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Lecture notes in computer science

On the Security of Pseudorandomized Information-Theoretically Secure Schemes

Koji Nuida, Goichiro Hanaoka

Published Jan 1, 2010• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-14496-7_6

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Pseudorandom permutations are ubiquitous in theoretical and applied cryptography. PRPs that offer security even against adversaries making quantum queries are of increasing interest, and used in applications ranging from constructing pseudorandom unitaries to separating SZK from BQP. A successful framework for constructing classically-secure PRPs is the key-alternating Even-Mansour approach, which interleaves applications of public permutations with additions of round keys. The single-round construction is already classically secure in the ideal permutation model (IPM), with added rounds offering improved concrete security. However, in the quantum-query setting, the status of this framework is presently unclear. A simple quantum-query attack based on Simon's algorithm breaks the one-round cipher. For two or more rounds, security is only known against non-adaptive adversaries who must prepare all queries in advance. In this work, we show that the two-round Even-Mansour cipher is information theoretically secure in the IPM against adversaries making polynomially-many adaptive forward and inverse quantum queries to all available oracles. Our proof uses compressed permutation oracles and a specially crafted isometry relating the ideal and real experiments. We also show that this construction is minimal, in the sense that essentially any cipher constructed via a single call to a public permutation is quantumly insecure.

quant-pharXiv:2609.40350•Oct 1, 2026•0 citations
In this paper, we discuss a naive method of randomness reduction for cryptographic schemes, which replaces the required perfect randomness with output distribution of a computationally secure pseudorandom generator (PRG). We propose novel ideas and techniques for evaluating the indistinguishability between the random and pseudorandom cases, even against an adversary with computationally unbounded attack algorithm. Hence, the PRG-based randomness reduction can be effective even for information-theoretically secure cryptographic schemes, especially when the amount of information received by the adversary is small. In comparison to a preceding result of Dubrov and Ishai (STOC 2006), our result removes the requirement of generalized notion of “nb-PRGs” and is effective for more general kinds of protocols. We give some numerical examples to show the effectiveness of our result in practical situations, and we also propose a further idea for improving the effect of the PRG-based randomness reduction.
This letter proposes a receiver-originated physical-layer secure transmissions scheme (ROST) which consists of two-phase communications. In phase 1, the receiver sends a pseudorandom signal (only known by itself) to the transmitter and in phase 2, the transmitter directly sends out the mixture of its confidential message and the received pseudorandom signal. The receiver could estimate the channel with the help of the pseudorandom signal before cancelling it from the received mixed signal, and finally detect the confidential information. By contrast, the eavesdropper can hardly obtain any confidential information because it cannot estimate the channel without any pilot signal in both phases transmissions and is interfered by the pseudorandom signal. Furthermore, we discuss the secrecy capacity of ROST and show that ROST can always keep the security of the confidential message, achieve much higher secrecy capacity than the traditional scheme, even without any channel information at the transmitter.
A hybrid encryption scheme consists of a public-key part called the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), that is used to generate and establish a shared secret key between two parties, and a (symmetric) secret-key part called the data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) that encrypts the data using the shared key. Hybrid encryption schemes are widely used for securing Internet communication. In this paper, we initiate the study of hybrid encryption in preprocessing model which assumes access to initial correlated variables by all parties (including the eavesdropper), and define information-theoretic KEM (iKEM) that together with a (computationally) secure DEM, results in a hybrid encryption scheme in preprocessing model. We define security of each building block, and prove a composition theorem that guarantees (computational) q-chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) security of the hybrid encryption system if the iKEM and the DEM satisfy q-chosen-encapsulation attack security and one-time security, respectively. We show that an iKEM can be realized by an information-theoretic one-way secret key agreement (OW-SKA) protocol where a single message is transmitted from Alice to Bob, with a new security definition that allowsqqqqueries to Alice. Using a OW-SKA that satisfies this new definition of security, effectively allows the established secret key to be used with a onetime symmetric key encryption system that can be implemented, for example, by XORing the output of a (computationally) secure pseudorandom generator with the message, to provide secure encryption ofqqqarbitrary messages (polynomially bounded length). We discuss our results and directions for future work.
Pseudorandom permutations are ubiquitous in theoretical and applied cryptography. PRPs that offer security even against adversaries making quantum queries are of increasing interest, and used in applications ranging from constructing pseudorandom unitaries to separating SZK from BQP. A successful framework for constructing classically-secure PRPs is the key-alternating Even-Mansour approach, which interleaves applications of public permutations with additions of round keys. The single-round construction is already classically secure in the ideal permutation model (IPM), with added rounds offering improved concrete security. However, in the quantum-query setting, the status of this framework is presently unclear. A simple quantum-query attack based on Simon's algorithm breaks the one-round cipher. For two or more rounds, security is only known against non-adaptive adversaries who must prepare all queries in advance. In this work, we show that the two-round Even-Mansour cipher is information theoretically secure in the IPM against adversaries making polynomially-many adaptive forward and inverse quantum queries to all available oracles. Our proof uses compressed permutation oracles and a specially crafted isometry relating the ideal and real experiments. We also show that this construction is minimal, in the sense that essentially any cipher constructed via a single call to a public permutation is quantumly insecure.