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Lecture notes in computer science

A Separation Between Selective and Full-Identity Security Notions for Identity-Based Encryption

David Galindo

Published Jan 1, 2006• 6 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/11751595_35

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From Selective to Full Security: Semi-Generic Transformations in the Standard Model.

Michel Ferreira Abdalla, Dario Fiore, Vadim Lyubashevsky

In this paper, we propose an efficient, standard model, semi-generic transformation of selectivesecure (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption schemes into fully secure ones. The main step is a procedure that uses admissible hash functions (whose existence is implied by collision-resistant hash functions) to convert any selective-secure wildcarded identity-based encryption (WIBE) scheme into a fully secure (H)IBE scheme. Since building a selective-secure WIBE, especially with a selective-secure HIBE already in hand, is usually much less involved than directly building a fully secure HIBE, this transform already significantly simplifies the latter task. This black-box transformation easily extends to schemes secure in the Continual Memory Leakage (CML) model of Brakerski et al. (FOCS 2010), which allows us obtain a new fully secure IBE in that model. We furthermore show that if a selective-secure HIBE scheme satisfies a particular security notion, then it can be generically transformed into a selective-secure WIBE. We demonstrate that several current schemes already fit this new definition, while some others that do not obviously satisfy

•Jan 1, 2012•0 citations
In this paper, we propose an efficient, standard model, semi-generic transformation of selectivesecure (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption schemes into fully secure ones. The main step is a procedure that uses admissible hash functions (whose existence is implied by collision-resistant hash functions) to convert any selective-secure wildcarded identity-based encryption (WIBE) scheme into a fully secure (H)IBE scheme. Since building a selective-secure WIBE, especially with a selective-secure HIBE already in hand, is usually much less involved than directly building a fully secure HIBE, this transform already significantly simplifies the latter task. This black-box transformation easily extends to schemes secure in the Continual Memory Leakage (CML) model of Brakerski et al. (FOCS 2010), which allows us obtain a new fully secure IBE in that model. We furthermore show that if a selective-secure HIBE scheme satisfies a particular security notion, then it can be generically transformed into a selective-secure WIBE. We demonstrate that several current schemes already fit this new definition, while some others that do not obviously satisfy