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IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Message authentication with correlated sources

Daming Cao, Wei Kang

Published Jun 1, 2015• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of message authentication with two correlated sources observed by the legitimate transmitter and receiver as secret information. We consider an active adversary capable of the impersonation attack and the substitution attack. We are interested in minimizing the maximum probability of successful deception under the two attacks, where the minimization is over all authentication schemes by the legitimate transmitter and receiver and the maximization is over all attack strategies by the adversary. We propose a random coding based authentication scheme and obtain upper bound on the solutions of the above min-max problem for both attacks. We also show that the proposed random coding based scheme outperforms the separation-based scheme, i.e., private-key generation first using the correlated sources and then authentication with the private key. Finally, for the impersonation attack, we obtain a lower bound, which meet the upper bound. Therefore, we solve the min-max problem and characterize the optimal performance of the authentication system under impersonation attacks.

DOI
10.1109/isit.2015.7282994

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In this paper, we study the problem of message authentication with two correlated sources observed by the legitimate transmitter and receiver as secret information. We consider an active adversary capable of the impersonation attack and the substitution attack. We are interested in minimizing the maximum probability of successful deception under the two attacks, where the minimization is over all authentication schemes by the legitimate transmitter and receiver and the maximization is over all attack strategies by the adversary. We propose a random coding based authentication scheme and obtain upper bound on the solutions of the above min-max problem for both attacks. We also show that the proposed random coding based scheme outperforms the separation-based scheme, i.e., private-key generation first using the correlated sources and then authentication with the private key. Finally, for the impersonation attack, we obtain a lower bound, which meet the upper bound. Therefore, we solve the min-max problem and characterize the optimal performance of the authentication system under impersonation attacks.
An authentication counterpart of Wyner's study of the wiretap channel is developed in this work. More specifically, message authentication over noisy channels is studied while impersonation and substitution attacks are investigated for both single- and multiple-message scenarios. For each scenario, information-theoretic lower and upper bounds on the opponent's success, or cheating, probability are derived. Remarkably, in both scenarios, the lower and upper bounds are shown to match, and hence, the fundamental limits on message authentication over noisy channels are fully characterized. The opponent's success probability is further shown to be smaller than that derived in the classical noiseless channel model. These results rely on a novel authentication scheme in which shared key information is used to provide simultaneous protection against both types of attacks. Finally, message authentication for the case in which the source and receiver possess only correlated sequences is studied.
We consider the problem of keyless message authentication over noisy channels in the presence of an active adversary. Different from the existing models, in our model, the legitimate users do not have any pre-shared key for authentication. Instead, we use the noisy channel connecting the legitimate users for authentication. The main idea is to utilize the noisy channel connecting the legitimate users to distinguish a legitimate message from a fake message, by generating an output at the receiver that is difficult for the adversary to replicate through its noisy channel. By interpreting the message authentication as a hypothesis testing problem, we investigate the authentication exponent and the authenticated channel capacity of the noisy channel. In the authentication exponent problem, for a given message rate, we investigate the speed at which the optimal successful attack probability can be driven to zero. We fully characterize the authentication exponent for the zero-rate message case and provide both an upper bound and a lower bound on the exponent for the non-zero message rate case. In the authenticated capacity problem, we study the largest data transmission rate under which the attacker's optimal successful attack probability can still be made arbitrarily small. We establish an all or nothing result. In particular, we show that the authenticated channel capacity is the same as the classic channel capacity if a simulatability condition is not satisfied, while the authenticated capacity will be zero if this condition is satisfied. We also provide efficient algorithms to check this condition. We further show that our results are robust to modeling uncertainties about the eavesdropper's channels.
Message authentication allows the receiver of a message to detect whether the message is forged or illegally modified by someone other than the legitimate sender.Traditional message authentication schemes are typically implemented at the network layer or higher,which are vulnerable to security threats such as replay attacks,denial of service attacks and so forth.Based on the existing schemes based on the physical layer,this paper proposes a message authentication scheme using the Minimum Mean Square Error(MMSE) method for estimation of channels under the Gaussian vector multiple-input channel model.An optimal attack strategy for the eavesdropper is also formulated,and determines the reachable secrecy boundary according to the probabilities of successful attacks of the eavesdropper.By using the information theory to analyze the maximum security authentication rate of the channel,the secrecy capacity domain of the channel is obtained.Experimental results show that the average probability of successful attack of the eavesdropper decreases exponentially with the increased number of received messages.When the spatial correlation coefficients between all senders and the eavesdropper are lower than 0.3,the average probability of successful attack of the eavesdropper is less than 1.87×10-7,which verifies the security of the proposed scheme.
We consider the problem of authenticated communication over a discrete arbitrarily varying channel where the legitimate parties are unaware of whether or not an adversary is present. When there is no adversary, the channel state always takes a default value ∅. When the adversary is present, they may choose the channel state sequence based on a non-causal noisy view of the transmitted codewords and the encoding and decoding scheme. We require that the decoder output the correct message with a high probability when there is no adversary, and either output the correct message or reject the transmission when the adversary is present. Further, we allow the transmitter to employ private randomness during encoding that is known neither to the receiver nor the adversary. Our first result proves a dichotomy property for the capacity for this problem – the capacity either equals zero or it equals the non-adversarial capacity of the channel. Next, we give a sufficient condition for the capacity for this problem to be positive even when the non-adversarial channel to the receiver is stochastically degraded with respect to the channel to the adversary. Our proofs rely on a connection to a standalone authentication problem, where the goal is to accept or reject a candidate message that is already available to the decoder. Finally, we give examples and compare our sufficient condition with other related conditions known in the literature.
User authentication (UA) supports the receiver in deciding whether a message comes from either the claimed transmitter or an impersonating attacker. Information-theoretically secure authentication can be implemented by using either a secret (symmetric key) shared between both the legitimate users or the transmission medium over which the message is transmitted [physical-layer authentication (PLA)]. We analyze these solutions when the physical-layer channel is the unique randomness source for either generating the key or performing PLA. For the symmetric-key-based UA approach, we resort to a secret key agreement. Moreover, we also consider an asymmetric-key-based UA based on the public-key (proven to be semantically secure), where the channel is used as an entropy source at one device only. We define the secure authentication rate at which the probability that the UA attack succeeds goes to zero as the number of independent and identically distributed variables describing how the channel goes to infinity. Both passive and active attacks are considered, and by numerical results, we compare the various UA schemes.
We study the secret-key capacity in a joint source-channel coding setup-the terminals are connected over a discrete memoryless channel and have access to side information, modelled as a pair of discrete memoryless source sequences. As our main result, we establish the upper and lower bounds on the secret-key capacity. In the lower bound expression, the equivocation terms of the source and channel components are functionally additive even though the coding scheme generates a single secret-key by jointly taking into account the source and channel equivocations. Our bounds coincide, thus establishing the capacity, when the underlying wiretap channel can be decomposed into a set of independent, parallel, and reversely degraded channels. For the case of parallel Gaussian channels and jointly Gaussian sources we show that Gaussian codebooks achieve the secret-key capacity. In addition, when the eavesdropper also observes a correlated side information sequence, we establish the secret-key capacity when both the source and channel of the eavesdropper are a degraded version of the legitimate receiver. We finally also treat the case when a public discussion channel is available, propose a separation based coding scheme, and establish its optimality when the channel output symbols of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are conditionally independent given the input.