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Lecture notes in computer science

On the Resilience of Key Agreement Protocols to Key Compromise Impersonation

Maurizio Adriano Strangio

Published Jan 1, 2006• 38 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/11774716_19

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Almost all the existing identity-based key agreement (ID-KA) protocols cannot achieve both ephemeral secret reveal resilience and pairing-free. In this paper, a pairing-free ID-KA protocol is proposed, which captures all basic desirable security properties including key generation center forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation resilience and ephemeral secrets reveal resistance. On the other hand, the proposed scheme only needs one round communication between the two parties. Compared with the previous ID-KA protocols, the proposed scheme is more secure and efficient.
Now,most of the tripartite authenticated key agreement protocols have been proven to be insecure.We design the new identity-based tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol,it is based on the secure IBE scheme by Peng.This protocol's security based on bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.This protocol could provide known key security,PKG forward secrecy,key-compromise impersonation resilience and unknown key-share resilience,so it's a secure tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol.