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Complex Systems

Demystifying Quantum Mechanics---A Simple Universe with Quantum Uncertainty

Gary L. Drescher

Published Dec 1, 1988• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

An artificial universe is defined that has entirely deterministic laws with exclusively local interactions, and that exhibits the fundamental quantum uncertainty phenomenon: superposed states mutually interfere, but only to the extent that no observation distinguishes among them. Showing how such a universe could be elucidates interpretational issues of actual quantum mechanics. The artificial universe is a much-simplified version of Everett's real-world model (the so-called multiple-worlds formulation). In the artificial world, as in Everett's model, the tradeoff between interference and observation is deducible from the universe formalism. Artificial world examples analogous to the quantum double-slit experiment and the EPR experiment are presented.

Related papers

One World, One Reality, and the Everett Relaltive State Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Paul L. Csonka

We modify the Relative State Interpretation (RSI) of Quantum Mechanics so that it does not imply many worlds and parallel realities. We drop the assumption that probability amplitudes correspond one-to-one with reality: Not all information is contained in amplitudes, and not all amplitudes need be realized. Amplitudes do not "collapse" after a measurement, but evolve continuously, including unrealized ones. After each "event" only one possible outcome is realized. Therefore, if a value is measured, that value is real, all others are not; there is only one reality and one world. Reality content is "quantized" : unity for realized outcomes, zero for all others. It is "conserved": can move along any possible sequence of events, but only one at a time. The modified RSI is is strictly deterministic in the sense that the "global" probability amplitudes of the universe are determined for all times by the laws of physics and the initial conditions. They guide all events. But it is not deterministic in the sense that from the amplitudes one can not predict which outcome actually happens; that represents new information that accumulates as history unfolds. To the extent that information is part of the physical world, the coming into being of the universe is ongoing, even after the Big Bang. All predictions of the two versions agree, except possibly in esoteric, untested cases.

arXiv:0901.4580•Jan 28, 2009•2 citations

Schrödinger Cat's Experiment's Interpretation and Parallel Universe or Multiple Universes

Rupak Bhattacharya, Pranab Kumar Bhattacharya, Upasana Bhattacharya +7 more

Quantum mechanics provides us most fundamental descriptions of our most early universe, but there is a long-standing debate amongst theoretical physicists about what all these mathematics really mean in real world? The present three-dimensional (3D) universe, we humans experience daily since our birth, is probably just one of an enormous numbers of essentially classical worlds, and all quantum phenomena arise from a universal force of repulsions that prevented many universes (Multiverse) from having identical physical configurations like ours. Probabilities arise only because of our human ignorance as to which in our world an observer occupies a position in space time. This picture is all that is needed to explain bizarre quantum effects such as particles that can tunnel through solid barriers and wave behavior in double-slit experiments or in a warm hole. Our many-interacting-universes approach hinges on our assumption that interactions between deterministically evolving worlds cause all quantum effects. Each world is simply the position of particles in three-dimensional space time, and each would evolve according to Newton’s laws, if there were no inter world interactions. A surprising feature of human approach was that the formulation contains nothing that corresponds to the mysterious quantum wave functions, except in the formal mathematical limit in which the number of worlds becomes infinitely large. Conversely, Newtonian mechanics corresponds to the opposite limit of just one world. Thus, our approach should incorporate both classical and quantum theory. As few as two interacting worlds can result in quantum like effects, such as tunneling through a barrier. Many interacting worlds theory (MIW) explains that rather than standing apart, an infinite number of universes in the early time shared the same space and time as ours. They show that the theory can explain quantum mechanical effects while leaving open the choice of theory to explain the universe at large scales. This is a fascinating new variant of multiverse theory that, in a sense, creates not just a doppelganger of everyone but an infinite number of them all overlaying each other in the same space and time. The fine tuning of parameters required to reproduce our present day universe suggests that our universe may simply be a region within an eternally inflating super-region. Many other regions beyond our observable universe might have existed in earlier times with each such universe governed by a different set of physical parameters and laws. Collision between these regions, if they occurred, should have left signatures of anisotropy in the cosmic microwave background (CMB) but have not been seen yet. We assess different mechanisms for this residual emission and conclude that although there is a 30% probability that noise fluctuations may cause foregrounds to fall within 3σ of the excess, there is less than a 0.5% probability that foregrounds can explain all the excess. A plausible explanation is that the collision of our universe with an alternate universe, whose baryon to photon ratio is a factor of ∼ 4500 larger than ours, could produce enhanced Hydrogen Paschen-series emission at the epoch of recombination. Future spectral mapping and deeper observations at 100 and 217 GHz are needed to mitigate systematics arising from unknown galactic foregrounds and to confirm this unusual hypothesis. After careful analysis of the spectrum of the CMB, Chary et al. found a signal that was about 4500x brighter than it should have been, based on the number of protons and electrons. Scientists believe that this existed in the very early universe. Indeed, this particular signal, an emission line that arose from the formation of atoms during the era of recombination is more consistent with a universe whose ratio of matter particles to photons is about 65x greater than our own. There is a 30% chance that this mysterious signal is just noise, and not really, a signal at all; however, it is also possible that it is real, and exists as a parallel universe. Keywords : Quantum mechanics, multiverse, Newtonian mechanics Cite this Article Pranab Kumar Bhattacharya, et al . Schrodinger Cat's Experiment's Interpretation and Parallel Universe or Multiple Universes. Research and Reviews: Journal of Space Science and Technology. 2016; 5(1): 35–52p.

•May 16, 2016•0 citations

Reality in Superposition: Quantum Mechanics

Lev Reyzin

This chapter introduces quantum mechanics through the experimental discoveries that revealed the limits of classical physics. Beginning with the historical debate over whether light is a wave or a particle, it examines Young’s double-slit experiment and its modern single-particle versions, which demonstrate that quantum objects can exist in superpositions of mutually exclusive states. The chapter explains how interference arises when alternative possibilities are not measured and how interaction with the environment suppresses these effects through decoherence, giving rise to classical behavior at macroscopic scales. A sequence of thought experiments involving interferometers and Stern–Gerlach devices highlights the counterintuitive structure of quantum measurement and the incompatibility of certain physical properties, as captured by the uncertainty principle. The chapter emphasizes that quantum mechanics does not describe particles taking multiple paths simultaneously in a classical sense but rather requires a new framework for probability based on amplitudes and interference. Finally, the discussion connects these foundational ideas to emerging technologies such as quantum computing, showing how superposition and entanglement can be harnessed to perform computations that have no classical analogue.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 21, 2026•0 citations

Quantum mechanics: how to use Everett theory practically

Yves Pomeau, Martine Le Berre

Among theories of the physical world, quantum mechanics remains a topic of lively discussions on its so-called interpretation. For some it remains an open question to understand how deterministic equations of this theory, as established long ago, may combine with a fundamental uncertainty. We consider the process of spontaneous emission by an atom interacting with infinite number of degrees of freedom of the electromagnetic field. There is uncertainty in the evolution of the photo-emission process which was characterized as Markovian by using the equations of quantum mechanics when the decay of the atom is due to the coupling with the vacuum field. The Markovian property leads us naturally to describe spontaneous emission by using the classical Kolmogorov equation for the probability evolution of a parameter defining the state of the atom. We explain that Everett’s many-worlds interpretation weld together our description, and appears therefore as a consequence of the equations of quantum mechanics, that solves in this case the riddle of deterministic equations describing random events.

EPJ Web of Conferences•Jan 1, 2022•2 citations

Quantum erasing the nature of reality: or, perhaps, the reality of nature?

Paul G. Kwiat, Berthold‐Georg Englert

The quantum measurement problem – how does an apparently "classical" definite world arise out of the random world of quantum superpositions – was and continues to be one of the fundamental philosophical issues in quantum mechanics. What we mean by a classical world, for example, is one in which macroscopic objects are not in superposition states of being simultaneously in several locations at once, and cats are never in coherent superpositions of being alive and dead. This lack of coherence is actually a loss of the coherence that exists at the level of the isolated quanta, but somehow does not survive the transition to the classical level of measuring apparatus. Such incoherent states are known as mixed states. Therefore, to study the quantum–classical interface, or even to investigate whether such an interface exists at all other than in the minds of "classical sympathizers," one should look carefully at mixed states, how they arise and how they behave. Here we describe a set of experiments, both real and gedanken, investigating the subtleties of quantum interference when mixed states are involved. We start by describing the well-known double-slit experiment, and the loss of interference when which-path information can be had.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 22, 2004•12 citations

Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Robert M. Wald

Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations
An artificial universe is defined that has entirely deterministic laws with exclusively local interactions, and that exhibits the fundamental quantum uncertainty phenomenon: superposed states mutually interfere, but only to the extent that no observation distinguishes among them. Showing how such a universe could be elucidates interpretational issues of actual quantum mechanics. The artificial universe is a much-simplified version of Everett's real-world model (the so-called multiple-worlds formulation). In the artificial world, as in Everett's model, the tradeoff between interference and observation is deducible from the universe formalism. Artificial world examples analogous to the quantum double-slit experiment and the EPR experiment are presented.
We modify the Relative State Interpretation (RSI) of Quantum Mechanics so that it does not imply many worlds and parallel realities. We drop the assumption that probability amplitudes correspond one-to-one with reality: Not all information is contained in amplitudes, and not all amplitudes need be realized. Amplitudes do not "collapse" after a measurement, but evolve continuously, including unrealized ones. After each "event" only one possible outcome is realized. Therefore, if a value is measured, that value is real, all others are not; there is only one reality and one world. Reality content is "quantized" : unity for realized outcomes, zero for all others. It is "conserved": can move along any possible sequence of events, but only one at a time. The modified RSI is is strictly deterministic in the sense that the "global" probability amplitudes of the universe are determined for all times by the laws of physics and the initial conditions. They guide all events. But it is not deterministic in the sense that from the amplitudes one can not predict which outcome actually happens; that represents new information that accumulates as history unfolds. To the extent that information is part of the physical world, the coming into being of the universe is ongoing, even after the Big Bang. All predictions of the two versions agree, except possibly in esoteric, untested cases.
Quantum mechanics provides us most fundamental descriptions of our most early universe, but there is a long-standing debate amongst theoretical physicists about what all these mathematics really mean in real world? The present three-dimensional (3D) universe, we humans experience daily since our birth, is probably just one of an enormous numbers of essentially classical worlds, and all quantum phenomena arise from a universal force of repulsions that prevented many universes (Multiverse) from having identical physical configurations like ours. Probabilities arise only because of our human ignorance as to which in our world an observer occupies a position in space time. This picture is all that is needed to explain bizarre quantum effects such as particles that can tunnel through solid barriers and wave behavior in double-slit experiments or in a warm hole. Our many-interacting-universes approach hinges on our assumption that interactions between deterministically evolving worlds cause all quantum effects. Each world is simply the position of particles in three-dimensional space time, and each would evolve according to Newton’s laws, if there were no inter world interactions. A surprising feature of human approach was that the formulation contains nothing that corresponds to the mysterious quantum wave functions, except in the formal mathematical limit in which the number of worlds becomes infinitely large. Conversely, Newtonian mechanics corresponds to the opposite limit of just one world. Thus, our approach should incorporate both classical and quantum theory. As few as two interacting worlds can result in quantum like effects, such as tunneling through a barrier. Many interacting worlds theory (MIW) explains that rather than standing apart, an infinite number of universes in the early time shared the same space and time as ours. They show that the theory can explain quantum mechanical effects while leaving open the choice of theory to explain the universe at large scales. This is a fascinating new variant of multiverse theory that, in a sense, creates not just a doppelganger of everyone but an infinite number of them all overlaying each other in the same space and time. The fine tuning of parameters required to reproduce our present day universe suggests that our universe may simply be a region within an eternally inflating super-region. Many other regions beyond our observable universe might have existed in earlier times with each such universe governed by a different set of physical parameters and laws. Collision between these regions, if they occurred, should have left signatures of anisotropy in the cosmic microwave background (CMB) but have not been seen yet. We assess different mechanisms for this residual emission and conclude that although there is a 30% probability that noise fluctuations may cause foregrounds to fall within 3σ of the excess, there is less than a 0.5% probability that foregrounds can explain all the excess. A plausible explanation is that the collision of our universe with an alternate universe, whose baryon to photon ratio is a factor of ∼ 4500 larger than ours, could produce enhanced Hydrogen Paschen-series emission at the epoch of recombination. Future spectral mapping and deeper observations at 100 and 217 GHz are needed to mitigate systematics arising from unknown galactic foregrounds and to confirm this unusual hypothesis. After careful analysis of the spectrum of the CMB, Chary et al. found a signal that was about 4500x brighter than it should have been, based on the number of protons and electrons. Scientists believe that this existed in the very early universe. Indeed, this particular signal, an emission line that arose from the formation of atoms during the era of recombination is more consistent with a universe whose ratio of matter particles to photons is about 65x greater than our own. There is a 30% chance that this mysterious signal is just noise, and not really, a signal at all; however, it is also possible that it is real, and exists as a parallel universe. Keywords : Quantum mechanics, multiverse, Newtonian mechanics Cite this Article Pranab Kumar Bhattacharya, et al . Schrodinger Cat's Experiment's Interpretation and Parallel Universe or Multiple Universes. Research and Reviews: Journal of Space Science and Technology. 2016; 5(1): 35–52p.
This chapter introduces quantum mechanics through the experimental discoveries that revealed the limits of classical physics. Beginning with the historical debate over whether light is a wave or a particle, it examines Young’s double-slit experiment and its modern single-particle versions, which demonstrate that quantum objects can exist in superpositions of mutually exclusive states. The chapter explains how interference arises when alternative possibilities are not measured and how interaction with the environment suppresses these effects through decoherence, giving rise to classical behavior at macroscopic scales. A sequence of thought experiments involving interferometers and Stern–Gerlach devices highlights the counterintuitive structure of quantum measurement and the incompatibility of certain physical properties, as captured by the uncertainty principle. The chapter emphasizes that quantum mechanics does not describe particles taking multiple paths simultaneously in a classical sense but rather requires a new framework for probability based on amplitudes and interference. Finally, the discussion connects these foundational ideas to emerging technologies such as quantum computing, showing how superposition and entanglement can be harnessed to perform computations that have no classical analogue.
Among theories of the physical world, quantum mechanics remains a topic of lively discussions on its so-called interpretation. For some it remains an open question to understand how deterministic equations of this theory, as established long ago, may combine with a fundamental uncertainty. We consider the process of spontaneous emission by an atom interacting with infinite number of degrees of freedom of the electromagnetic field. There is uncertainty in the evolution of the photo-emission process which was characterized as Markovian by using the equations of quantum mechanics when the decay of the atom is due to the coupling with the vacuum field. The Markovian property leads us naturally to describe spontaneous emission by using the classical Kolmogorov equation for the probability evolution of a parameter defining the state of the atom. We explain that Everett’s many-worlds interpretation weld together our description, and appears therefore as a consequence of the equations of quantum mechanics, that solves in this case the riddle of deterministic equations describing random events.
The quantum measurement problem – how does an apparently "classical" definite world arise out of the random world of quantum superpositions – was and continues to be one of the fundamental philosophical issues in quantum mechanics. What we mean by a classical world, for example, is one in which macroscopic objects are not in superposition states of being simultaneously in several locations at once, and cats are never in coherent superpositions of being alive and dead. This lack of coherence is actually a loss of the coherence that exists at the level of the isolated quanta, but somehow does not survive the transition to the classical level of measuring apparatus. Such incoherent states are known as mixed states. Therefore, to study the quantum–classical interface, or even to investigate whether such an interface exists at all other than in the minds of "classical sympathizers," one should look carefully at mixed states, how they arise and how they behave. Here we describe a set of experiments, both real and gedanken, investigating the subtleties of quantum interference when mixed states are involved. We start by describing the well-known double-slit experiment, and the loss of interference when which-path information can be had.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.