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Lecture notes in computer science

Trading correctness for privacy in unconditional multi-party computation: Extended abstract

Matthias Fitzi, Martin Hirt, Ueli M. Maurer

Published Jan 1, 1998• 73 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bfb0055724

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Trading Correctness for Privacy in Unconditional Multi-Party Computation ? Corrected Version ??

Matthias Fitzi, Martin Hirt, Ueli M. Maurer

This paper improves on the classical results in uncondition- ally secure multi-party computation among a set of n players, by consid- ering a model with three simultaneously occurring types of player cor- ruption: the adversary can actively corrupt (i.e. take full control over) up to ta players and, additionally, can passively corrupt (i.e. read the entire information of) up to tp players and fail-corrupt (i.e. stop the compu- tation of) up to tf other players. The classical results in multi-party computation are for the special cases of only passive (ta = tf =0 ) or only active (tp = tf = 0) corruption. In the passive case, every function can be computed securely if and only if tp <n = 2. In the active case, every function can be computed securely if and only if ta <n =3; when a broadcast channel is available, then this bound is ta <n =2. These bounds are tight. Strictly improving these results, one of our results states that, in addi- tion to tolerating ta <n =3 actively corrupted players, privacy can be guaranteed against every minority, thus tolerating additional tp n=6 passively corrupted players. These protocols require no broadcast and have an exponentially small failure probability. We further show that the bound t<n =2 for passive corruption holds even if the adversary is additionally allowed to make the passively corrupted players fail. Moreover, we characterize completely the achievable thresholds ta, tp and tf for four scenarios. Zero failure probability is achievable if and only if 3ta +2 tp + tf <n ; this holds whether or not a broadcast chan- nel is available. Exponentially small failure probability with a broadcast channel is achievable if and only if 2ta +2 tp +tf <n ; without broadcast, the additional condition 3ta + tf <n is necessary and sucient. In this corrected version, an error pointed out by Damg ard (Dam99) is corrected.

•Jan 1, 1998•0 citations
This paper improves on the classical results in uncondition- ally secure multi-party computation among a set of n players, by consid- ering a model with three simultaneously occurring types of player cor- ruption: the adversary can actively corrupt (i.e. take full control over) up to ta players and, additionally, can passively corrupt (i.e. read the entire information of) up to tp players and fail-corrupt (i.e. stop the compu- tation of) up to tf other players. The classical results in multi-party computation are for the special cases of only passive (ta = tf =0 ) or only active (tp = tf = 0) corruption. In the passive case, every function can be computed securely if and only if tp <n = 2. In the active case, every function can be computed securely if and only if ta <n =3; when a broadcast channel is available, then this bound is ta <n =2. These bounds are tight. Strictly improving these results, one of our results states that, in addi- tion to tolerating ta <n =3 actively corrupted players, privacy can be guaranteed against every minority, thus tolerating additional tp n=6 passively corrupted players. These protocols require no broadcast and have an exponentially small failure probability. We further show that the bound t<n =2 for passive corruption holds even if the adversary is additionally allowed to make the passively corrupted players fail. Moreover, we characterize completely the achievable thresholds ta, tp and tf for four scenarios. Zero failure probability is achievable if and only if 3ta +2 tp + tf <n ; this holds whether or not a broadcast chan- nel is available. Exponentially small failure probability with a broadcast channel is achievable if and only if 2ta +2 tp +tf <n ; without broadcast, the additional condition 3ta + tf <n is necessary and sucient. In this corrected version, an error pointed out by Damg ard (Dam99) is corrected.