Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Security Analysis of Two Distance-Bounding Protocols

Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh

Published Jan 1, 2012• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-25286-0_7

Related papers

A Secure Distance Bounding Protocol with Two-Bit Challenges

Jingxian Zhou

Journal of Computational and Theoretical Nanoscience•Oct 24, 2017•0 citations

Security Aspects of Distance-Bounding Protocols

Vom Fachbereich

•Jan 1, 2012•0 citations

Formal Analysis of Distance Bounding with Secure Hardware

Handan Kılınç, Serge Vaudenay B

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2018•5 citations

Analysis and Design of Distance-Bounding Protocols for RFID

Xin Wei, Huiping Sun, Chen Zhong

Journal of Computer Research and Development•Nov 15, 2013•4 citations

Security Analysis of the Distance Bounding Protocol Proposed by Jannati and Falahati

Fatemeh Baghernejad, Nasour Bagheri, Masoumeh Safkhani

In this paper, the security of a distance bounding protocol is analyzed which has been recently proposed by Jannati and Falahati (so-called JF). We prove that an adversary can recover key bits of JF protocol with probability of “1” while the complexity of attack is “2n” runs of protocol. In addition, we propose an improved protocol and prove that the improved protocol is resistant to mafia fraud attack, distance fraud attack and key recovery attack.

•Jul 1, 2014•5 citations

Secure Distance Bounding Verification using Physical-Channel Properties

Hadi Ahmadi, Reihaneh Safavi–Naini

We consider the problem of distance bounding verification (DBV), where a proving party claims a distance and a verifying party ensures that the prover is within the claimed distance. Current approaches to "secure" distance estimation use signal's time of flight, which requires the verifier to have an accurate clock. We study secure DBV using physical channel properties as an alternative to time measurement. We consider a signal propagation environment that attenuates signal as a function of distance, and then corrupts it by an additive noise. We consider three attacking scenarios against DBV, namely distance fraud (DFA), mafia fraud (MFA) and terrorist fraud (TFA) attacks. We show it is possible to construct efficient DBV protocols with DFA and MFA security, even against an unbounded adversary; on the other hand, it is impossible to design TFA-secure protocols without time measurement, even with a computationally-bounded adversary. We however provide a TFA-secure construction under the condition that the adversary's communication capability is limited to the bounded retrieval model (BRM). We use numerical analysis to examine the communication complexity of the introduced DBV protocols. We discuss our results and give directions for future research.

arXiv:1303.0346•Mar 2, 2013•2 citations
We consider the problem of distance bounding verification (DBV), where a proving party claims a distance and a verifying party ensures that the prover is within the claimed distance. Current approaches to "secure" distance estimation use signal's time of flight, which requires the verifier to have an accurate clock. We study secure DBV using physical channel properties as an alternative to time measurement. We consider a signal propagation environment that attenuates signal as a function of distance, and then corrupts it by an additive noise. We consider three attacking scenarios against DBV, namely distance fraud (DFA), mafia fraud (MFA) and terrorist fraud (TFA) attacks. We show it is possible to construct efficient DBV protocols with DFA and MFA security, even against an unbounded adversary; on the other hand, it is impossible to design TFA-secure protocols without time measurement, even with a computationally-bounded adversary. We however provide a TFA-secure construction under the condition that the adversary's communication capability is limited to the bounded retrieval model (BRM). We use numerical analysis to examine the communication complexity of the introduced DBV protocols. We discuss our results and give directions for future research.