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History of Problem, Cooperstock is Wrong. Dmitri Martila
Published Feb 1, 2015 • 0 citations
Abstract Dear readers, the picture of Physics lefts you in confusion. The prime example is refutation of black holes in 2014, Phys.Lett.B 738, 61–7 by Laura, a Professor. I have arguments against her paper, but perhaps I am the only one, who is worried. They keep bringing things forward, which are thought to be refuted and over refuted. Another example of mind blowing is the Dr. Cooperstock. First his attempt was to deny the Standards of Metrology (within Energy Localization hypothesis). I have arguments against his idea. Then he came up with another mind abuse: absence of long detected Dark Matter. In the following I am defending the Dark Matter from the nihilistic aggression of Dr. Cooperstock. Speaking of nihilism, the most grim picture is in Quantum Mechanics of Niels Bohr. In 2015 they have proved in elitist Nature, that Shrodinger's Cat is real. Thus, the world does not exist: a thing can not both be and not be. It is very convenient now: if even a grain of sand is crazy hallucination (like the proven reality of undead cat), then this non-existent grain needs no divine (loved, but more often hated) Creator. The reason of delusion: they have missed an intelligent factors, e.g. evil spirits, which very often act on the measuring device. Recall the wrong alarms in atomic armies.
Related papers More on the quantum measurement problem
Gregory N. Derry
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today • Nov 1, 2022• 2 citations
Mermin habitually answers opinions, real and abstract
Philip Pearle
David Mermin cautions against taking our “most successful abstractions to be real properties of our world.” I think he has set up a straw man. To me, the tenable realist position is not that our concepts are real but rather that they have a correspondence to reality: There can be many such correspondences, each with its utility, none capturing reality—whatever that is.I am not surprised he uses that argument to bolster the position “that quantum states are calculational devices.” In the vein of the disagreement about reality he cites, between Bishop Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, I recall a similar disagreement, between Mermin and John Bell, concerning the foundations of quantum theory. It took place at a meeting in Erice, Italy, in August 1989. Bell had finished his now famous talk “Against ‘Measurement,’ “ in which he argued that there is something wrong with quantum theory, that its rules of application are ill-defined. 1 1. J. Bell, Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty, A. Miller, ed., Plenum, New York (1990), p. 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-8771-8_3 reproduced in Phys. World 3, 33 (August 1990). He introduced the acronym FAPP, meaning that quantum theory is good “for all practical purposes” but insufficient for a truly fundamental theory. In the question-and-answer session, Mermin gave an argument not unlike the one in his Reference Frame. When he was done, Bell replied, “FAPPtrap,” and that was that.Mermin says that if one takes his view, it “can diminish the motivation for theoretical or experimental searches for a ‘mechanism’ underlying … the ‘collapse of the wavefunction’—searches that make life harder than it needs to be.” But why would one want to diminish such motivation? Might not the deficiencies of quantum theory elucidated by Bell be a clue to some deeper theory? And is that not good for physics? Certainly, in this generation, in which we did not predict the acceleration of the universe nor know the nature of dark energy or dark matter, we should have the humility to think that perhaps we do not yet have the “final” quantum theory. For example, in standard quantum theory, how or why an event occurs is a complete mystery. Nature determines an outcome, but we are told it is impossible for us to understand that in terms of anything deeper. Things happen for no reason at all. Why should we follow Mermin’s advice and not try to do better?In my own work and that of Gian-Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber, we have developed what is called a dynamical theory of wave-function collapse (continuous spontaneous localization, or CSL). 2 2. Two reviews are P. Pearle in Open Systems and Measurement in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory, H. P. Breuer, F. Petruccionne, eds., Springer, Berlin (1999), p. 195 and A. Bassi, G. C. Ghirardi, Phys. Rep. 379, 257 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-1573(03)00103-0 To Schrödinger’s equation, a term is added that describes the interaction of matter with a randomly fluctuating field, so that a state vector in a superposition of macroscopically different states rapidly evolves to one of them. The final state describes the world as we see it. Therefore, the state vector can be said to correspond to reality and not be merely a computational device. Bell regarded CSL as an example of a well-defined theory, which overcomes his objections to standard quantum theory. Moreover, it provides a mechanism, a description, for the occurrence of events. And it makes some predictions that differ from those of standard quantum theory, so it is experimentally testable. Experiments so far have shown that the coupling of random field to matter must be mass proportional, but otherwise they have neither confirmed CSL nor denied it. This is a good thing, and that such attempts should not be discouraged, as Mermin’s article does, was underlined by Richard Feynman, who said in 1964,We have to find a new view of the world that has to agree with everything that is known, but disagree in its predictions somewhere, otherwise it is not interesting. And in that disagreement it must agree with nature. If you can find any other view of the world which agrees over the entire range where things have already been observed, but disagrees somewhere else, you have made a great discovery. It is very nearly impossible, but not quite, to find any theory which agrees with experiments over the entire range in which all theories have been checked, and yet gives different consequences in some other range, even a theory whose different consequences do not turn out to agree with nature. 3 3. R. Feynman, in The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1970), p. 171. REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. Bell, Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty, A. Miller, ed., Plenum, New York (1990), p. 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-8771-8_3 , Google ScholarCrossrefreproduced in Phys. World 3, 33 (August 1990). , Google Scholar2. Two reviews are P. Pearle in Open Systems and Measurement in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory, H. P. Breuer, F. Petruccionne, eds., Springer, Berlin (1999), p. 195 and , Google ScholarCrossref A. Bassi, G. C. Ghirardi, Phys. Rep. 379, 257 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-1573(03)00103-0 , , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. R. Feynman, in The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1970), p. 171. Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today • Sep 1, 2009• 0 citations
Do Your Thoughts Matter? Because They Are Made Of Matter? An Exploration On The Mind Body Problem Through The Lenses Of Philosophy, Neuropsychology, and Quantum Physics
Erica Mickey
In the late 21th century, the concept of Quantum Consciousness arose, joining theories and concepts from the disciplines of Philosophy, Neuropsychology, and Quantum Physics. The Preface of Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics (Henry P. Stapp. 1993) states, “Nature appears to be composed of two completely different kinds of things; rock-like things and idea-like things. The first is epitomized by an enduring rock, the second by a fleeting thought. A rock can be experienced by many of us together, while a thought seems to be long to one of us alone” (Stapp, 1993 p. vii). Stapp refers to the mind-body problem, not as a problem, but as a connection; the mind-body connection. Descartes believed the mind and body could be separate and act separately. Stapp embellishes Descartes philosophy of “I think, therefore I am” through Quantum Physics by connecting the mind to the body; calling it the mind-body connection. Stapp states that nature is composed of two different things, rock-like things and idea-like things. I believe that rock-like things and idea-like things do not differ, but are one and the same. This paper explores the philosophies of Descartes, the contents of a thought and the ways in which neuropsychology and Quantum Physics help illuminate the question: do thoughts contain matter?
• Jan 1, 2014• 0 citations
Dear readers, the picture of Physics lefts you in confusion. The prime example is refutation of black holes in 2014, Phys.Lett.B 738, 61–7 by Laura, a Professor. I have arguments against her paper, but perhaps I am the only one, who is worried. They keep bringing things forward, which are thought to be refuted and over refuted. Another example of mind blowing is the Dr. Cooperstock. First his attempt was to deny the Standards of Metrology (within Energy Localization hypothesis). I have arguments against his idea. Then he came up with another mind abuse: absence of long detected Dark Matter. In the following I am defending the Dark Matter from the nihilistic aggression of Dr. Cooperstock. Speaking of nihilism, the most grim picture is in Quantum Mechanics of Niels Bohr. In 2015 they have proved in elitist Nature, that Shrodinger's Cat is real. Thus, the world does not exist: a thing can not both be and not be. It is very convenient now: if even a grain of sand is crazy hallucination (like the proven reality of undead cat), then this non-existent grain needs no divine (loved, but more often hated) Creator. The reason of delusion: they have missed an intelligent factors, e.g. evil spirits, which very often act on the measuring device. Recall the wrong alarms in atomic armies.
An example of mind blowing is the Dr. Cooperstock. First his attempt was to deny the Standards of Metrology (within Energy Localization hypothesis). I have arguments against his idea. Then he came up with another mind abuse: absence of long detected Dark Matter. In the following I am defending the Dark Matter from the nihilistic aggression of Dr. Cooperstock. Speaking of nihilism, the most grim picture is in Quantum Mechanics of Niels Bohr. In 2015 they have proved in elitist Nature, that Schrodinger's Cat is real. Thus, the world does not exist: a thing can not both be and not be. It is very convenient now: if even a grain of sand is crazy hallucination (like the proven reality of undead cat), then this non-existent grain needs no divine (loved, but more often hated) Creator. The reason of delusion: they have missed an intelligent factors, e.g. evil spirits, which very often act on the measuring device. Recall the wrong alarms in atomic armies.
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
David Mermin cautions against taking our “most successful abstractions to be real properties of our world.” I think he has set up a straw man. To me, the tenable realist position is not that our concepts are real but rather that they have a correspondence to reality: There can be many such correspondences, each with its utility, none capturing reality—whatever that is.I am not surprised he uses that argument to bolster the position “that quantum states are calculational devices.” In the vein of the disagreement about reality he cites, between Bishop Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, I recall a similar disagreement, between Mermin and John Bell, concerning the foundations of quantum theory. It took place at a meeting in Erice, Italy, in August 1989. Bell had finished his now famous talk “Against ‘Measurement,’ “ in which he argued that there is something wrong with quantum theory, that its rules of application are ill-defined. 1 1. J. Bell, Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty, A. Miller, ed., Plenum, New York (1990), p. 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-8771-8_3 reproduced in Phys. World 3, 33 (August 1990). He introduced the acronym FAPP, meaning that quantum theory is good “for all practical purposes” but insufficient for a truly fundamental theory. In the question-and-answer session, Mermin gave an argument not unlike the one in his Reference Frame. When he was done, Bell replied, “FAPPtrap,” and that was that.Mermin says that if one takes his view, it “can diminish the motivation for theoretical or experimental searches for a ‘mechanism’ underlying … the ‘collapse of the wavefunction’—searches that make life harder than it needs to be.” But why would one want to diminish such motivation? Might not the deficiencies of quantum theory elucidated by Bell be a clue to some deeper theory? And is that not good for physics? Certainly, in this generation, in which we did not predict the acceleration of the universe nor know the nature of dark energy or dark matter, we should have the humility to think that perhaps we do not yet have the “final” quantum theory. For example, in standard quantum theory, how or why an event occurs is a complete mystery. Nature determines an outcome, but we are told it is impossible for us to understand that in terms of anything deeper. Things happen for no reason at all. Why should we follow Mermin’s advice and not try to do better?In my own work and that of Gian-Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber, we have developed what is called a dynamical theory of wave-function collapse (continuous spontaneous localization, or CSL). 2 2. Two reviews are P. Pearle in Open Systems and Measurement in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory, H. P. Breuer, F. Petruccionne, eds., Springer, Berlin (1999), p. 195 and A. Bassi, G. C. Ghirardi, Phys. Rep. 379, 257 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-1573(03)00103-0 To Schrödinger’s equation, a term is added that describes the interaction of matter with a randomly fluctuating field, so that a state vector in a superposition of macroscopically different states rapidly evolves to one of them. The final state describes the world as we see it. Therefore, the state vector can be said to correspond to reality and not be merely a computational device. Bell regarded CSL as an example of a well-defined theory, which overcomes his objections to standard quantum theory. Moreover, it provides a mechanism, a description, for the occurrence of events. And it makes some predictions that differ from those of standard quantum theory, so it is experimentally testable. Experiments so far have shown that the coupling of random field to matter must be mass proportional, but otherwise they have neither confirmed CSL nor denied it. This is a good thing, and that such attempts should not be discouraged, as Mermin’s article does, was underlined by Richard Feynman, who said in 1964,We have to find a new view of the world that has to agree with everything that is known, but disagree in its predictions somewhere, otherwise it is not interesting. And in that disagreement it must agree with nature. If you can find any other view of the world which agrees over the entire range where things have already been observed, but disagrees somewhere else, you have made a great discovery. It is very nearly impossible, but not quite, to find any theory which agrees with experiments over the entire range in which all theories have been checked, and yet gives different consequences in some other range, even a theory whose different consequences do not turn out to agree with nature. 3 3. R. Feynman, in The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1970), p. 171. REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. Bell, Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty, A. Miller, ed., Plenum, New York (1990), p. 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-8771-8_3 , Google ScholarCrossrefreproduced in Phys. World 3, 33 (August 1990). , Google Scholar2. Two reviews are P. Pearle in Open Systems and Measurement in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory, H. P. Breuer, F. Petruccionne, eds., Springer, Berlin (1999), p. 195 and , Google ScholarCrossref A. Bassi, G. C. Ghirardi, Phys. Rep. 379, 257 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-1573(03)00103-0 , , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. R. Feynman, in The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1970), p. 171. Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.
In the late 21th century, the concept of Quantum Consciousness arose, joining theories and concepts from the disciplines of Philosophy, Neuropsychology, and Quantum Physics. The Preface of Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics (Henry P. Stapp. 1993) states, “Nature appears to be composed of two completely different kinds of things; rock-like things and idea-like things. The first is epitomized by an enduring rock, the second by a fleeting thought. A rock can be experienced by many of us together, while a thought seems to be long to one of us alone” (Stapp, 1993 p. vii). Stapp refers to the mind-body problem, not as a problem, but as a connection; the mind-body connection. Descartes believed the mind and body could be separate and act separately. Stapp embellishes Descartes philosophy of “I think, therefore I am” through Quantum Physics by connecting the mind to the body; calling it the mind-body connection. Stapp states that nature is composed of two different things, rock-like things and idea-like things. I believe that rock-like things and idea-like things do not differ, but are one and the same. This paper explores the philosophies of Descartes, the contents of a thought and the ways in which neuropsychology and Quantum Physics help illuminate the question: do thoughts contain matter?
The concept of "reality" is often raised in the context of philosophical foundations of physics or interpretations of quantum mechanics. When this term is so raised, it is a warning to me that I am about to be led down a rabbit hole. Such diversions usually lead nowhere unless you consider endless discussions of Schrodinger's cat, wave function collapse, quantum non-locality, and parallel universes to be useful. A prime example is the famous Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen paper wherein they concluded that the quantum wave function cannot provide a complete description of physical reality. In this essay I suggest that, in physics discourse, the term "reality" should be avoided at all costs.