems. Let us call this the infinity assumption. The suggestion that we ought to make the infinity assumption has been made in connection with two closely related but distinct problems. One is the problem of determining the importance of the limitations on measurement incorporated into the Wigner-Araki-Yanase quantum theory of measurement. The other is the measurement problem. These problems are not internal to the quantum mechanical formalism. They arise when we obtain particular formal results in applying the quantum mechanical formalism to measurement interactions. The formal results are problematic because they resist explanation. Various authors have claimed that by making the infinity assumption we can neglect the limitations on measurement. Bub (1988) and (1989) claims it allows us to solve the measurement problem. I will argue that both claims are unjustified.

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Consistent Quantum Histories: Towards a Universal Language of Physics

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The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics is a reformulation of the standard Copenhagen interpretation that aims at incorporating quantum probabilities as part of the axiomatic foundations of the theory. It is not only supposed to equip quantum mechanics with clear criteria of its own experimental verification but, first and foremost, to alleviate one of the stumbling blocks of the theory ‐ the measurement problem. Since the consistent histories interpretation operates with a series of quantum events integrated into one quantum history, the measurement problem is naturally absorbed as one of the events that build up a history. The interpretation rests upon the two following assumptions, proposed already by J. von Neumann: (1) both the microscopic and macroscopic regimes are subject to the same set of quantum laws and (2) a projector operator that is assigned to each event within a history permits to transcribe the history into

Old and New Concepts of Physics•Feb 6, 2007•0 citations

Quantum measurement as theory: Its structure and problems.

Marco Del Seta

This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

•Jan 1, 1998•2 citations
We critically evaluate the treatment of the notion of measurement in the Consistent Histories approach to quantum mechanics. We find such treatment unsatisfactory because it relies, often implicitly, on elements external to the provided formalism. In particular, when dealing with measurement scenarios, the formalism, in order to be informative, needs to assume that after measurements measuring apparatuses are always in states of well defined pointer positions. The problem is that there is nothing in the formalism to justify this assumption. We conclude that the Consistent Histories approach, contrary to what is claimed by its proponents, fails to provide a truly satisfactory resolution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1
The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.
The Letters reply by Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, and Jeff Tollaksen gives a misleading impression of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics. As I pointed out in the same issue, consistent histories is an alternative to their time-symmetric formulation. It resolves the “collapse problem” of quantum foundations, which Aharonov and coauthors admit they have failed to do. However, that is not its only or even its principal virtue. It also solves what I call the second quantum measurement problem: how to infer from the measurement outcome the state of the measured system at an earlier time before the measurement took place. Thus the consistent histories approach, without any fuzzy references to “ensembles,” provides a proper probabilistic framework for inferring that Sx for a spin-1⁄2 particle actually was −1⁄2 before the measurement took place. This approach evades the criticisms expressed by Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson in their letters in the same issue.Furthermore, consistent histories, unlike certain aspects of the approach of Aharonov and coauthors, is fully consistent with the Hilbert-space structure of quantum mechanics introduced by John von Neumann and now taught to all students of the subject. Indeed, with a consistent histories analysis one can locate fairly precisely11. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 the error in reasoning that leads to claims such as that the measured spin of a spin-1⁄2 particle can equal 100.22. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 Claims about what weak measurements actually measure, when made by those who have not yet solved either the collapse problem or the second measurement problem, should be treated with great caution.The claim that the consistent histories approach is controversial was true back in the 1990s, and the controversy led to a clearer formulation of the interpretation. However, no significant problems have come to light in the decade since the publication of my book.33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. The fact that something has been ignored does not imply it is controversial. Admirers of Richard Feynman, some of whose writings were cited by Aharonov and coauthors in their reply, may be interested to know that shortly before his death he was quite sympathetic to an early form of the consistent histories or decoherent histories approach to understanding quantum mechanics (see PHYSICS TODAY, February 1999, page 11)—an open-mindedness worth imitating.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. R. E. Kastner, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 35, 57 (2004), http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2003.02.001 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. Y. Aharonov, D. Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60, 1351 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.60.1351 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory Cambridge U. Press, New York (2002), http://quantum.phys.cmu.edu/CQT/. Google Scholar© 2011 American Institute of Physics.
It has been suggested that the measuring apparatus used to measure quantum systems ought to be idealized as consisting of an infinite number of quantum systems. Let us call this the infinity assumption. The suggestion that we ought to make the infinity assumption has been made in connection with two closely related but distinct problems. One is the problem of determining the importance of the limitations on measurement incorporated into the Wigner-Araki-Yanase quantum theory of measurement. The other is the measurement problem. These problems are not internal to the quantum mechanical formalism. They arise when we obtain particular formal results in applying the quantum mechanical formalism to measurement interactions. The formal results are problematic because they resist explanation. Various authors have claimed that by making the infinity assumption we can neglect the limitations on measurement. Bub (1988) and (1989) claims it allows us to solve the measurement problem. I will argue that both claims are unjustified.
The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics is a reformulation of the standard Copenhagen interpretation that aims at incorporating quantum probabilities as part of the axiomatic foundations of the theory. It is not only supposed to equip quantum mechanics with clear criteria of its own experimental verification but, first and foremost, to alleviate one of the stumbling blocks of the theory ‐ the measurement problem. Since the consistent histories interpretation operates with a series of quantum events integrated into one quantum history, the measurement problem is naturally absorbed as one of the events that build up a history. The interpretation rests upon the two following assumptions, proposed already by J. von Neumann: (1) both the microscopic and macroscopic regimes are subject to the same set of quantum laws and (2) a projector operator that is assigned to each event within a history permits to transcribe the history into
This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.